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       Abstract 
The 2009 banking crisis in Nigeria awakened the country on the need for 
effective corporate governance regulation. In a bid to prevent future banking 
crisis in the country, this thesis examines control fraud in the 2009 banking 
crisis using the first five banks involved as a case study. The research 
addresses three major areas of concern: first, it investigates the fraudulent 
activities of the banks’ CEOs in the periods leading to the crisis; second, it 
explores the involvement of other corporate actors in the banking crisis; 
lastly, it examines how corporate governance regulation can be improved to 
reduce the likelihood of future control fraud in the banking sector. 
The research adopts a socio-legal method that links corporate governance 
regulations pre and post banking crisis to the role of corporate actors 
including CEO’s, auditors, shareholders and Regulators in corporate 
governance. The research explores corporate governance as a driver of 
control fraud in Nigerian banks. The research suggests that prevention of 
control fraud is not in itself determined by provision of adequate corporate 
governance regulation but also include a number of enforcement 
mechanisms and contribution of corporate participants, a totality of which 
could help prevent future control frauds in Nigerian banks. 
The research contributes to theory, practice and policy. First, it integrates 
and enhances appropriate literature and knowledge on corporate governance 
regulation in Nigerian banks. Also, by using the concept of control fraud to 
understand the banking crisis of 2009; the research unfolds a relatively new 
type of fraud perpetrated by CEOs in collaboration with other corporate 
individuals. This is the first study of its kind in Nigeria and will be useful 
for future studies to adopt in conducting similar research.
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The research also influences regulators and policy makers by providing a set 
of recommendations for each actor in corporate governance which can be 
incorporated into law in the fight against future control frauds in Nigerian 
banks. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background to the Study 
The topic of corporate governance regulation, particularly following periods 
of financial crisis, has been at the epicentre of debates for scholars across 
various institutions ranging from law to politics, economics and regulatory 
bodies.
1
 The fall of multi-national companies like Enron and Bank of Credit 
and Commerce International (BCCI) due to control fraud have increased 
global concerns on the need for regulation of corporate governance.
2
 
Following the global financial crisis, many public organisations have 
resorted to improving corporate governance standards in a bid to reduce 
fraud.
3
  
In Nigeria, fraud is endemic. The past few decades have witnessed 
significant financial reforms in the Nigerian banking industry in a bid to 
promote greater integrity in the sector. As will be shown in the thesis, fraud 
in the Nigerian banking sector has reached epidemic proportions 
contributing to the country’s economic depression.4  
                                                          
1
 Mehran, H., Morrison, A., Shapiro, J. (2011) ‘Corporate Governance and Banks: What 
have we learned from the Financial Crisis? 502 Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff 
Reports 3  
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr502.pdf accessed 12.12.14 
2
 For instance, Enron was America’s seventh largest firm in market capitalizations by 
August 2002, with its stock price at $90. However, by the time Enron fell, its stock has 
decreased to around 40 cents a share, making it the world’s biggest financial fraud and 
largest audit failure. (Bratton, W., W., (2002) 'Enron and the dark side of shareholder value' 
76 Tulane. Law Review 1275.1335) 
3
 Ibid 
4
 Bolton R.J., Hand D.J., (2002) ‘Statistical Fraud Detection: A Review’ 17 Journal of 
Statistical Science 235-249 
 2 
 
In a speech on consolidation and strengthening of banks, the former Central 
Bank of Nigeria (CBN) governor, Charles Chukwuma Soludo
5
 identified six 
major problems faced by Nigerian banks, which justified the need for 
consolidation. These were: 
1. Weak corporate governance particularly demonstrated by inaccurate 
reporting, non-compliance with regulatory requirements; 
2. Late or non-publication of financial accounts; 
3. Insider abuse leading to a high level of non-performing loans;  
4. Insolvency through negative capital adequacy ratios and eroding 
shareholders’ funds by operating losses;  
5. Weak capital base; and  
6. Over-dependency on deposits from the public.6 
According to him: 
‘The Nigerian banking system faces enormous challenges 
which, if not addressed urgently could snowball into a 
crisis in the near future. We don’t have to wait for the 
crisis to explode before we act. The Nigerian banking 
system today is fragile and marginal. Our vision is a 
banking system that is part of the global change, and 
which is strong, competitive and reliable. It is a banking 
system which depositors can trust, and investors can rely 
upon. Evolving such a banking system is a collective 
                                                                                                                                                   
5
 The number of banks subsequently reduced to 24 following the merger of two. (Heynes, 
S. (2010) ‘Fighting Fraud in Nigeria- What Progress has been made’ 29 KPMG Forensic 
Fighting Fraud, 16-17) 
5
 Charles Chukwuma Soludo was the CBN Governor from 2004-2009 
http://www.cenbank.org/museum/Governors.htm Last accessed 21.10.14 
6
 Charles Chukwuma Soludo, ‘Consolidating the Nigerian banking industry to meet the 
development challenges of the 21st century’ (Special Meeting of the Bankers’ Committee, 
Abuja, 6 July 2004) P. 3   
http://www.bis.org/review/r040727g.pdf accessed 20.12.14 
 3 
 
responsibility of all agents in the Nigerian economy. 
Everyone has a role to play.’7 
The above statement appears to have anticipated the crisis of 2009. What 
then followed was the introduction of a recapitalization scheme by the CBN 
in 2005 with a new minimum share capital requirement of N25Billion 
($167million)
8
, which encouraged larger banks to acquire smaller ones in 
order to meet the requirement. The recapitalization exercise therefore saw 
the consolidation of 89 banks into 25.
9
 It was believed that the CBN 
launched this scheme with the intention of making Nigeria part of the ‘big 
league’ as one of the 20 biggest economies in the world by 2020.10 
However, while it can be said that the CBN governor was right to enumerate 
the ongoing problems and challenges faced by Nigerian banks at the time, 
the consolidation exercise was insufficient to prevent the crisis. What was 
needed was not only an identification of the problems, but an examination 
of the underlying cause of the problems faced by the banks as well as 
solutions to solve them. It was therefore not surprising that on the 14
th
 of 
August 2009, the CBN governor at the time, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, upon 
investigation of five of the existing banks in the country revealed that most 
banks in operation were experiencing financial distress due to fraudulent 
practices and mismanagement of funds.
11
 Five major banks were revealed to 
be in grave distress. These were Oceanic Bank Plc, Intercontinental Bank 
Plc, Afribank, Finbank and Union Bank. As a result, the CEOs and Board of 
                                                          
7
 Ibid 
8 The minimum capital requirement prior to this was N1.0 billion ($7.53 million at the 
time) for existing banks and N2.0 billion ($15.06million) for new banks.  
9
 The number of banks subsequently reduced to 24 following the merger of two. (Heynes, 
S. (2010) ‘Fighting Fraud in Nigeria- What Progress has been made’ 29 KPMG Forensic 
Fighting Fraud, 16-17) 
10
 Otusanya, O. J., Lauwo, S., and Ajibolade, S. O. (2013) ‘An investigation of corporate 
executive fraud by CEOs in the Nigerian banking sector’ 2(1) African Journal of 
Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 65, 69 (Quoting Tell Magazine, 31
st
 August 2009)  
11
 Sanusi Lamido Sanusi ‘Address by the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, Mallam 
Sanusi Lamido Sanusi on Developments on the Banking Sector in Nigeria  (Abuja 14 
August 2009)  
http://www.cenbank.org/Out/speeches/2009/Govadd-14-8-09.pdf  accessed 12.10.14 
 4 
 
Directors of the five banks were fired and replaced
12
 in accordance with 
Sections 33 and 35 of BOFIA 1991.
13
  
Eight interrelated factors were considered to be responsible for the crisis. 
These included macroeconomic instability evidenced by sudden and large 
capital inflows, lack of investor confidence, significant failure in banks’ 
corporate governance, inadequate transparency and disclosure, uneven 
supervision and enforcement, gaps in regulations and regulatory framework, 
un-coordinated management and governance process at the CBN and weak 
business environment.
14
  
It can be said that most of the problems identified in 2004 have reoccurred. 
It can be suggested that the consolidation exercise added to the problem 
rather than solving it. This is because due to the pressure by banks to meet 
up with the new financial requirements and also the need to reflect global 
trends of corporate governance. The extent of fraudulent activities within 
the banks cannot be over-emphasized and how the gaps in regulation as 
identified by the CBN were used to perpetrate fraud. Failure of the 
regulatory framework, that is, Company Law and Corporate Governance 
Codes to prevent the crisis becomes a major concern.  
The CBN governor further acknowledged that the Central Bank as a whole 
lacked a well-structured management procedure which allowed fraud to eat 
deep into the system for a long time, particularly from the consolidation 
period to the point of the crisis. (The period from 2005-2009). This no doubt 
created more room for a web of financial frauds involving various 
                                                          
12
 Ibid 3. 
13
 Now 2004. The combined effect of the Section provides the CBN the right to intervene in 
any bank in distress. 
14
 Sanusi Lamido Sanusi ‘The Nigerian Banking Industry: What went wrong and the way 
forward (Convocation Lecture, Bayero University, Kano, 26 February 2010) 5-11. 
http://www.cenbank.org/OUT/SPEECHES/2010/THE%20NIGERIAN%20BANKING%20
INDUSTRY%20WHAT%20WENT%20WRONG%20AND%20THE%20WAY%20FOR
WARD_FINAL_260210.PDF accessed 22.10.14 
 5 
 
categories of people who used weak corporate governance regulation as a 
means to perpetrate fraud.  
This type of fraud, involving top officials, that is, the CEOs of the banks, as 
well as other accomplices, becomes a carefully organised corporate crime, 
the type identified by William Black as ‘Control Fraud’ where apparently 
legitimate organisations, (in this case, banks) are controlled by financial 
super-predators (The CEOs) who use them as a means to perpetrate fraud.
15
 
The inadequacy of corporate governance practices evidenced by weak 
regulation, lack of transparency and disclosure created the opportunity for 
control fraud to occur. It follows that bad corporate governance creates 
potential for control fraud as there is a link between corporate governance 
and control fraud. 
1.2 Study Aims and Objectives 
In view of the above, the aim of this research is to investigate the banking 
crisis of 2009 using the above named five banks as a case study. The study 
aims to explore why corporate governance regulations failed to prevent the 
control fraud and to suggest ways of improving the regulatory framework in 
order to prevent or at least reduce future control fraud in Nigerian banks.  
The objective of the thesis is to investigate how legal and regulatory 
framework in place was bypassed to the detriment of depositors, creditors, 
shareholders and the general public.  
Nigeria’s corporate governance regime is made up of a combination of 
Laws and Codes. The Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), 1990, 
                                                          
15
 Black, W. K.. (2005) The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One. Texas: University of 
Texas Press William Black was the first person to introduce Control Fraud as a type of 
fraud perpetrated by people who use their control of the company itself as a vehicle for 
fraud. 
 6 
 
governs all companies in Nigeria
16
 while the Banks and Other Financial 
Institutions Act (BOFIA), 1991, is targeted to all banks in the country.
17
 
However, two major regulators in the banking industry have developed 
Codes of corporate governance for banks.
18
 These are the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The 
Codes amongst others are intended to regulate corporate activities within the 
sector.  
The research suggests that the differences between countries will mean that 
corporate governance regulation in any economy should be culture specific 
and in the case of Nigeria, this would mean a number of things, including 
the need to eradicate or reduce corruption, improve enforcement 
mechanisms and encourage more participation from key stakeholders. The 
study aims to look into the fundamental problems in the Nigerian system of 
codes; one of which is the issue of regulatory multiplicity. The conflicts that 
exist between the codes would suggest a lacuna that could allow loopholes 
for the perpetration of fraud. This problem is linked to the fact that the codes 
were copied from developed countries and did not reflect the specific 
configurations of Nigeria.
19
  
The research further suggests the need for a combined code of corporate 
governance in Nigeria that takes into consideration the peculiarities of the 
country and addresses the institutional challenges faced in the system. It is 
important that corporate governance principles are specifically designed to 
                                                          
16
 CAMA, 1990 (Now 2004) 
17
 BOFIA, 1991(Now 2004) 
18
 Code of Corporate Governance for Banks in Nigeria Post Consolidation, 2014; Code of 
Corporate Governance for Public Companies, 2011 
19
 For instance, the CBN Code was copied from the US while the SEC Code was copied 
from the UK. Osemeke, L. And Adegbite, E. 2014, ‘Regulatory Multiplicity and Conflict: 
Towards a Combined Code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria.’ Journal of Business and 
Ethics 8 (referring to one of their focus group respondents) 
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meet the needs of a particular jurisdiction as opposed to transplanting 
western norms.
20
  
The thesis therefore reaches the conclusion that Nigeria’s corporate 
governance is in dire need of reform to address issues that are endemic in 
the society. Corruption is probably impossible to eradicate but can be 
significantly reduced if there is operational unity involving teamwork by all 
participants within the corporate governance system. 
1.3 Why Nigeria? 
This thesis is limited to corporate governance regulation and control fraud in 
Nigerian banks. The choice of Nigeria emanates from the country’s position 
in Africa’s economy which also impacts across the world. 
As the most populated country in Africa with over 183million people and 
the 7
th
 most populated country in the world,
21
 the Nigerian economy is 
largely based on oil production which accounts for about 80% of its Gross 
Domestic Product and more than 90% of its exports.
22
 The Nigerian Stock 
Exchange,
23
 the second largest capital market in Africa
24
 is made up of 260 
public limited companies and total market capitalization of $125 billion.
25
 
The largest Plc, Dangote Group of Companies ranks 1434
th
 position in the 
                                                          
20
 Adegbite, E (2012) ‘Corporate Governance Regulation in Nigeria’ 112(2) Corporate 
Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 257-76  
21
 Source: http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/nigeria-population/ Last 
accessed 13.08.15 
22
 With the second being Agriculture. Source:  
http://www.Mbendi.com.energysector.html Last accessed 06.08.14 
23
Source:http://www.nigeriainvestment.com/doing_business/nigeriastockexchange.html 
Last assessed 27.08.14 
24
 The first being the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE):   
http://www.advfn.com/StockExchanges/about/JSE/JohannesburgStockExchange.html Last 
assessed 27.08.14 
25
 Figures as at the end of 2007. Source: The Nigerian Stock Exchange available at: 
http://www.nigerianstockexchange.com/quoted_companies.jsp Last Accessed 06-08-2011 
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list of the world’s biggest public companies26 with an asset value of $2.1 
Billion and a market value of $12.5 Billion; Nigeria is therefore an 
important player in the global corporate economy. 
Nigeria is however, confronted with a significant problem of corruption and 
fraud. The Annual Comparative list of worldwide corruption known as 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency 
International
27
 in 2010 reveals that on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 
(very clear); Nigeria’s level of corruption is 2.4. Nigeria currently ranks 136 
out of the 175 countries listed on the index.
28
 This level of corruption 
threatens the credibility of the country as a place for inward investment and 
development.  
Furthermore, this thesis focuses on the banking sector as a very important 
player in Nigeria’s corporate world. In 2009, the banking sector was faced 
with a financial crisis, the worst of its kind in the history of Nigerian banks. 
Whilst taking the peculiarities of Nigeria’s institutional structure into 
account, the thesis investigates the activities of the five banks which, upon 
investigation by the CBN were declared to be in grave financial distress in 
2009.
29
 Evidence is limited as to the activities of these banks in the periods 
preceding the crisis. The reason for this is not far-fetched. First, the CBN 
revealed that the level of non-performing loans granted by these five banks 
amounted to 39.9 percent of the total loans in the banking sector.
30
  
                                                          
26
 Source: 
http://www.forbes.com/global2000/#p_144_s_acompanyRankOverall_All_All_All Last 
accessed 06.08.2014 
27
 A non-governmental organisation monitoring corporate and political corruption 
worldwide through the publication of annual corruption perceptions index. Source: 
http://www.transparency.org last accessed 20.08.14 
28
 2014 results. Available at http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results Last accessed 
20.08.15 
29
 These are Oceanic Bank Plc, Intercontinental Bank, Union Bank Plc, Finbank Plc and 
Afribank Plc. 
30
 Otusanya et al (n 10) 70. 
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Furthermore, being the first five banks to be investigated, it is interesting to 
unravel the series of events following the indictment of the CEOs as they 
became subject of public interest due to the grave amount of financial 
misappropriation involved. It is also interesting to examine how the CEOs 
connived with other corporate participants, using both regulatory weakness 
and political affiliation to create a friendly environment for the perpetration 
of control fraud. The wave of activities of the perpetrators becomes 
interesting to examine as a case study in order to understand the link 
between corporate governance regulation and control fraud.  
Also, the periods after the crisis unravelled series of investigations by 
various bodies such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC) as well as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Other 
bodies in the web of corporate governance were also appalled as to how the 
crisis came to be. Shareholders and depositors demanded answers to know 
who was to blame for the crisis which led to the near collapse of the 
Nigerian Stock exchange at the time.
31
 
1.4 Originality 
The research will be a major contribution to the on-going global literature 
on corporate governance; it will also contribute to the limited literature for 
developing countries, particularly Nigeria, and will greatly expand the 
knowledge and understanding of how important appropriate regulation is to 
effective corporate governance. 
                                                          
31
 The banking sector is one of the areas that was hit by the crisis in Nigeria; another major 
sector was the oil and gas sector which is outside the scope of this thesis, however, the 
crisis as a whole saw the near collapse of the Nigerian Stock Exchange, which led to 
concerns regarding the corporate governance regime of the country. Report of the Ad-Hoc 
Committee on Capital Market on the near collapse of the Nigerian Stock Exchange.  
http://proshareng.com/news/download.php?item=AdHocCommitteeonCapMktReport19%2
5200712.pdf accessed 17.12.14 
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The research aims to examine corporate governance regulation through the 
lens of control fraud, the first study of its kind in Nigeria. The thesis is the 
first study to use the lens of control fraud to explore the Nigerian banking 
crisis by providing an exposition of the activities of major participants in the 
fraud. The problem of control fraud is investigated as a peculiar challenge of 
Nigerian banks and will therefore make original contribution in terms of 
diagnosing the problem and suggesting ways to improve corporate 
governance regulation in Nigeria.  
The research will also hopefully influence policy and decision-makers. It 
emphasizes the need to reform Nigeria’s corporate governance regime and 
makes a number of recommendations. By identifying the complex causes of 
the 2009 banking crisis, the thesis intends to help reduce the chance of 
future control frauds in Nigerian banks. 
1.5 Research Questions 
This thesis is an investigation into control fraud in Nigerian banks using the 
2009 banking crisis as a case study.  
In this context, the thesis seeks to answer the following key questions in 
Nigerian banks: 
1. Why did the corporate governance system in place in Nigerian banks 
fail to prevent control fraud? 
2. How has Nigeria’s institutional problem contributed to the 
perpetration of control fraud during the crisis? 
3. How did the activities of corporate participants in the periods 
leading to the crisis contribute or facilitate the fraud? 
4. What changes to corporate governance norms, codes and regulation 
are required to prevent future control fraud in Nigerian banks? 
 11 
 
The next section will attempt to present the issues to be examined in the 
thesis and provide a brief outline of the structure of the thesis. 
1.6  Structure 
Chapter 2 Literature Review: This chapter will examine the literature on 
corporate governance and control fraud. It will commence with an 
examination of the concept of corporate governance. This will be followed 
by a broad definition of fraud, with particular reference to Nigeria. The most 
prominent type of fraud in the Nigerian criminal code will be also be 
analysed, that is Section 419. The chapter will then discuss corporate 
governance in the Nigerian banking system. This will be followed by a 
discussion of notable cases of control fraud in order to establish the link 
between control fraud and corporate governance. The aim of the chapter is 
to identify gaps in literature that will further emphasize the significance of 
the research.  
Chapter 3 Methodology: this chapter will briefly discuss the methodology to 
be adopted in the research, that is, the socio-legal methodology and the 
reasons for adopting this method. There will be a brief summary of the 
theoretical underpinnings of the research including the agency theory and 
deterrence theory. Sources and data used will be also be identified. The 
chapter will then discuss the limitations of the research and the problems the 
researcher encountered in the process of data collection will be highlighted. 
Chapter 4: Control fraud of CEOs in the Nigerian banking sector: this 
chapter will look at the involvements of the CEOs of the five banks in the 
collapse of their banks. The chapter will begin with a background to the 
crisis, that is, the consolidation exercise of 2006. This is to create awareness 
of how the new financial obligation of banks as directed by the CBN at the 
time might have triggered control fraud in a bid to meet with the on-going 
demands of the CBN at the time. The chapter will then explore the activities 
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of the each of the CEOs and show how these amounted to control fraud. The 
chapter will also examine how the CEOs of the banks took advantage of 
regulatory weaknesses in the perpetration of fraud. It will emphasize that 
although CEOs are the main agents in control frauds, they need the 
collaboration of other participants such as auditors, shareholders and 
regulators. Issues such as the regulatory weakness of the CBN which paved 
way for the persistent use of the discount window will be introduced. 
Chapter 5: The Role of the Regulatory Framework in the perpetration of 
control fraud: This chapter will link corporate governance regulation in 
Nigeria to control fraud. There will be an examination of the institutional 
framework; that is, regulation and policy. Various codes that have evolved 
in Nigeria’s corporate governance pre and pro crisis will be examined. 
Problems such as regulatory multiplicity and rules/principles based nature of 
enforcement of the existing codes will be analysed. Emphasis will be placed 
on the fact that Nigeria copied its corporate governance codes from 
developed countries, particularly UK and USA with no consideration for the 
peculiarity of jurisdictions and this has facilitated control fraud. The chapter 
stresses that weak regulation and enforcement are major factors responsible 
for control fraud in Nigerian banks,  
 
Chapter 6: The regulatory involvement of the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN) in the Banking crisis. This chapter examines the regulatory and 
supervisory function of the CBN as a whole and focuses on the activities of 
the CBN during the banking crisis, particularly; internal regulatory 
weaknesses that could suggest lack of capacity to deal with control fraud. 
The politics played by the CBN will also be analysed by reference to 
literature and available evidence, particularly in its refusal to publish the 
results of the special investigation that led to the removal of the five CEOs. 
The roles played by regulators such as president, senate and courts will also 
be discussed. 
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Chapter 7: An assessment of the role of Auditors in the banking crisis: This 
chapter will explore the activities of the auditors of the five banks in 
question in order to examine whether or not they were complicit in the 
control fraud of 2009.  The chapter will commence by explaining the 
expectations gap of auditing and the notion of audit explosion will be 
analysed in detail. The issue of auditor independence, particularly on the 
provision of non-audit fees by the auditors in question will be explored in 
order to emphasise the possible connivance or passivity of the auditors with 
CEOs of the banks. Although both internal and external auditors can be said 
to have allowed control fraud to happen, the fact that none of the said 
auditors have been brought to book since the crisis suggests a fundamental 
problem of regulation, particularly the effect of bad corporate governance 
regulation on control fraud.  
 
Chapter 8: Investigation of the role of Shareholders in control fraud: 
Evidence from the banking crisis: This chapter will look at the involvement 
of shareholders in the control fraud of 2009. Particular attention will be 
drawn to majority shareholders of these banks and political domination 
utilised in the perpetration of fraud through connivance of the CEOs, 
politicians and majority shareholders in order to explore the mechanics of 
control fraud in the banks in question. Issues such as rent seeking through 
governmental involvement will also be discussed. Shareholder primacy will 
then be discussed and its possible contribution to control fraud examined. 
 
Chapter 9: Corporate Governance and Control Fraud in Nigerian Banks; 
The Way Forward: This chapter will recap the issues identified throughout 
the research in order to make recommendations. There will be suggestions 
on the way forward for Nigerian banks in the fight against future control 
fraud.  Participation of all corporate participants such as CEOs, auditors, 
shareholders and regulators will also be emphasized with recommendations 
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on how this can be achieved. Lastly, the chapter will discuss contributions 
of the research to theory, practice and policy. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The problem of fraud remains a universal phenomenon of which the 
magnitude cannot be known for certain because most frauds are undetected, 
and not all detected frauds are published.
32
 With the fall of multi-national 
companies like Enron, and high level of allegations and actual cases of 
control fraud
33
 across the globe, the need to promote corporate governance 
becomes more important. Many organisations have therefore resorted to 
developing ethical guidelines and codes of conduct aimed at ensuring 
compliance to minimum standards of corporate ethics targeted at controlling 
fraud.
34
 
The financial sector is the epicentre of most economies and activities are 
mainly based on trust and confidence. It is good practice that potential 
investors satisfy themselves of the existence of strong business environment 
before any financial commitment; they, therefore, assess political, business 
and financial risks involved. Countries with poor business environment lose 
attraction in trade and investment, having failed to establish standards of 
transparency, fairness and accountability which are the themes of efficient 
corporate governance.
35
   
In Nigeria, the growth and rate of the occurrence of fraud in recent years is 
appalling in virtually all spheres of the economy especially in the banking 
                                                          
32
 Ajayi, M.A. (2011) ‘Determinants of Fraud in the Nigerian Banking Industry’ 3(2) Lapai 
Sociological Law Review 101  
33
 This will be defined below. 
34
 Bratton, W., W., (2002) 'Enron and the dark side of shareholder value' 76 Tulane. Law 
Review 1275 
35
 Okeahalam C., C., Akinboade O., A. (2003) ‘A review of Corporate Governance in 
Africa: Literature, Issues and Challenges’ A paper presented for the Global Corporate 
Governance (15 June, 2003)  8-11 
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sector. The gravity of control fraud in Nigerian banks can be inferred from 
its value, volume and loss. The Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation
36
 
(NDIC) reported that the level of actual fraud in Nigerian banks rose from 
N804million in 1990 to N3,199 million in 1998, leaving the percentage of 
amount loss to fraud rising from 3% in 1990 to 22% in 1998.
37
 However, 
the year 2009 saw the highest level of banking fraud, where a total of 1, 764 
cases of attempted fraud involving over N41.3billion was reported, out of 
which ten banks with the highest number of cases were responsible for 
90.10% (N37billion).
38
  It can therefore, follows that fraud is perhaps the 
most challenging of all the risks confronted by the Nigerian banking sector 
and it can be said to be an institutional problem of corruption.  
In view of this, it is the focus of this chapter to review the literature on 
control fraud and corporate governance. It will commence with an 
examination of the concept of corporate governance and will delve into 
corporate governance in banks in order to establish the peculiarity of banks 
as having a unique form of governance different from other companies. 
Corporate governance in Nigerian bans will then be examined and linked to 
fraud and control fraud. Some cases of control fraud across the globe will be 
cited in order to establish the relationship between corporate governance 
and control fraud. The chapter stresses that the peculiarities of systems 
across the world will mean that corporate governance in Nigeria should be 
culture-specific and in the case of Nigerian banks, corporate governance 
ought to be understood slightly differently and a unique set of corporate 
governance norms is required to help curb control fraud.  
                                                          
36
 The NDIC is an independent agency set up by the federal government to maintain 
financial stability by insuring depositors’ funds in event where financial institutions can no 
longer meet their obligations. http://ndic.org.ng/about-ndic.html accessed 10.06.12 
September, 2010); NDIC Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1999 
37
 NDIC Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1999
 
http://ndic.org.ng/files/NDIC_1999_ANNUAL_REPORT.pdf accessed 02.06.12 
38
 Ibid  
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2.2 The Concept of ‘Corporate Governance’ 
Any attempt to explore the concept of corporate governance will also 
involve defining the term ‘governance’. It is important to state that the 
concept of ‘Governance’ is different from ‘Governing’ or ‘Government’, 
which involves a process whereby formal state structures and policies are 
determined and enforced.
39
 The term ‘Governance’ is presently used as a 
concept which is all encompassing and capable of having numerous 
meanings not covered by the traditional notion of ‘Government’ that focus 
more narrowly on formal state structures and their operation
40
.  
Richards and Smith examine ‘governance’ as a descriptive label used to 
describe the interaction of various actors involved in decision-making. The 
writers view ‘governance’ as collaboration of all actors and locations which 
go beyond the central government ‘core executive’ that are involved in 
policymaking process.
41
 In view of this, it can be said that ‘governance’ is 
both a process and a system; and as with any system, it is made up of 
various actors and processes whereby each plays a role. It is important to 
note that whereas not all actors are part of the internal structure of the 
company, both internal and external actors play important parts in 
governance.  
Rhodes (1997) identified six different meanings for ‘Governance’ that are 
currently used in contemporary social sciences. These are: 
- The minimal State 
- Corporate Governance 
                                                          
39
 Gatto, A., 2006, The Law and Governance Debate in the European Union. Available at:  
http://staging2.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
inst/documents/publication/wcms_193614.pdf  P.9 Last accessed 28.07.14 
40
 Ibid p.9 
41
 Richards and Smith (2002) as quoted by Leach, M., Bloom, G., Ely, A., Nightingale, P., 
Scoones, I., Shah, E. and Smith, A. (2007) Understanding Governance: pathways to 
sustainability, STEPS Working Paper2, Brighton; STEPS Centre P. 8 Available at: 
http://www.stepscentre.org/PDFs/final_steps_governance.pdf Last accessed 28.07.14 
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- New public management 
- Good Governance 
- Social-cybernetic systems 
- Self-organised networks42 
Therefore contrary to the traditional model of government, Governance is 
used to mean a novel mode of government whereby both public and private 
actors as well as state and non-state institutions participate co-operatively in 
the formation and implementation of public policy. This emerging field of 
governance indeed connotes an abrasion of politically centred governance 
and nation-state constitutionalism
43
. 
It is worth noting at this stage that for the purpose of this research, the 
concept of ‘Governance will be used to mean ‘Corporate Governance’, to be 
elaborated on below. 
The term ‘corporate governance’ refers to a set of rules, regulations, policies 
and customs, which influence the management and control of corporate 
entities. Monks and Minow define corporate governance as ‘the relationship 
among various participants in determining the direction and performance of 
corporations.’44 The major participants include shareholders, management 
(led by chief executive officer), and the board of directors; others include 
employees, customers, investors, suppliers and the society.
45
 
Furthermore, the major definition extracted from the Cadbury Report views 
Corporate Governance as the ‘system by which companies are directed and 
                                                          
42
 Rhodes, R., Understanding Governance. Policy Network Governance Reflexivity and 
Accountability 46–59 (1997). Avalable at http://oss.sagepub.com/content/28/8/1243.pdf 
Last accessed 28.01.14 
43
 Gatto, A., 2006, (n.39) p.9 
44
 Robert A.G. Monks and Nell Minow ‘Corporate Governance’ 2nd ed. Blackwell Business 
p.1  
45
 Ibid 
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controlled.’ 46  The Organization for Economic Corporation and 
Development (OECD)
47
 2004 principles proffered a broader definition. This 
definition sees corporate governance as a part of a larger economic context 
in which firms operates.
48
 The OECD principles further describe corporate 
governance as a set of relationships between a company’s board, 
shareholders and other stakeholders, which provides the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled.
49
 This definition refers to corporate 
governance as a mechanism or system which must ensure transparency, 
accountability and control. The interrelationship between these actors will 
mean that a number of participants are involved in the goal of corporate 
governance, including regulators, auditors and employees.  
John and Senbet
 
also define corporate governance as the tool through which 
stakeholders exercise control over employees and management in order to 
protect their interests.
50
 Generally, stakeholders are individuals or groups of 
people who are affected or likely to be affected by the organisation’s 
decisions. Post et al define stakeholders as: ‘Individuals and constituencies 
that contribute, either voluntarily or involuntarily to a company’s wealth-
creating capacity and activities and can therefore be said to be potential 
beneficiaries and or risk bearers of the company’.51 
                                                          
46
  Section 2.5 of The 1992 Report of the Committee on Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance. Available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf Last accessed 
on 28.09.14 
47
 See the 2004 OECD Principles available at  
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf last 
accessed 22.09.14. First released in May 1999 and revised in 2004, the OECD Principles 
form the basis for the corporate governance component of the Report on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes of the World Bank Group. 
48
 This includes macroeconomic principles and level of competition. See OECD Principles 
Ibid at p.12 
49
 OECD principles Ibid at p.12 
50
 John, K, and Senbet L. (1998) Corporate Governance and Board  effectives” in Farinha J. 
(2003) “Corporate governance. A survey of the Literature Centro de Estudes de Economic 
Industrial, do Trabalhoe da Empresa Faculdade de economia, Univeridade do porto: 
Portugal. 
51
 Post, J.E., L.E. Preston and S. Sachs (2002). ‘’Managing the Extended Enterprise: The 
New Stakeholder View,’’ California Management Review, 45, 1 pp. 6-28 at p.8  
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O’ Sullivan defines corporate governance as concerned with institutions that 
influence how business corporations allocate resources and returns. 
Corporate governance shapes WHO makes investments decisions in 
corporation, WHAT type of investments are made and HOW returns are 
distributed across stakeholders.
52
  
Furthermore, according to G.O. Donovan, Corporate governance is:  
‘an internal system encompassing policies, processes and 
people, which serves the needs of shareholders and other 
stakeholders by directing and controlling management 
activities with good business savvy, objectivity, 
accountability and integrity.”53  
In corporate governance, the most prominent set of actors are the company 
directors. These can either be executive or non-executive directors. The 
ratio of executive to non-executive directors depends on the corporate 
governance codes, as well as the practice of individual companies, in the 
country in question. Generally, the non-executive directors tend to be retired 
executives or executives in other companies such that their capacity to 
provide independent scrutiny of the company results in a more robust 
governance process. All directors are responsible for the company’s 
performance and behaviour and they must ensure the company complies 
with the regulatory measures in place, including accounting standards.
54
 
Apart from directors, other actors in the company include shareholders, and 
in the case of banks, creditors, which include depositors and bondholders. 
By virtue of the economic agency relationship that exists between directors 
                                                          
52
 O’ Sullivan, M. (2003) The Political Economy of Comparative Corporate Governance 
10(1) Review Of International Political Economy 23-72. 
53
 G.O. Donovan: “A Board Culture of Corporate Governance, Corporate Governance 
International” Journal, Vol. 6 Iss.3 (2003). 
54
Source:http://www.accaglobal.com/uk/en/student/acca-qual-student-journey/qual-
resource/acca-qualification/p1/technical-articles/corporate-governance.html Last accessed 
29.12.14 
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and shareholders, many economists view shareholders as principals and 
directors as their agents.
55
 As principals, shareholders are dependent on 
directors because they expect that directors act in their best interest and 
from a legal point of view, directors are to observe a fiduciary duty towards 
the company.
56
 
According to the Cadbury Report, corporate governance seeks to improve 
accountability within an organisation, its success in this regard, is generally 
often assessed in terms of financial performance, for instance, return on 
investments or equity.  It is important to note that performance of an 
organisation, however, does not in itself connote maximum financial results, or 
ability to generate optimum cash flows, but includes non-financial interests 
that come to bear in the company. The performance of quoted firms across 
the world is significantly influenced by non-financial interests including 
diversification, quality of service, workforce, development and 
organisational survival, a combination of which ultimately serves to 
influence financial performance of the company.  
In an attempt to harness the aforementioned definitions, this thesis view 
corporate governance as an umbrella term relating to concepts, theories and 
practices of inter-relationships between various participants in the company 
ranging from boards to shareholders, regulators and other stakeholders. 
Unlike the day-to-day management of the company, corporate governance 
ensures the company operates in pursuit of its operational values, mainly 
targeted at helping the board function properly and in best interest of the 
company.   
From the above definitions, it can be said that any attempt to define 
corporate governance should be jurisdiction-specific as many of the 
challenges of corporate governance are culture-bound. It is therefore 
                                                          
55
 More on Agency relationship will be discussed in Chapter three. 
56
 See generally CAMA 2004, s.279,  
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important to understand corporate governance within the ambit of the 
jurisdiction it involves in order to analyse the specific problems associated 
with it and ultimately suggest lasting solutions. 
2.3 Corporate Governance in Banks  
2.3.1 Early Banking Industry 
There is no gainsaying that banks are unique in terms of ownership, 
regulation and governance. The special attributes of banks no doubt has its 
consequences. In the early 19
th
 century, banking and banking governance 
was relatively straight forward, however, by late 19
th
 century, the UK alone 
had around 500 banks operating as unlimited partnerships and 700 building 
societies that were mutually owned co-operatives.
57
 In the UK, early 
banking industry was a high-liquidity business with low concentration and 
low leverage.
58
 There was also a mutually compatible balance sheet 
structure whereby equity capital comprised of almost half of liabilities and 
about 30% of banks assets involved cash and liquid securities.
59
 Banking 
model during this period aligned with risk-taking incentives whereby the 
unlimited liability structure meant that control rights became the 
responsibility of investors with incentives to be prudent with depositors’ 
money.
60
 Also, there was also adequate market discipline whereby directors 
authorised transfer of shares to shareholders who also maintained liability 
after transfer of their shares; that way, checks and balance was exercised by 
each party.
61
   
                                                          
57
 Cleary, E. J. (1965). The building society movement London: Elek Books; Collins, M. 
(2012). Money and Banking in the UK: A History (Vol. 6). Routledge. 
58
 A similar banking system was practiced in the US and across Europe. See Haldane, A. G. 
(2012). Control rights (and wrongs). 32(2) Economic Affairs, 47-58.  
59
 Haldane, Ibid 48 
60
 Ibid 
61
 Ibid 49 
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Soon, the global economy began to change and gradually, capital became 
restricted to a small amount of unlimited liability partners.
62
 The 6 partner 
restriction rule was lifted in the UK in 1826 so that ownership and control 
could no longer be vested in a single-agent and banks began to operate as 
joint-stock companies.
63
 Overtime, shareholder liability became limited, and 
shareholder discipline began to fade.
64
 However, in the case of banks, 
limited liability was slow to kick-start. This is because unlimited liability 
served as a guarantee for depositors, knowing that their money is secured in 
a bank whose shareholders are accountable to them. However, according to 
Bagehot, the problem of unlimited liability was derived in its incentives 
whereby the wealthy assumed too much risk and lacked control, thereby 
preventing them from investing.
65
 
With the collapse of City of Glasgow Bank in 1878, unlimited liability in 
banks became under attack as no shareholders became bankrupt while 
depositors lost nothing. Although, the subsequent Companies Act of 1879 
provided for limited liability,
66
 unlimited liability was still preserved in the 
form of extended liability which served to make shareholders liable in the 
event of insolvency or bankruptcy.
67
 By virtue of this, both managers and 
shareholders were brought to book and made accountable. 
Gradually, limited liability became rooted in the banking industry over the 
years. The last two decades witnessed a substantial increase as well as 
                                                          
62
 Ibid 
63
 Ibid 
64
 Limited liability of shareholders began in the US in 1817 in Massachusetts. In the UK, 
the enactment of the Limited Liabilities Act and the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1855 
and 1856 respectively brought a broad change to shareholder liability. See Haldene Ibid  
65
 Bagehot, W. (1873). Lombard Street: A Description of Money Market, 1962 ed. Irwin, 
Homewood, IL. 
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imbalance in both risks and returns. Banks now differ in terms of 
distribution of risks and returns.
68
 This is because while the responsibility of 
risks is borne by the society at large, returns on the other hand, are now 
borne by managers and shareholders.
69
 According to Haldane, it is only in 
banking that control rights and incentive wrongs can be combined.
70
 While 
CEOs across the globe earn exceptionally high income, the fall in share 
prices of banks across the world mean a decrease in the global economy and 
investment.
71
 Although ownership and control rights are placed on 
shareholders, for banks, equity holders are often provided with a number of 
risk taking incentives not proportional to the interests of other stakeholders 
and the society. This then paved way for privatised interests and socialised 
risks.
72
 This uneven distribution of risks and returns have grown over the 
years through a number of regulations and reforms targeted at lowering 
capital and also the rise of institutions that are ‘too big to fail’.73 It can be 
said that the sudden rise in investor and managerial short-termism 
unravelled governance weakness in banks, thereby leading to the global 
credit crunch and banking crisis of 2007, the result of which is still being 
felt till date.
74
 
2.3.2 Development of banking activities in Nigeria 
Banking activities in Nigeria can be traced back to the period between 1892- 
1894 with the establishment of African Banking Corporation and First Bank 
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of Nigeria.
75
 With the commencement of British control in the economy 
during the 19
th
 century, the Colonial Banks were established in Nigeria to 
regulate commercial affairs, trade and financial activities from Nigeria to 
West Africa.
76
 In 1925, a merger of the Colonial Bank, Anglo-Egyptian 
Bank and the Bank of South Africa saw the birth of Barclays Bank in 
Nigeria. Indeed the first indigenous bank to be created in Nigeria was in 
1929 when the Industrial and Commercial Bank was established. However, 
the bank was short lived and later went into liquidation shortly after, 
precisely in 1930.
77
 Its collapse was attributed to mismanagement, 
accounting malpractices, embezzlement and poor economy.  
In 1931, Barclays bank was replaced by Mercantile Bank of Nigeria; sadly, 
it also went into liquidation six years later. In 1947, the Nigerian Farmers 
and Commercial Bank was established and in 1948, the British and French 
Bank for Commerce and Industry was established in Nigeria.
78
 In 1949, 
African Continental Bank was established by Dr. Nnamdi Aziwke, as a Pan 
African bank.  The rate of establishment of the indigenous banks made the 
government appoint an official of the Bank of England, Mr. G.D. Paton to 
look into the Nigerian banking sector and make recommendations regarding 
the level of control to be introduced. The findings of the inquiry, submitted 
in 1952 led to the introduction of the first Banking Ordinance Act of 1952. 
The Act was established mainly to ensure orderliness in the banking sector 
and to prevent unregulated banking transactions.
79
 In 1958, draft legislation 
for the establishment of the Central Bank of Nigeria was presented to the 
House of Representatives, which was later implemented on the 1
st
 of July 
                                                          
75
 First Bank of Nigeria was formerly known as Bank of British West Africa (BBWA). See 
Onoja, I.R. ‘The Contributions of Research Development in the Banking Industry in 
Nigeria’.(1998) Nigerian Journal of Management Research, 210.   
76
 Uche, C.U. 1999 ‘Foreign Banks, Africans and Credit in Colonial Nigeria’ 1890-1912 
52(4) The Economic History Review 669-691   
77
 Brown, C.V., (1966) The Nigerian Banking System North-western University Press, 
Department of Business & Economics, p.1  
78
 This later became the United Bank For Africa (UBA) 
79
 See Alford, D. (2010) “ Nigerian Banking Reform, Recent Actions and Future 
Prospects” University of South Carolina School of Law Coleman Karesh Law Library, p.2   
 26 
 
1959 with the establishment of the Central Bank of Nigeria. It therefore 
suffices to say that the period from1892-1952 can be said to be a ‘Free 
Banking Era’ due to lack of banking legislation and banks were set up based 
on the Companies Ordinance Act of 1922 (as amended).  
Deregulation of the finance and banking sector was introduced between 
1959 and 1989 with the introduction of the Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP)
80
 and this led to increase in the number of deposit banks, 
community banks, finance houses and People’s and Mortgage Banks (Also 
known as Primary Mortgage Institutions). The Nigerian Deposit Insurance 
Commission (NDIC) was established in 1988 charged with the 
responsibility of ensuring safe banking practices and regulation, as well as 
insuring deposits for customers. The NDIC was also to assist the Central 
Bank in policy formulation and banking supervision.  
Four major statutes have regulated Companies in Nigeria since 1900. The 
Companies Ordinance of 1912 was the first Local Company Statute in 
Nigeria. The Act was derived from the English Companies Act of 1908. It 
initially applied to the colony of Lagos but was subsequently amended in 
1917 to extend operation to the rest of the country. The aim of the Act in 
particular was to: ‘Provide for the formation of limited company within the 
colony and protectorates, and to foster the principles of co-operative trading 
and effort in the country’.81 The Act also provided for the registration of 
Companies. 
In 1922, a new Ordinance was enacted which merely consolidated the 1912 
and 1917 Ordinances. The 1922 Ordinance governed commercial activities 
in Nigeria and witnessed series of amendments from 1929 to 1954. The 
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Ordinance was incorporated into the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
(CAP 37) in 1958. 
Following independence in 1960, the need to adapt with the growing trend 
of economic activities became prominent. The 1968 Companies Act 
therefore repealed the 1922 Companies Ordinance (as amended). The Act 
was well known for categorising companies as public and private, the 
minimum number for establishing a public company was seven and there 
was no maximum while for private companies, the minimum was two and 
maximum fifty. A major shortcoming of the Act was its failure to define a 
‘public company’ while providing for the features of a private company.82 
The independence of the country further envisioned the need to provide a 
more comprehensive legal framework that better meets the development 
needs of the country, particularly the promotion of indigenous companies. 
This necessitated the establishment of a Law Reform Commission to make 
recommendations on the future of the country’s corporate sector while 
protecting the interest of investors, the general public and the nation as a 
whole. 
The recommendations of the Law Reform Commission saw the birth of the 
Companies and Allied Matters Decree (now Act) 1990 (CAMA).
83
 Part 1 
and 2 of CAMA provides that it shall apply to all companies formed and 
registered under it, as well as all existing companies, all companies formed 
or incorporated under other enactments and also all unregistered 
companies.
84
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It is important to mention that in Nigeria, corporate governance in banks is 
faced with the problem of regulatory multiplicity, resulting in conflicts 
within the codes.
85
 Corporate governance regulation, as provided for in 
codes, is therefore different from actual corporate governance system of 
practice in banks. This difference arise from the gap between what ‘ought to 
be’ and what ‘is’. The problem, according to Osemeke and Adegbite can be 
attributed to the fact that the codes were copied from developed countries, 
particularly the UK and USA.
86
 In their survey, the writers found that the 
conflict within the codes sends mixed signals as to compliance, presenting 
an opportunity to comply with less rigid codes or outright non-compliance 
as the case maybe.
87
 This consequently creates an avenue for the 
perpetration of fraud whereby directors use regulatory weaknesses arising 
from conflicts within the codes as a fraud mechanism.
88
 
2.4 Conceptual Clarification of Fraud 
It is imperative to exegesis on various definitions attributed to fraud. This is 
necessary for a clear understanding of the concept and also to attain a 
foundational background of the nature of control fraud, which is the focus of 
this thesis.  
According to Idolor, fraud can be defined as:   
‘An act of deception aimed at gaining unlawful advantage; 
for any action to constitute fraud, there must be a 
dishonest intention to benefit (on the part of the 
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perpetrator) at the detriment of another person or 
organisation’. 89 
Mahdi and Zhila
90
 identify fraud as an  
‘Intentional misrepresentation, omission or concealment of 
truth for manipulation purposes to the financial detriment 
of either an individual or organisation and include theft, 
embezzlement or unlawfully obtaining or misusing the 
asset of either a person or an organisation’.91 
Boniface
92
 describes fraud as any premeditated act of criminal deceit, 
trickery or falsification by a person or group of persons with the intention of 
altering facts in order to gain undue personal and monetary advantage.
93
 
Fraud was defined in the old American case of Wells V. Zenz, as:  
‘A generic term which embraces multifarious means 
which human ingenuity can devise and is resorted to by 
one individual to get any advantage over another. It 
includes surprise, trickery, cunning and unfair ways by 
which another is deceived.’94  
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According to Owolabi;
95
 fraud usually involves an act, omission and 
concealment taking the form of a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or 
evidence resulting in damage to another through which undue and 
conscienceless advantage is taken. The term ‘fraud’ can therefore be said to 
be generic in nature. Fraud may be seen as any act or behaviour by one 
person with the intention of gaining an unlawful and dishonest advantage 
over another. This usually begins with the creation of trust, which is 
developed to a height where it is then eroded or betrayed. Fraud covers a 
number of crimes committed by corporations ranging from embezzlement to 
theft and misappropriation of funds to mention a few. 
The distinctive nature of fraud differentiates it from other synonymous 
concepts such as treachery or cheat, which can also be regarded as 
components of fraud. Fraud is more affirmative in nature, involving deceit 
based on false representations or concealment of material facts whereby a 
person is being misguided by another to his advantage. The deliberate and 
intentional act with a wicked motive to cheat becomes central as a peculiar 
nature of fraud as opposed to its similar counterparts. 
2.5  Taxonomy of Fraud 
The Serious Fraud Office (SFO) 
96
identifies seven taxonomies of fraud. 
These include individual, corporate, charity and non-profit, market abuse, 
fiscal, public sector and supporting activities. An examination of corporate 
fraud as one of the taxonomies of fraud identified by the SFO is necessary 
to help unfold the peculiarities of control fraud that is later defined in the 
course of this chapter.  
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Corporate frauds have been identified by the SFO to include the following:
97
 
2.5.1 Institutional Investment Frauds:  
This is the manipulation of institutions to make seemingly profitable 
investments, which, in the long run, becomes a fraud. Share sales, pension 
funds, ponzi schemes or pyramids and the like fall under this type of fraud. 
2.5.2 Corporate Services Frauds:   
These are frauds perpetrated by employees of the company or service 
providers. The types of perpetrators include lawyers and accountants. The 
SFO also identifies the sort of frauds that fall under this category, and they 
include procurement fraud, false accounting, personnel management, 
payment fraud, exploiting assets and information, travel and other expenses 
fraud.
98
  
2.5.3 Business Trading Frauds:  
This involves setting up businesses with the intention to defraud others. The 
frauds that fall under this category, according to the SFO, are insolvency 
and bankruptcy related frauds, long and short-term frauds. 
2.5.4 General Business Frauds:  
These are general day-to-day frauds that occur in businesses such as cheque 
overpayment scams, invoice scams, bogus government agency scams and 
charitable publication scams.
99
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2.5.5 Banking and Credit Specific Frauds: 
This is fraud against the banking and credit industry committed directly or 
indirectly either through the banks or its employees. It comprises credit card 
fraud, cheque fraud, account/facility takeover and mortgage related fraud. 
Other types of fraud further identified by the SFO include intellectual 
property frauds, insurance specific frauds, telephone specific frauds and 
gambling specific frauds.
100
 
2.6 Fraud in Nigeria – 419 Advance fee fraud and others 
In Nigeria, corruption makes fraud evident in a number of ways that may 
not be obvious to the western world. According to Adeyemo
101
, the most 
common type of fraud in Nigeria is Advance Fees Fraud. This is popularly 
known as ‘419’ and was named after Section 419 of the Criminal Code CAP 
77 LFN 1990. The section basically prohibits obtaining property by false 
pretence. By virtue of Section 419, any person who obtains property or 
credit by false pretence from another person and with the intention to 
defraud thereby incurring debt or liability by means of an entry into a debit 
or credit account between the person giving and receiving the credit is guilty 
of a felony and liable for imprisonment.
102
 
As a financial fraud scam, Section 419 has been widely associated with the 
Nigerian state. According to Mustapha, the 419 industry has boomed over 
the last decade in Nigeria and has spilled even to neighbouring countries 
and beyond.
103
 The scam involves fraudsters who use fake financial 
documents such as bank accounts, websites, company names and 
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incorporation documents to solicit for help in transferring lump sum of 
money out of Nigeria using fake government documents. In the corporate 
world, 419 usually involve an agent introducing business offers to a person 
or company in return for the payment of an advance commission. The agent 
proposes very interesting financial gains and the victim in turn pays the 
commission in advance to the agent after which he disappears into thin air. 
More often than not, victims are aware of the dubious nature of the business 
but play along in the hope of financial gain at the end. Banks in distress and 
desperate for large funds are particularly prone to advance fees fraud, but 
after being defrauded, they are unlikely to report to the police in fear of 
being prosecuted as a ‘partner to crime’.104 
Recently, 419 scam has spread globally across countries such as Australia, 
Russia, Southeast Asia, New Zealand and the US; this is done in form of 
unsolicited letters received by major companies from people claiming to be 
employees of the Central Bank of Nigeria or the Nigerian Government.
105
 
The victims are then conned into sending money with the promise of profits 
and wealth beyond their imagination. The biggest case was recorded in 2007 
in the largest city of Lagos where the Nigerian anti-fraud police revealed a 
multi-million dollar scam with about 15,000 fake cheques written to the 
value of $4 million in the space of one month. Furthermore, lots of mails 
were discovered to have been sent by ‘advance fees’ conmen as well as 
forged financial documents and identification papers intended to bring their 
victims to the spider’s web of seduction, conviction, addiction and 
desperation.
106
 
Apart from 419, another method of fraud in Nigerian banks includes forged 
cheques whereby cheques are stolen, and signatures forged. This type of 
fraud is mainly perpetrated by insiders, that is, bank staff or in collusion 
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with outsiders as they come across cheques on a daily basis. It is usually 
targeted towards deposit accounts, savings accounts and in some cases 
company accounts. 
In Nigeria, money-laundering fraud has also become prominent in the last 
two decades as a major form of fraud and means of financial embezzlement 
and is not limited to only outsiders. Money-laundering involves the use of 
illegally obtained money for untraceable transactions that tend to appear 
legitimate with the intention of concealing its source.
107
 As a form of 
outsider fraud, money-laundering fraud takes the form of money transfer 
through moving finances to and from a bank to a beneficiary account in any 
bank worldwide. Means of perpetration could include telephone, over-the-
counter, electronically or otherwise. The deceitful intention makes the 
transaction fraudulent for instance, alteration or changing of beneficiary’s 
name or account details. 
2.7 From white collar crime to control fraud 
The notion of control fraud can be said to originate from business crimes, 
otherwise known as ‘white collar crime’. Edwin Sutherland was the first to 
examine this concept of ‘white collar crime’ as a term which embodies 
general corporate crimes relating to fraudulent business activities.
108
  
The National White Collar Crime Centre defines white collar crime as: 
‘Illegal or unethical acts that violate fiduciary 
responsibility or public trust, committed by an individual 
or organisation , usually in the course  of legitimate 
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occupational activity , by persons of high or respectable 
social status for personal or organisational gain’.109  
The centre further identified four types of white collar crime, namely:
110
 
- Personal Crimes committed outside a business for personal gain, for 
example, credit card fraud 
- Crimes committed against an employer such as embezzlement 
- Corporate crimes committed by a businesses 
- Those who set up businesses simply to defraud others, for instance 
selling dubious investments. 
From the above, it can be said that white collar crime is a non-violent, 
criminal activity based on financial mismanagement by people of high 
education, high social class and respectable character. Sutherland compares 
crime in upper or white-collar class which is made up of respectable 
business men who are also professionals with crime in the lower class, that 
is, persons of low social and economic status.
111
 
 
He begins on the premise that in the past, white collar crimes are often seen 
as non-violent and as such viewed by the judiciary and police as less 
deviant, therefore lighter sentencing was given compared to violent crimes 
such as rape or murder. He goes on to note that although economists are 
well grounded in business methods, they fail to consider business activities 
from a criminal point of view and same goes for sociologists who are well 
knowledgeable in crime but not acquainted with its relationship with 
business. The aim therefore, was to integrate both schools of thought 
through a comparison of crime in upper or white collar class made of 
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respectable business personnel in a professional capacity and crime in the 
lower class made of persons with low socio-economic status.
112
 
 
Sutherland goes on further on the statistics used by criminologists to 
generalise theories of criminal behaviour, particularly the conclusion that 
the concentration of crime in the lower class is associated with poverty and 
all poverty related factors.
113
 This statement, although misleading when 
compared with the various conventional theories of crime and criminal 
behaviour, tends to present a central probability. Sutherland therefore puts 
on the argument that crime and indeed fraud is not closely associated with 
poverty. White collar crime in business usually takes the form of 
misrepresentation of financial statements and manipulation in the stock 
exchange, commercial bribery, embezzlement, misapplication of funds or 
tax frauds to mention a few. 
 
Two elements have been identified as components of white collar crime, 
namely misrepresentation of assets and duplicity in the manipulation of 
power.
114
 According to Sutherland, the first can be likened to fraud or 
swindling while the second is similar to double-crossing, for instance,  a 
company director who, knowingly purchases a piece of land which he 
believes the company will need and sells it with good profit gain to the 
company. This concept of duplicity in manipulation of power arises where a 
person in position of authority holds two antagonistic positions, one of 
which involves trust and commercial honesty which is being breached. It 
should be mentioned, however that although, in complicated business 
relationships, it may be completely impossible to separate these antagonistic 
positions, the tendency to violate the delegated level of trust is of major 
concern. 
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An important point made by Sutherland is that the financial amount 
involved in white collar crime should not be construed to mean wealth as 
white collar in upper and lower classes merely serve as illustrations of 
persons of high and low socio-economic status.
115
 This is because ‘white 
collar’ in this sense is used to mean ‘respected’, ‘socially recognised’ and 
‘dignified’ and some persons of this class may not be well dressed or have 
high incomes. Accordingly, persons of low socio-economic status could be 
‘white collar’ fraudsters to the extent that they are well comported and 
highly knowledgeable with high incomes. 
The most important loss arising from ‘white collar’ crime is its effect on 
social relations, loss of trust and honesty. Central to ‘white collar’ crime is 
the weakness of their victims. Consumers, investors and stockholders who 
may be ignorant in protecting themselves usually are the victims of white 
collar crime and white collar crime usually blossoms where its perpetrators 
come in contact with persons who are weak as opposed to the many other 
crimes perpetrated against the wealthy and powerful such as burglary or 
robbery.
116
 The wide margin of difference in victims accords some sort of 
relative immunity to perpetrators of white collar crime. 
At the heart of white collar crime is the theory of differential association and 
social disorganisation. Differential association as examined by Sutherland 
views white collar crime as a process of invention whereby inventions are 
frequently made in order to assist in the perpetration of fraud.
117
 The 
perpetrators are generally persons with good backgrounds and begin their 
careers with a level of idealism, working in businesses where criminality 
prevails and gradually become introduced to the system. The social 
disorganisation theory considers society as lacking in the organisation to 
tackle this type of criminal behaviour. Accordingly, the ‘rules of the game’ 
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in business conflicts with ‘legal rules’ leading to breach of business policies 
and ethics.
118
 Consequently, the society fails to provide a solid mechanism 
and foundation in the opposition of crime and the result is persistence of 
white collar crime and commercial violations. 
Furthermore, According to Reiman, the general public as well as policy 
makers are in constant support of practices that make the ‘rich get richer and 
the poor get prison’.119 Emphasis is mainly based on the delinquents of a 
stereotyped ethnic group of the society, neglecting the various boundaries 
between legal and illegal rules.
120
 
Passas examines white collar crime as legal corporate crimes.
121
 According 
to him, by focusing on activities that are classified by the society as criminal 
and illegal, there is a diversion from a more injurious threat to the society. 
This is the threat posed by corporate activities that are legal, yet with serious 
implications to the society, creating a lawful but awful environment for 
corporate crime.
122
 A distinctive attribute is the ability to oppose 
criminalisation, while preventing regulatory attempts aimed to curb the 
harmful effects of their activities.
123
 Cross border violations are a suitable 
example of crimes without law breaking. The boundaries of law 
enforcement and legal jurisdictions allow offenders to commit crimes that 
are prohibited in their home countries in other jurisdictions without breaking 
any law and ignorance of off-shore corporate structures can be used to 
shield both the company and executives from prosecution.
124
 By so doing, 
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corporate transactions that are prohibited in one country can be transferred 
off shore to countries with friendlier corporate regulations.  
Going from the above, one can conclude that ‘Crime in the Suites’ 
victimizes more people than street offenders.
125
  
2.8 Control Fraud Defined 
The term ‘control fraud’ is defined as a wave of frauds led by the people 
who control large corporations causing massive losses and great systematic 
damage.
126
 In his book: ‘The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One’, Black 
examines control fraud in the public and private sector. He explores how 
corporate executives use companies
127
 to defraud, fooling the most 
sophisticated market participants and experts.
128
 According to him, control 
fraud refers to fraud in which those that control (typically the CEOs) an 
entity use it as a ‘weapon and shield’ to defraud.129  
As earlier explained, fraud is theft by deception; the perpetrator creates and 
then exploits trust to cheat others, therefore eroding the trust.
130
 Deceit and 
betrayal, therefore, become pivotal to control fraud. Furthermore, control 
fraud is premised on trust and betrayal. Trust is necessary in effective 
relationship among markets, polities and societies. Trust is therefore vital to 
any society and it is important for business and market transactions. Fraud 
therefore destroys trust. In corporate governance, trust is necessary for 
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healthy relationship among actors such as shareholders, directors, and other 
stakeholders. 
Black describes control fraud as crimes led by the CEO, who uses the 
company as a fraud vehicle.
131
 He identifies the CEO as a financial super-
predator who uses accounting fraud as a weapon and shield to perpetrate 
fraud and try to avoid prosecution.
132
 It is important to mention that Black 
refers to perpetrators of control fraud as ‘control frauds’.133 Furthermore, 
recklessness is the trait that sets control fraud ablaze, this is premised on the 
fact that any individual in control of a bank could commit control fraud but 
it is the audacity to actually go ahead with it that becomes legendary.
134
 
Control frauds can be seen as viruses that control the body and turn it into a 
reproductive system for their infections.
135
 Just like viruses, control frauds 
must find a way to overcome the body’s immune system, that is, internal 
controls in place and corporate governance regulations. Control frauds must 
develop a way to paralyse the immune system so as to be able to infect the 
virus into their predators.
136
 Control frauds reconstruct the corporate 
environment to help their frauds. This is done by securing accounting 
abuses in order to weaken regulatory measures.
137
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It is important to mention that control fraud is a particularly serious form of 
white collar crime, or blue-collar thieves as identified by Black.
138
 This is 
because they cause The CEO poses the greatest fraud risk, causing systemic 
corporate failure and ultimate economic injury. He directs the fraud, making 
it difficult to detect and punish. According to Black, this is achieved by 
structuring stock options to maximize their own interest and using it as a 
weapon to convert company’s assets for personal use. Directors camouflage 
the fraud, using accounting manipulation to make illegitimate practices 
appear legal. Black illustrates control fraud with side mirrors that appear to 
reflect so normal that the government requires a protective warning on a 
permanent basis to be attached to them: ‘Objects in this mirror are closer 
than they appear.’ Surely, catastrophic insolvency is closer than it appears 
for control frauds.
139
 Therefore, the impact of control fraud is often greater 
than other types of frauds, in banks; it can cause massive business failures in 
waves that jeopardize the economy as a whole
140
 and expose taxpayers to 
huge liabilities, either under deposit guarantee schemes or by causing losses 
to banks in situations where the central bank provided liquidity against 
assets (loans) of questionable quality.  
Pontell explains control fraud as a criminogenic environment which aids 
perpetration of criminal activities, and ultimately lead to proliferation of 
control fraud as in the savings and loans crisis. According to him, a number 
of factors facilitate control fraud:
141
 
- Complete insider domination (‘The best way to rob a bank is to own 
one’) 
- Conversion of corporate assets for personal gain 
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- Concealment of losses by investing in assets that have no readily 
ascertainable value which is then overstated and loss hidden 
- Ability to evade detection in the perpetration of fraud by fronting 
fraudulent transactions as ‘normal’ 
- Irrational liquid assets compared to liabilities (the larger the amount, 
the more that can be looted) 
- Ability to create a rapid growth of the corporation 
- Minimal ethical standards (where greed is considered a virtue and 
governmental regulations unnecessary) 
From the above, it can be said that control fraud involves seemingly 
legitimate corporate transactions that tend to go unnoticed for a significant 
period of time. It is important to consider the theories of control fraud in 
order to shed more light on the peculiarities of this kind of fraud. 
2.9 Theories of Control Fraud 
As earlier explained, in the banking sector, the likelihood of control fraud is 
higher. According to Comer, when two people meet to discuss money 
belonging to a third, there is a risk of fraud.
142
 Fraud appears to be 
impalpable and unstructured to which its complicated nature cannot be over-
emphasized. However, perpetrators are constantly faced with constraints in 
committing fraud. This is because they have no choice or control over the 
environment in which they operate. Thus, the interrelationship between the 
society and fraud pattern creates behaviours and practices that define 
perpetration of fraud and from which various deductions can be made.  
In his book, Comer sheds important light on the theories to which the 
complexities of control fraud can be understood.
143
 Although the writer 
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examined corporate fraud, his analysis parallels with the work of Black. 
These theories are examined below:
144
 
 Differential Opportunity 
 Theory of Concealment 
 Theory of Deviation 
 Theory of Collusion 
2.9.1 Differential Opportunity: 
According to Comer, the differential opportunity theory suggests that given 
certain factors, people have the tendency and opportunity to commit fraud, 
either against their employer, against suppliers and customers of their 
employers, against third parties or against government departments. 
However, availability of this opportunity is guided by three main factors: 
1. Level of access given to the perpetrator to assets, properties, 
accounts and computer systems 
2. Possession of adequate skill required to identify the existence of 
such opportunity and means of exploitation 
3. Utility of sufficient time in planning and execution of the fraud. 
A large amount of control fraud is usually caused by breach of trust either 
by management or employers to whom access is granted. ‘Access’ can, 
therefore, be said to be the most significant factor in the theory of 
differential opportunity and is described below: 
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Table 1: Access to Fraud Opportunity 
Access Level Fraud Achieved by 
Authorized access granted 
through managerial role or 
employment 
Breach of Trust 
No access Access granted by skill or collusion 
Source: Comer 1986
145
. 
It is important to stress that the position of the CEO poses the greatest risk 
for control fraud considering the above attributes such as access, skill and 
time coupled with control and power. The CEO or Managing Director as the 
case may be, is the highest placed corporate officer or executive charged 
with the management of the company.
146
 Being the head of the executive 
management, the CEOs training, knowledge, skill and experience becomes 
vital to his appointment, duties, powers and responsibilities.
147
 He is 
therefore given adequate access and opportunity as he is empowered with 
specific managerial duties and responsibilities delegated to him by the 
board.
148
  
In Re Newspaper Proprietary Syndicate Ltd
149
, the English courts 
considered the position of a managing director as: 
‘… Ordinary director entrusted with some special powers. 
These special powers may be as broad or as strictly 
defined as the directors choose. The directors may … 
Delegate to any managing director … such powers as they 
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consider desirable to be exercised by him. Any such 
delegation may be made subject to any conditions the 
directors may impose and either collaterally with or to the 
exclusion of their own powers and may be revoked or 
altered.’150 
From the above, it can be said that the broad powers and duties of directors 
as provided in common law are not in themselves sufficient to protect 
dispersed shareholders or taxpayers against control fraud. It is no news that 
the position of the CEO as a managerial role creates the opportunity to carry 
out control fraud in the company. Their level of skill and intelligence can be 
used as a tool and weapon for control fraud. Effective management and day-
to-day running of the company is the responsibility of the CEO who can 
therefore be said to be in ‘control’ of the company. The main duty of the 
CEO is to lead the company by abiding by internal systems and regulations. 
He is also charged with the responsibility of encouraging all employees to 
carry out activities in accordance with prescribed policies and regulations. 
Being a very significant personality in the bank, they are considered to be at 
the top of power. They could thus become influential, not only to the bank 
alone but to the nation’s economic, financial and even political futures as 
the case may be. The position of ‘Control’ occupied by the CEO becomes a 
vital tool for the perpetration of fraud. 
In Nigeria, as in most jurisdictions, those appointed as CEOs, are long-
serving professionals with requisite skills and experience and have held 
senior managerial roles.
151
 Section 263 (5) of the CAMA empowers 
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directors to delegate any of their powers to a managing director who shall be 
any member of the board that they think fit and in exercise of the powers so 
delegated, the managing director shall conform to any regulations set out by 
the directors.
152
 They are, therefore, appointed to serve the company and 
should be accountable to both the board of directors and the company as a 
whole. Although the intention of the Act, coupled with subsequent corporate 
governance regulations was to create avenue for checks and balances within 
the system, this was clearly not enough in preventing the banking crisis. The 
problem of accountability of the CEO remains a very controversial issue 
across the world.  
2.9.2 Theory of Concealment:  
Concealment as a theory of fraud remains a very important factor that plays 
a significant role in many corporate frauds and is also a fruitful element in 
fraud detection owing to permanent and predictable traces. The basic 
objective of fraud is to gain personal and dishonest advantage. Krauss and 
Maccahan
153
 consider important factors of fraud; namely Dishonesty, 
Opportunity and Motive. With this motive being greed, the perpetrator 
usually tries to hide any possible evidence that may expose or suggest their 
responsibility. According to Ovuakpourie,
154
 three elements are central to 
fraud: The will to commit fraud, The Opportunity to execute the fraud and 
The Exit, which is the escape route to conceal the fraud. These three 
elements are readily available to control frauds, presenting a fraud-friendly 
environment. 
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Central to the theory of concealment is the element of confusion, which the 
perpetrator usually deliberately introduces before, during or after the 
fraudulent act. Non-concealment of fraud may lead to imbalances between 
physical inventories and accounting records otherwise known as Account / 
Inventory discrepancy. However, as identified by Comer,
155
 concealment of 
fraud may not be necessary when: 
- The victims’ records may not disclose the loss 
- Where the loss is identified, there are insufficient records to identify 
the perpetrator 
- The victims condones the fraud 
In effect, what is indeed being concealed is the discrepancy in accounting 
records and this is achieved through misrepresentation and manipulation. 
While manipulations involve falsification of accounting records, 
misrepresentations include falsification of commercial or personal realities 
either before, during or after the fraud in order to assist in its perpetration or 
to conceal facts.
156
 
2.9.3 Theory of Deviation:  
According to Comer, the deviation theory is based on the fact that fraud is a 
deviant behaviour and perpetrators often conceal their dishonesty and 
guilt.
157
 This occurs when the pressure to overcome their limitations results 
in plausible deviations or breach of policies and procedures and usually, this 
is the first sign that a fraud has been committed. Identification and 
explanations of all plausible deviations from accepted policies and 
behaviours studied from perpetrators point of view may reveal evidence of 
fraud.
158
 In control frauds, it is interesting to see that the CEO as the one 
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ultimately in charge of the company is faced with the pressure to make 
returns on investments, and this could open door to illegal risks taken and 
breach of accounting rules. According to Black, control frauds see these 
practices as ‘clever’ or ‘innovative’ rather than immoral.159  It should be 
mentioned that in the battle to showcase a fast growing company, breach of 
policies and procedures become almost normal in the face of financial 
performance. 
2.9.4 Theory of Collusion:  
Collusion is a very common element of fraud and can occur either as 
minimum or general (institutionalized) collusion.
160
 Minimum collusion is 
paramount in high scale manipulative frauds whereby a few people are 
required for the necessary skill, opportunity and will to perpetrate an act or 
gain access to property or records. General or institutionalized collusion, on 
the other hand, involves low skill, common criminal motive and a large 
number of people.
161
 These include employees who consider themselves to 
be in ‘the same boat’, therefore reducing the risk of detection or whistle-
blowing. However, it should be mentioned that for control fraud to occur, 
more often than not, both minimum and institutional collusion are required 
in the wave of perpetration. This is because different categories of persons 
are needed in order to provide an illusionary liquid company with the aim of 
attracting investments, thereby creating more avenues to perpetrate fraud. 
Maintaining this web of frauds will require collective participation of a large 
number of people from top and bottom positions with a common goal to 
defraud. 
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2.10 The Mechanics of control fraud  
It is important to state that although control fraud has been identified as a 
type of fraud, it is however, different from the ordinary fraud that is well 
known, that is, the type associated with corruption and embezzlement; 
nevertheless these are also attributes of control fraud. The difference lies in 
the mode of operation of control fraud. While both types of fraud involve 
the use of opportunities for personal gain, control fraud mainly occurs in the 
banking sector and it requires a more in-depth knowledge and skill. It 
becomes imperative to examine the mechanics of control fraud that 
distinguishes it from other types of fraud. 
2.10.1 The ‘Yes-Men’ 
As control freaks, control fraudsters  create what Black calls a ‘fraud 
friendly’ corporate environment, shopping for yes-men which includes 
accountants, auditors, lawyers and employees that can be manipulated as 
profit centres.
162
 They use excessive pay packages, intimidation and anxiety 
to get employees who will submit to the CEO.
163
  Control frauds manipulate 
employees with constant praises to sweep them off their feet, turning them 
to loyal disciples, otherwise known as yes-men who will spread their 
message of success. According to Black, bonuses are given for being 
‘creative’.164 Creative in this sense is nothing more than inventing new ways 
of by-passing accounting rules, staying back at work to get new goodwill 
acquirers for mergers and conversions.  
As financial super-predators, control fraudsters are particularly skilful in 
identifying and exploiting human weaknesses.
165
 In Nigeria, the ongoing 
wave of control fraud in banks reveals that the CEOs succeeded in getting at 
                                                          
162
 Ibid 2 
163
 Ibid 
164
 Ibid 282 
165
 Ibid 2 
 50 
 
least one clean audit opinion and this routine goes on for years. The external 
auditor therefore becomes the most valuable accessory to control fraud.
166
 
Generally, well-run companies do have adequate internal and external 
mechanisms targeted at preventing crimes. However, the CEO, as the person 
ultimately in charge of the company, could bypass all of these measures and 
controls. Not only do the CEOs beat control mechanisms, they influence and 
turn them into accessories.
167
 
2.10.2 The Fraud Vehicle – An Arm’s-length Transaction 
Another destructive mechanism employed by control fraud is the 
optimization of the bank as a fraud vehicle, which can therefore be used to 
optimize the corporate regulatory environment. Black examines the 
seemingly arm’s-length (independent) transaction considered by 
accountants as the best evidence of value which involves using an elegant 
fraud mechanism whereby control fraudsters transact with each other on a 
seeming arm’s-length basis when actually they are engaged in massive 
overvaluation and manipulation of assets so as to create sensational 
incomes, fictitious profits and hide real losses.
168
 As predators, they ‘spot 
and attack’ human regulatory weaknesses to their advantage. They cause the 
firm to invest in transactions that can be used for perpetration of fraud, that 
is, transactions without readily ascertainable market values and utilise 
professionals as superior vehicles, flaunting themselves as legitimate 
leaders, while moving the company to the best level suitable for weak 
regulation and accounting fraud. According to Black, only control fraud can 
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use the full resources of the company to buy, bully, bamboozle or bury the 
regulators.
169
  
In Nigeria, this method of fraud usually involves inflation of assets or 
omission of liabilities with the intention of inflating the company’s financial 
performance. It is often difficult to discover this as CEOs often leave no 
apparent clues for detection and more often than not, the people involved 
have a longstanding level of established trust and honesty. Many 
organisations quoted on the Nigerian stock exchange have the most 
prevalent level of this kind of fraud as they would want to appear and look 
good to the outside world so as to attract both local and foreign investment. 
This method of control fraud is usually exposed with cases of sudden failure 
or insolvency of banks with published records of sound financial 
performance till the end.  
A good illustration of this would be the case of Oceanic bank Plc and 
Intercontinental Bank Plc analysed subsequently in the course of this thesis. 
The basis for manipulation of accounts is premised on enhancing the 
performance of the banks with unearned profits in order to deceive investors 
as to the proper management of the organisation and its financial position, 
and possibly increase pay packages of CEOs involved.
170
 Skilful 
concealment is involved in the utilisation of this method to perpetrate fraud 
and it commonly involves manipulation of ‘cut-off’ procedures, which are 
laid down as a means of checks and balances to ensure correlation between 
purchase records and stocks following the end of an accounting period.
171
 In 
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effect, the aim is to ‘bolster’ or ‘shore-up’ a company in an unsecure 
financial and managerial position as a tool for maintaining confidence of 
shareholders, creditors and investors. 
2.10.3 Looting of funds 
Control frauds create a ‘legitimate’ atmosphere for the CEO to divert a 
company’s assets to their personal gain. In Nigerian banks, one of the most 
efficient fraud mechanisms in control fraud is for the CEO to ‘loot’ cash 
from the bank, which is mostly done by defrauding the bank by indirectly 
borrowing money to fictitious lenders linked to the CEO (which would 
subsequently become non-performing) and wiring the money to other 
accounts at an offshore bank, thereby leaving valueless assets but real 
liabilities. As will be examined in later chapters, it can be said that most of 
the top five cases of control fraud in Nigerian Banks were guilty of 
fraudulent diversion of funds for personal gain.
172
  
Looting of cash in Nigeria is not new, especially in the public sector where 
monies meant for projects are often shared between officials. Looting can 
also be done through excessive pay packages as will be seen in the case of 
the CEOs. Reckless spending is also a prominent means of looting whereby 
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a ridiculous amount of money is being utilised for projects with connected 
parties which then become unaccountable.
173
 
Because accounting frauds are the weapon of control frauds, fictitiously 
inflated incomes would hide losses of companies with the most likely 
insolvency tendencies, giving room for control frauds to divert a company’s 
funds for their personal gain through means that appears to be legitimate 
and with the use of simple tools such as stock bonuses. The CEO tends to 
maximize the apparent legitimacy of his actions to the extent that ordinary 
individuals, economists, shareholders or auditors cannot simply imagine the 
rationality behind a CEO ever conceiving to defraud ‘his’ own company. 
Nigerian CEOs, particularly those who run top companies receive large pay 
packages and bonuses and report awesome profits tendering financial 
statements that have been ‘blessed’ by auditors. It thus follows that the 
profitability of the firm would warrant a presumption that the firm and 
auditors are acting with integrity. 
2.11 Notable cases of control fraud across the globe 
2.11.1 The US Savings and Loans Debacle of the 1980’s 
One of the worst financial disasters of the 1980s is the Savings and Loans 
crisis, which led to the largest recorded financial loss in America. Calavita 
et al reveals that by the end of 1990, a total of 680 organizations were 
reported to be insolvent and thousands of criminal cases had been reported 
to the state crime department and over $150 billion was spent on resolution 
costs.
174
 As a governmental response to the crisis, a majorly funded research 
was launched on the savings and loans debacle to investigate the extent of 
loses attributed to fraud in the 1980’s. The research utilised data from law 
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enforcement agencies and regulatory bodies. Pontell considers the findings 
of the research and noted that fraud and crime were at their peak in the 
country in the 1980’s which led to the collapse of various institutions 
leading to taxpayer bailout.
175
 Of all the issues that emanated in the periods 
after the crisis, the role of fraud stood out. It became imperative to know 
what role fraud played in the crisis, making it the worst of its kind. This 
became the subject of discussion for academics, media as well as the 
government. Various accounts of crime were used to explain the crisis and 
how white collar crime coupled with other economic factors such as 
managerial incompetence, regulatory weakness, risk taking and the likes led 
to the grave amount of loss in the savings and loans crisis.
176
  
While it would be an error to attribute too much weight to the role of fraud, 
to underestimate its prevalence would amount to a judgement error.
177
 In 
this regard, it is important to distinguish control fraud as a new and 
emerging concept developed in the wake of economic gains during the 
periods leading to the savings and loans debacle. This distinction according 
to Pontell is based on previous research differentiating corporate crime, 
whereby a company commits fraud on its own behalf, and embezzlement 
where financial crime is committed against a company.
178
 
According to Calavita and Pontell, control fraud might have been 
discovered in the form of collective or collaborative embezzlement during 
the savings and loans debacle, which had not been examined by legal and 
criminological analysts at the time.
179
 Sutherland considers the ordinary 
case of embezzlement in white collar crime as crime perpetrated by one 
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individual who is in a subordinate position against a corporation.
180
 
However, collective embezzlement, (which will later become control fraud) 
is different from the traditional notion of embezzlement and it involves 
outright looting or diversion of funds from an organisation by its top 
management.
181
 Therefore, as opposed to a low level type of fraud collective 
embezzlement involves corporation management in the corporate web and 
those in control who conspires with both insiders and outsiders to defraud 
the corporation.
182
 Organisational support is a tool for collective 
embezzlement. According to Pontell, collective embezzlement can be said 
to be a crime by the corporation against the corporation.
183
  
Furthermore, apart from outright looting of funds, collective embezzlement 
also involves fraudulent business activities for personal gains to the 
detriment of the corporation.
184
 This includes all form of ways devised by 
management to rob their own organisations such as excessive pay packages 
involving holidays, travelling in private planes, buying expensive houses, 
yachts, etc.
185
 A more subtle form of collective embezzlement which can be 
easily concealed involve excessive executive compensation, inflation of 
accounts and fabrication of profits in order to attract more investments.
186
 
However, Black in his book confirmed that control fraud was actually 
prominent during the savings and loans debacle of 1990, leading to 
catastrophic loss in the industry. According to him, majority of the debacle 
can be attributed to bad regulation, particularly; the prohibition of 
adjustable-rate mortgages which was meant to reduce interest-rate risk; 
which made S&L insolvent in market value, therefore it was cheaper for 
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opportunists to get control and soon, the regulatory and business 
environment became ideal for control fraud as owners became desperate to 
sell and opportunists desperate to buy.
187
 Black further added that lack of 
adequate regulation leads to abusive accounting and companies with bad 
accounting practices tend to grow faster as they are run with fictitious 
profits, causing investors and creditors to provide even more money for the 
perpetration of control fraud.
188
 
Two notable policy changes were believed to have led to the crisis. This 
includes the increase in deposit insurance and the deregulation of the thrift 
industry in the early 1980’s which created an environment conducive for the 
perpetration of fraud. The governmental research particularly pointed out 
that the change in regulation increased the opportunities for fraud while 
decreasing the risk associated with the fraud.
189
 The research also revealed 
that about 91% of the hundreds of prosecuted cases was convicted, of which 
78% were sentenced to prison, although the sentences were short when 
compared with other federal offences.
190
 It is important to say that despite 
the large amount of prosecuted cases, a significant amount of cases were left 
unprosecuted due to inadequate enforcement capacity.
191
 According to 
Rosoff et al, the official statistics of financial loss in the Savings and loans 
industry that were attributed to white-collar crimes only represent a ‘tip of 
the iceberg’.192 
Notably, the study revealed that the lack of attention given to large amount 
deposits or large investments by insiders in the organisation provides an 
avenue for the continued perpetration of control fraud which according to 
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Wheeler and Rothman was used as a ‘tool and weapon’ for the perpetration 
of their crimes.
193
 
2.11.2 Enron 
The Enron scandal is one of the most notorious financial scandals, not only 
America but across the world, it is therefore important to examine the facts 
of the case.   
Enron was formed in 1985 due to a merger between Houston Natural Gas 
and Omaha-based Inter North. The CEO of Houston Natural Gas, Kenneth 
Lay became the CEO of Enron and the company became an energy trader 
and supplier.
194
 Subsequently Enron applied for government deregulation 
and was granted. By virtue of this, governmental involvement in the 
company was substantially reduced, therefore creating avenue for series of 
misconducts including granting executives agency rights over financial 
reports presented to investors.
195
 
Due to this agency rights, Enron’s financial statements could be easily 
falsified to reflect unearned profits in anticipation of future investments. 
Through creative accounting, the company was able to misrepresent their 
true financial status and enjoyed investments from people who not privy to 
the real state of affairs.
196
 They also created subsidiaries known as Special 
Purpose Entities (SPEs) that were carrying out risky businesses to which 
disclosure was restricted to partnership investors which subsequently led to 
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huge financial loses.
197
 Enron had engaged in some self dealing transactions 
through its chief finance officer,
198
 Andrew Fastow, who had entered 
limited partnership deals which he became manager of the general partner. 
By so doing, he earned around $30 million, the result of which created a 
continuous accounting manipulation for over four years or around $1.1 
billion.
199
 Its dealings with Chewco Investment LP set the pace for later 
dealings with its LJM partnerships.
200
 Overtime, he used Chewco and LJM 
to buy Enron’s poor stocks and shares in the stock market, thereby bolster 
Enron’s financial statements.201 
The collaborative embezzlement of funds continued for a long period of 
time with inflated accounts reported at the end of every financial year, 
leading to more investments from both current and new stockholders.
202
 
By August 2000, Enron stock price peaked to about $90 per share and it 
became the seventh largest firm in America by market capitalization and for 
five consecutive years, it was awarded the most innovative firm by fortune 
magazine.
203
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However, by December 2011, the company also became number one as the 
largest bankruptcy claim in American history with shares that had fallen to 
around 60 cents per share.
204
 Due to financial mismanagement by the 
company’s executives, Enron filed for bankruptcy in 2001. The total amount 
of loss by investors exceeded $70 billion.
205
 Enron became notorious as 
history’s biggest financial fraud and audit failure. This is no doubt a control 
fraud skilfully carried out by the executives of the company. The most 
losses were recorded by stockholders and employees, particularly 
employees who are also shareholders in the company owing to 
mismanagement of invested funds, stock options, pension funds and savings 
plans.
206
 
As one of the biggest financial scandals in the world, Enron became the 
subject of debate for regulators, academics and law enforcement agencies 
and issues such as energy deregulation, financial disclosure, accounting 
regulation, pension schemes, retirement plans, whistle blowing and internal 
corporate governance system raised concerns.
207
 Series of legislations and 
regulatory responses have since been provided in the wake of the country’s 
biggest corporate scandal.
208
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It is shocking to see that a company whose corporate governance system 
was once the envy of the world had been undergoing a system of skilfully 
concealed prolonged financial mismanagement. Either that, or hidden 
regulatory defects at the time simply gave way for the perpetration and 
continuity of the fraud.  
It is no news that Enron’s corporate governance system would have allowed 
control fraud to occur. The corporate governance structure of the company 
encouraged significant risks of immediate shareholder value in a bid to 
encourage innovation and economize enforcement costs, therefore causing 
executives to engage in earnings manipulation. Control fraud as a means of 
maximizing shareholder value using earnings management begins in the 
form of accounting fraud. Blair describes this as simply using the flexibility 
of accounting rules to smooth cash flow numbers, and this can be said to be 
a first step on the road to control fraud.
209
Concealment of vital financial 
information coupled with accounting malpractices became the order of the 
day in the wake of shareholder value maximization.  
In the last few years leading to its collapse, Enron had indeed lost track of 
what goods or services it provided to the public and what its core values 
were. Rather, what is seen was a kind of trading activity which no one could 
really explain, but in reality turned out to be a high profile accounting fraud 
aimed at devising a system of growing revenues for the company in order to 
maintain a high stock price which in turn would mean fat pay cheques for 
the executives. It had also manipulated its balance sheets to conceal losses 
and engaged in accounting fraud. It is important to state that the effect of 
control fraud through accounting manipulation in a bid to maximize 
shareholder value also extends to competitive companies who feel pressured 
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with the need to engage in high-risk strategies in order to meet investor 
demands and expectations, and head off the threat of hostile takeover.
210
 
2.11.3 Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
The Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) scandal was one of 
the UK’s biggest fraud cases in the 1990’s. The control fraud involved 
international financial crime between the founder, Agha Hassan Abedi, a 
Pakistani Financier and Swaleh Naqvi, his assistant. The BCCI was 
established in Luxembourg in 1972 after capital was sought from the ruler 
of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Zayed and the Bank of America.
211
 Although the 
bank had its head office based in Karachi and London, from inception, it 
comprised of interrelated affiliations with subsidiaries and banks within 
banks, insider relationships and charitable organisations in around seventy 
three countries, becoming one of the fastest growing banks of its time.
212
 
However, it would be later revealed that BCCI had been insolvent from the 
start with manipulated accounts, inflated profits generated through illegal 
investments.
213
 It was also revealed that Abbas Gokal, who was one of its 
executives, laundered funds using his Geneva based Gulf Company. It was 
later revealed that loans over $1 billion were made to the Gulf Company, an 
amount which was in fact larger than BCCIs capital base.
214
 
Investigations also revealed a prolonged and unparalleled international 
control fraud which involved a well calculated and systematic bribery of top 
officials of countries across the world that had dealings with them. 
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According to Kerry’s Report, both BCCI and BCCI customers were 
involved in money laundering across Europe, Asia, Africa and America.
215
 
Further criminality committed by the bank include facilitation of tax 
evasion, support of terrorism, illegal immigration, illegal purchase of banks 
and real estate, arms trafficking, etc.
216
 By manipulating the corporate 
environment, regulations, accounts and audits, regulatory policies for the 
legal movement of capital and goods across countries were easily evaded in 
the ordinary course of business with no questioning. 
Furthermore, the bank, through its executives was able to infiltrate financial 
markets in some third world countries and in Europe. In order to achieve 
this, it engaged the services of third parties to purchase banks and hired 
highly skilled men such as lawyers, accountants and auditors (otherwise 
known as ‘the yes men’ ) to protect its activities.217 It must be mentioned 
that the bank even had connections with well known politicians across these 
countries.  
As earlier explained, control fraud is theft by deception; the perpetrator at 
first creates trust and then betrays the same to the detriment of the victim. 
This was the strategy employed by Abedi whereby he deceived the US 
regulators with the trust gained by transacting with notable countries such as 
China, United Arab Emirates, India, Lebanon, Tunisia and Argentina to 
mention a few.
218
  
Overtime, the US market became next in line, to be infiltrated by BCCI. In 
1977, the bank developed a scheme to secretly purchase US banks, open 
branch offices of BCCI across the US and then later merge both banks. 
Despite regulatory limitations, the scheme became successful in seven states 
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and also the District of Columbia. 
219
 The eventual success of BCCI in the 
US is no doubt linked to its prior success across other countries, which was 
achieved in collaboration with heads of state of foreign countries as well as 
top government officials, therefore, it used its outstanding achievements in 
these countries to win the trust and ultimately deceive the US regulators into 
acquiring the banks and this continued for a significant amount of time. In a 
bid to conceal its intentions, the bank further colluded with several heads of 
states of foreign Emirates by becoming the most important banker in the 
Middle-East. Furthermore, the bank used reputable US politicians, 
regulators and legislators to conceal their intentions in the face of suspicion. 
This includes Clark Clifford, who was former Defence Secretary, Bert 
Lance, former director of the office of budget and management under 
President Jimmy Carter, and the likes.
220
 
In the periods leading to its closure, suspicions grew regarding fraudulent 
activities in the bank. BCCI was indicted in 1988 regarding drug money 
laundering. Kerry’s Report revealed that the judicial system erred in its 
investigation against BCCI. The justice system worked to frustrate efforts of 
investigators and prosecutors on the case. Notably, a plea agreement was 
entered in 1990 which prevented BCCI workers from revealing information 
about BCCI’s larger criminal environment, particularly ownership of First 
American and other banks across the US.
221
 The plea agreement functioned 
to keep BCCI alive and investigations against the bank practically stopped 
as a result until mid 1991 when William P. Barr became Attorney General. 
The eventual global closure of BCCI can be attributed to New York District 
Attorney; Robert Morgenthau who conducted a criminal investigation of 
BCCI and revealed a chain of events including activities with its England 
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based Auditors, Price Waterhouse regarding ownership of First American. 
The investigation was also very instrumental in stopping the planned 
reorganization of BCCI intended to further conceal BCCI’s criminality. The 
reorganisation was to be among the Bank of England, BCCI’s auditors, 
Price Waterhouse and the government of Abu Dhabi. Subsequently, the 
indictment of BCCI by the New York District Attorney coupled with 
information from Price Waterhouse became a substantial reason for Bank of 
England to close BCCI in 1991.
222
 
It suffices to conclude that till date, investigations regarding BCCI remain 
incomplete and US investigators are faced with the fact that documents are 
being withheld by the British Government as well as the Government of 
Abu Dhabi. The case of BCCI remains an eye opener to the vulnerability of 
the world to international financial crime and control fraud in the banking 
sector that is beyond government parameters. 
2.12 Summary and Conclusion: Bad corporate governance as a 
driver of control fraud 
This chapter reviewed literature on control fraud and corporate governance. 
It can be seen that according to Black, the basis of control fraud is theft by 
deception. This is the foundation upon which the control fraudsters in the 
cases examined perpetrated their fraud. They were prominent members of 
the corporate society, with years of experience in the banking sector. They 
have established levels of trust with regulators and investors who trust their 
judgement and believe their actions. 
A close examination of the cases revealed above would also lead to the 
conclusion that corporate governance is a key to both the occurrence and 
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possible prevention of control fraud. Issues such as regulatory weakness, 
inadequate supervision and lack of accountability run through the cases 
discussed above. It is important to mention that provision of adequate 
regulation in the corporate sector is not only a function of the companies 
alone but the entire corporate community including regulators and 
legislators. Effective corporate governance therefore becomes a collective 
responsibility in the fight against control fraud. A good illustration for 
example, is the case of BCCI. In 1990, the Bank of England advised Price 
Waterhouse of poor corporate governance practices in BCCI such as 
accounting manipulation, financial misrepresentation, high non-performing 
loans and evidence of fraud. The Bank of England, in response to the 
information decided to find a way to prevent its collapse, no criminal action 
was taken against BCCI at the time, neither was any regulatory response 
provided that could curb insider abuse in the bank, but rather the Bank of 
England reached an agreement with BCCI, Abu Dhabi and Price 
Waterhouse whereby Abu Dhabi would guarantee BCCI’s losses and in 
return, the accounts would be certified by Price Waterhouse; the 
consequence of which will deceive depositors and creditors into believing 
that the bank was not in any more danger than it already was, and as a result 
guaranteeing the continuity of the bank. By so doing, the fraud grew even 
higher as regulators became ineffective.  
Furthermore, although corporate governance has received attention in the 
last few decades and various countries have developed appropriate codes of 
corporate governance, control fraud yet remains. This suggests that 
regulation and soft law without participation of all the relevant actors will 
only serve to increase the risk of future control fraud. The answer, therefore, 
lies in enforcement. It is important that corporate participants conform to 
codes and statutes that are consistently applied by regulators and by the 
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competitive market.
223
 Given that the codes in themselves are not enough to 
enforce effective corporate governance and ultimately reduce control fraud 
in the banking industry; it becomes imperative for corporate participation to 
be encouraged.  
In Nigeria, it can be said that control frauds cannot be reduced by the mere 
provision of adequate corporate governance regulation but should be 
complemented with a variety of enforcement mechanisms and most 
importantly the engagement of corporate participants which, when 
combined, could help to prevent future control fraud in Nigerian banks. The 
role of corporate participants in enforcing corporate governance and 
ultimately reducing control fraud therefore becomes important and it is the 
focus of this research to examine this in relation to Nigerian banks. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology and Theoretical underpinnings 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the methodology and theoretical underpinnings of the 
research. The chapter begins with the methodology adopted in the research 
which is the socio-legal methodology. An exploration of this methodology 
is provided in order to establish the reasons for adopting same for the 
purposes of the research. This is then followed by the theoretical 
underpinning to be used for the research, that is, the agency theory. This is 
particularly necessary as the foundation to which director-shareholder 
relationships are based. The principle of ownership and control is also 
examined which is at the core of principal-agent relationships. The chapter 
aims to lay theoretical foundations upon which the research is based.   
Finally, data and sources used in the research are identified; ethical 
considerations and also limitations regarding data collection are also 
explained.  
3.2 Methodology 
The research will adopt a Socio-legal methodology in order to answer the 
research questions. Socio-legal methodology is an approach to analysing 
law, legal phenomena and its relationship with the wider society in order to 
produce findings that were not determined in advance. There will be an 
analysis of the law to investigate its adequacy or otherwise. Socio-legal 
methodology seeks to gain insight into a given research problem from the 
perspective of the local population it involves
224
, in this case, Nigeria. 
Socio-legal methodology aims to answer the ‘why’ or ‘how’ questions 
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through analysis of a number of unstructured information and data. Socio-
legal research is usually effective in obtaining culturally specific 
information. It includes both theoretical and empirical works drawn from a 
socio-scientific point of view involving critical legal studies directed 
towards the concerns, theories and informants of external perspectives with 
the aim of bringing insights that are not available in the context of a purely 
‘black law’ or doctrinal approach.  
The purpose of adopting this method is to achieve an expository research 
which allows for flexibility of researcher to explore the causal link between 
corporate governance regulations and control fraud and also examine the 
peculiarity of the problem of a legal phenomenon with the particular people 
it involves
225
. 
Socio-legal methodology has its relevance to the formation of the research 
questions as well as the purpose and outcome of the research. It is also 
helpful in the determination of data and sources to be employed. It helps to 
contribute to the understanding of the field of enquiry, which is control 
fraud. Furthermore, owing to the fact that control fraud and corruption as a 
whole is a reflection of a combination of underlying issues not covered only 
by the lack of effective regulation, the study aims to understand the links 
between Nigeria’s legal, cultural and social arrangements and the 
facilitation of fraud. In investigating this, the socio-legal approach will be 
adopted to strategically examine why Nigerian banks are confronted with 
the major challenge of control fraud; the aim is to determine the relationship 
between corporate governance regulation in Nigeria and fraud. The 
methodology will allow for materials to be drawn from fields such as Social 
Sciences, including Economics and Sociology towards investigating 
corporate governance and control fraud in Nigeria.  
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The last stage of the research on how corporate governance regulation in 
Nigeria can be improved to prevent future control fraud in banks and would 
necessarily involve qualitative empirical analysis in order to formulate 
strategic recommendations directed towards enforcing legal and policy 
responses in place in a bid to preventing future fraud and promote effective 
corporate governance in the light of the findings of the research.  
Furthermore, although the inadequacy of regulation is a major factor 
responsible for the banking crisis of 2009, it is worth noting that the success 
or otherwise of effective regulation depends on a number of factors. These 
include not only the improvement of the law to provide for adequate 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, but also the facilitation of 
effective corporate behaviour between corporate participants to whom the 
law applies and the wider society. This will therefore require perspectives 
outside the discipline of law such as economics, sociology and politics. The 
methodological approach will thus allow for the research to draw inferences 
and make appropriate recommendations peculiar to Nigeria’s institutional 
configurations. 
3.3 Theoretical Underpinnings 
The research will mainly employ the Agency theory as propounded by 
Jensen and Meckling
226
 in order to examine the relationship between 
corporate participants, particularly, directors and shareholders. 
As Jenson explained: 
‘Agency theory involves a contract under which one or 
more persons (the shareholders) engage another person 
(the directors) to perform some service on their behalf 
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which includes delegating some decision making authority 
for the agent’.227  
Jenson and Meckling begin their analysis by examining the economic theory 
of risk-sharing by Arrow and Wilson
228
 whereby corporate risk is shared 
among individuals or groups. They identified the problem of risk sharing to 
begin when parties have different attitudes towards risk. If both parties are 
utility maximizers, there is a good reason to believe that one will not always 
act in the best interest of the other. As Eisenhardt
229
 explained, agency 
theory is concerned with resolving the problem that could occur when the 
desires or goals of the principal and agent conflicts, a problem of risk 
sharing that could arise when the principal and agent have different attitudes 
towards risk. 
Eisenhardt
 230
 analysed two streams of agency theory developed by Jensen: 
Positivist and principal-agent. Both share a common unit of relationship 
between principal and agent but differ in their mathematical rigour, variable 
and style. While positivist researchers have focused on identifying situations 
that principal and agent are likely to have conflicting goals, principal-agent 
researchers are concerned with the general theory of principal-agent 
relationship that can be applied to employer-employee and other agency 
relationships
231
. Positivist researchers focus mainly on the special case of 
principal-agent relationship in large public corporations while principal-
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agent researchers have included more testable implications involving logical 
deduction and mathematical proof
232
.  
This study will particularly lend more to the positivist agency theory to 
investigate friction between directors and shareholders and how 
controversial practices, mainly boardroom fraud, can be curbed.  
The selected agency theory to be adopted by the research allows for the 
study to critically investigate the relationship between directors and other 
corporate participants as agents who impose costs on shareholders, 
depositors and taxpayers (the principals) and to explore the causal link 
between corporate governance regulations, boardroom fraud and corporate 
corruption. The agency theory by Jensen and Meckling
233
 which was later 
elaborated by Fama and Jensen is based upon the principle of trust as a 
foundation for corporate performance whereby trust involves an agreement 
between parties with asymmetrical access to information.
234
 Shareholders 
therefore ‘trust’ the directors to be stewards of their funds.  
Although corporate governance is replete with a number of theories ranging 
from agency theory to stewardship theory, stakeholder theory, ethical theory 
and resource-dependent theory, this research utilises agency theory to the 
exclusion of others because agency theory can be extended to encompass 
taxpayers and depositors as principals as explained above. Also, agency 
theory makes two specific contributions to corporate governance; first is the 
creation of a monitoring avenue for board of directors. The agency theory is 
premised on monitoring executive behaviours. From an agency perspective, 
boards can be used as monitoring devices for shareholder interests.
235
 
Compensation and reward is therefore based on firm performance whereby 
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boards are rewarded for taking high conceived actions and high risks. The 
success or otherwise of the firm determines whether or not the behaviour of 
corporate participants will be consistent with shareholders’ interests. For 
example, behaviours such as golden parachutes, tunnelling, corporate 
raiding and corporate corruption are less likely when boards are better 
monitors of shareholders’ interests. 
The second contribution of Agency theory is what Eisendhardt describes as 
‘risk implications’. 236  Owing to the uncertainty of the future of every 
organisation, Agency theory promotes organisational thinking by extending 
the boundaries of outcome uncertainty to their implications for creating risk. 
The implication is that outcome uncertainty together with the preferences in 
ability to undertake risks could influence contractual relationships between 
principal and agent.
237
  
Agency theory is therefore relevant in situations where there is conflict of 
interests between principals and agents (in this case, shareholders and 
directors) and where agent opportunism is likely. Agency theory is basically 
premised on the concept of separation of ownership and control whereby 
ownership and management are divided between the principal and agent 
respectively. It thus seems reasonable to adopt agency theory when 
investigating issues of principal-agent nature  
Having said that, it is important to analyse the concept of ownership and 
control as the foundation to which agency theory is based. 
As earlier explained, Jensen and Meckling define agency relationship as a 
contract whereby one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
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delegating some decision-making authority to the agent.
238
 The principals 
are identified as shareholders while the directors are agents. If both parties 
to the relationship are utility maximisers, there is good reason to believe that 
the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal.
239
 They 
further examined the ownership structure of a corporation, taking into 
account how equity ownership by managers can be said to combine their 
interests with that of the shareholders.
240
 
According to them, the principal is able to limit divergences from his 
interest through monitoring costs and the creation of various incentives 
aimed at limiting future deviant activities of the agent.
241
 Monitoring costs 
are usually undertaken by shareholders up to the point that these do not 
exceed agency costs they are aiming to control. For example, providing 
bonding costs (such as advertising costs that results in attracting more 
external scrutiny to the firm thus reducing agency costs) for the agent to 
guarantee that he will not harm the principal, and where this happens, 
ensuring that the principal is compensated. However, more often than not, 
there will be a discrepancy between the agents’ decisions and decisions that 
would serve to optimize the interest of the principal. This is because it is 
generally not feasible for either the principal or agent to ensure that the 
agent will make vital decisions in the interest of the principal at no cost; 
generally, monitoring and bonding costs are usually incurred.
242
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Agency costs are defined by Jensen and Meckling to include monitoring 
expenditures incurred by the principal, bonding expenditures incurred by the 
agent, as well as residual loss.
243
 
According to Fama and Jensen, organisations that tend to separate residual 
risk bearing from decision management are generally complex in nature 
because valuable information is then diffused among many agents of the 
organisation, therefore what we have in most complex organisations are 
diffuse decision control systems of formal decision levels where the 
decision of lower agents (such as managers) are submitted to higher level 
agents (such as the board of directors), initially for ratification and later for 
monitoring.
244
 This is because where there are many residual claimants, 
decision control becomes a costly exercise; hence, the need to separate 
residual risk from decision control. This would then create problems of 
agency relationship between residual claimants and decision agents. The 
separation of decision management and control at all stages in the 
organisation, the incurring of monitoring costs by the residual risk claimers 
and the bonding costs incurred by the agents would collectively help to 
reduce possible agency problems by limiting the power of agents to 
appropriate the interests of residual claimants.
245
  
The need to separate decision control and management would be effective in 
complex organisations as they would both allow relevant applicable 
knowledge to be utilised as and when due because they help to control the 
agency problems that are posed by diffuse residual claims. Furthermore, in 
decision control systems where multiple-member board of directors tend to 
ratify and monitor important decisions as well as choosing, rewarding and 
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dismissing important decisions that bear little or no share of the cost effects 
of their decisions, make it difficult for any form of collusion between 
decision management at the top and control agents.
246
 This ultimately 
facilitates the separation of the management and control of organisations’ 
most crucial decisions.  
It is important to mention here that although the role of corporate 
governance codes, law and regulation is to ensure the accountability of 
managers to shareholders, this poses a potential danger, because in doing so, 
or in their possible failure, they create the possibility of control fraud. 
3.4 Data and Sources 
The research will adopt a combination of legal and non-legal materials to 
answer the research questions. Primary sources to be adopted include the 
Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1990 (now 2004), the Banks 
and Other Financial Instruments Act (BOFIA) 1991 (now 2004), the Central 
Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Act 2007, Investment and Securities Act, 2007, 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN) Act, 1965 amongst 
others. 
Secondary sources include Codes, Guidelines, Policy documents and 
Reports such as the Code of Corporate Governance for Public Companies in 
Nigeria, 2003, Code of Corporate Governance for Banks and Other 
Financial Institutions in Nigeria, 2003, Code of Corporate Governance for 
Banks in Nigeria Post-Consolidation, 2006, CBN Prudential Guidelines for 
Deposit Money Banks.2010, Criminal Code CAP (77) LFN 1990, Code of 
Corporate Governance for Banks and Discount Houses in Nigeria and 
Guidelines for Whistle Blowing in the Nigerian Banking Industry, 2014, 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) of Nigeria Exposure Draft Code of 
Corporate Governance, 2015. 
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Furthermore, materials such as scholarly Articles and books will be taken 
from academic fields in the areas of economics, psychology, philosophy and 
sociology in order to understand the link between Nigerian Corporate 
Governance Regulations and control fraud. 
3.5 Limitations of the Research 
This research is limited to available sources including primary and 
secondary data such as identified above. It is important to state that attempts 
to gather first hand data and information from government bodies such as 
SEC, CBN and EFCC proved abortive. This can be attributed to a number of 
reasons, including the fact that most of the banks in question have either 
been made insolvent or merged with other banks. Several attempts to gather 
information were made in 2013 and 2014 and it can be said that poor record 
keeping in Nigeria coupled by fear of divulging sensitive information 
became a major challenge of data collection throughout the course of this 
research. 
3.6 Ethical Consideration 
During the course of the research, Legal and Policy documents were 
handled with adequate consideration. All data used were based on 
appropriate validation. 
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Chapter 4 
Control Fraud of CEOs in the Nigerian Banking Sector 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the activities of the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) 
in the banking crisis of 2009. The chapter looks at the involvement of the 
five banks’ CEOs and the aftermath of the crisis. It is important to say that 
although some of the members of the board were also arrested with the 
CEOs and charged with fraud, the thesis only focuses on the involvement of 
the CEOs of the banks. 
The limitation of this chapter is due to the unavailability of data regarding 
the other members of the board charged with them. It is interesting to see 
that the CEOs’ cases received lots of publicity from the press and the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) because of their grave involvement in frauds 
and the members of the boards were used as accomplices. It would have 
been good to see the outcome of the cases of these members of the board, 
were they documented.  
The chapter concludes that the activities of the CEOs at the time of the crisis 
could be based on their ability to get away with it for a long time. As earlier 
revealed in the previous chapter, control frauds have the tendency of 
manipulating a system to their advantage. The availability of the CBN’s 
discount window was one of the factors that made the control frauds very 
plausible at the time. It is interesting to know also that the CBN claimed to 
have been unaware of the frauds and internal manipulations going on at the 
time. But could the CBN have been afraid to take them on? Did the CBN 
simply sit back and let the frauds happen due to the connections of the 
CEOs involved? The chapter suggests that at the time of the crisis in 
Nigeria, the country was under the influence of the rich and mighty CEOs 
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that had been involved with politicians and government thus, the CEOs 
were effectively ‘immune’ to any probe or questions. It is the aim of this 
chapter to draw more insights on the pernicious effects of the activities of 
the CEOs in Nigerian banking crisis.  
4.2 The legal position of directors 
For the purposes of this study, it is important to examine the role of 
directors. This is examined by analysing the legal position of directors under 
Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) followed by discussion of the 
control frauds of directors during the crisis. 
Section 244(1) of CAMA defines directors as persons ‘duly appointed by 
the company to manage and conduct the affairs of the company’. 247  A 
director also includes any person on whose instructions directors are 
accustomed to act.
248
 According to Section 283 of the Act: 
‘Directors are trustees of the company's moneys, 
properties and their powers and as such must account for 
all the moneys over which they exercise control and shall 
refund any moneys improperly paid away, and shall 
exercise their powers honestly in the interest of the 
company and all the shareholders, and not in their own 
interests.’’249 
The above definition clearly gives directors control of company’s assets but 
does nothing to prevent them from perpetrating fraud. It is important that 
directors are aware of the nature of their position as agents of the company 
and should be made accountable to the assets managed by them. 
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Furthermore, the definition suggests that shareholders’ interest should be the 
underlying responsibility of directors. CAMA fails to include other 
stakeholders’ interest in identifying the legal position of directors and tends 
to lean towards shareholder primacy as most important in the definition of 
directors, which is, putting shareholders at the forefront of corporate 
performance. This position is different in the United Kingdom. The 2006 
Companies Act places the overall success of the company at the forefront of 
directors’ duties. Section 172 stresses that directors must have regard to the 
long-term consequences of their decision and should act fairly between 
members of the company and in good faith for the benefit of its members as 
a whole, (including employees, suppliers and customers) and should take 
into account the impact of the company’s operations on the community and 
environment in order to promote high business standards. Placing 
shareholder primacy at the centre of directors’ duties may be quite 
overbearing in Nigeria.
250
 In the quest to act in good faith, the demand to 
make shareholders happy while also acting in the best interest of the 
company seems hard to achieve in Nigeria. Directors may lose sight of what 
‘the best interests’ of the company are in the quest to satisfy shareholders or 
even themselves which can lead to activities such as share price 
manipulation, accounting inflation and earnings management. 
That notwithstanding, it is important to mention that shareholders do not 
have the right to interfere with management. This decision was held in the 
Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v Cunninghame
251
 where 
the effect of distinction of powers between board of directors and members 
in general meeting was illustrated. In this case, the company’s Articles 
vested management powers on directors and the courts refused to order 
directors to abide by the decision of the shareholders in general meeting 
requiring them to dispose of company’s assets. The court of appeal affirmed 
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that directors are not agents of shareholders and are therefore not bound to 
abide by shareholders’ resolutions where the rules provide for different 
procedures.
252
 The courts considered members in general meeting as 
‘constituting the company’. The courts were also reluctant to regard 
members as the ‘leader’ of the company since doing so would create a 
conflicting situation in cases of disputes between members and directors.
253
  
Furthermore, directors’ fiduciary duties are provided for in Section 279 of 
CAMA where it states that directors stand in a fiduciary duty towards the 
company and shall act in utmost good faith in every transaction.
254
 A 
separate fiduciary duty to shareholders is provided in subsection 2 of 
Section 279 where it states that a director owes fiduciary duty to the 
company where he is acting as an agent of the shareholder and where the 
shareholder is dealing with company securities.
255
 It therefore follows that 
fiduciary duty directly to shareholders should only arise on rare 
occasions.
256
 
The section goes further to state that directors are to act at all times in what 
they believe is the best interest of the company and in a careful, diligent and 
skilful manner.
257
 This duty of care and skill is further elaborated in Section 
282 where it is stated that directors are to act honestly and in good faith in 
the best interests of the company, and shall exercise reasonable care, 
diligence and skill which is expected of them. The section also provides that 
failure to do this will constitute an action for negligence of breach of duty of 
care.
258
 Likewise, each director shall be individually responsible for the 
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actions of the board in which he takes part and mere absence of boards 
deliberation, unless justified will not relieve him of such liability.
259
 
Conflict of interests is provided for in Section 280 of the Act where 
directors are prohibited from making secret profits or achieving unnecessary 
benefits. In effect, the personal interest of a director is not to conflict with 
any of his legal duties under the Act.
260
 
On the issue of enforceability of directors’ duties, Section 279(9) provides 
that any duty imposed on the director shall be enforceable against the 
director by the company. An interpretation of this would mean that actions 
can only be brought against directors in the name of the company, for 
instance in a derivative action and not individually.  
It is important to emphasise that the duties of directors across jurisdictions 
have impacted on corporate governance and indeed control fraud over time. 
In the case of Nigeria, it can be said that the enforcement of directors’ duties 
has been lacking, therefore creating an avenue for perpetration of fraud. 
This is due to the ignorant nature of other actors in the web of corporate 
governance, particularly, shareholders who have left the sole management 
and running of the company to directors and are more concerned with 
profit-making.
261
  
Going back to the theme of this thesis which is control fraud in Nigerian 
banks, it is useful to reiterate the position of Black that control frauds are 
financial super predators who use the company as a vehicle and avenue for 
perpetration of fraud.
262
 Authorised access to assets and properties of the 
bank provides opportunity for fraud through a breach of trust. This is what 
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Black calls ‘theft by deception’ whereby the perpetrator creates and then 
exploits trust to cheat others and erode the trust.
263
  
Whether or not directors’ duties may help prevent control fraud cannot be 
known for certain in Nigeria. This is because control fraud is an institutional 
problem that is culture specific to the country it applies to and merely 
strengthening the duties of directors alone may not serve the purpose of 
preventing future control fraud in Nigerian banks because everyone has a 
role to play in the web of corporate governance. It suffices to say that the 
legal provisions in the country as it relates to directors seem to be adequate 
enough as to potentially prevent or significantly reduce control fraud. 
However, it is lack of enforcement of these laws that seems to pose the risk 
of fraud. As would be seen shortly, control frauds as control freaks utilise 
ongoing legal and regulatory measures as a fraud vehicle and because they 
are considered to be notable authorities, they can develop a workable system 
of getting away with control fraud, while still maintaining their dignity. 
Enforcement therefore becomes necessary for future control frauds to be 
prevented or reduced in Nigerian banks. 
4.3 Development of control fraud in Nigeria 
4.3.1 The banking reforms of 2004 
Banking reforms all around the world have been necessitated by economical 
and institutional prerogatives. Recapitalization can be said to be a regulatory 
response to avert a perceived or impending banking crisis. It is important to 
state that one major factor that can lead to banking crisis is weak corporate 
governance. This can form the basis for control fraud that can then lead to 
bank failures. Adegbaju and Olokoyo consider a number of factors that can 
also trigger banking crisis; these include undercapitalization, insolvency, 
persistent illiquidity, high level of non-performing loans and weak corporate 
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governance.
264
 Countries with weak financial system can be vulnerable to 
banking crisis owing to the inability of the bank to meet its financial 
obligations to stakeholders; the result of which will be a run on banks with 
depositors withdrawing money in fear that the bank may be insolvent.
265
 
Mechanisms such as recapitalization, consolidation in terms of mergers and 
acquisition, use of bridge banks and asset management companies are 
timely interventions to prevent bank crisis. The role of consolidation is to 
strengthen the banking system, enhance healthy competition, increase 
efficiency, and also to strengthen the intermediary role of banks, particularly 
in overall economic development. Berger argues that increase in the size of 
banks through consolidation could lead to increase in returns and 
elimination of weak banks can reduce industry risks.
266
  
However, De Nicolo et al argue that bank consolidation increases banks’ 
propensity to risk taking through leverages and off balance sheet 
transactions and complex entities are also costly to manage.
267
 It suffices to 
say that reforms in the form of recapitalization, consolidation and the likes 
are determined by the country’s economic and developmental needs. In the 
case of Nigeria, reform is necessary for strong capital base which will 
become useful where there are non-performing assets. Reform in the form 
of recapitalization is usually done through consolidation.
268
  As Lemo puts 
it, the reforms are necessary to develop an efficient banking system in the 
role of financial intermediation and to promote the nations’ economic 
development.
269
 It can therefore be said that reforms are a positive step 
                                                          
264
 Adegbaju, A. A. and Olokoyo, F. O. (2008) Recapitalization and Banks’ Performance: A 
Case Study of Nigerian Banks. 6(1) African Economic and Business Review, 1-17. 2 
265
Chapter five on the role of regulation sheds more light on bank run 
266
 Berger, A. N. (2000). The Integration of the Financial Services Industry: Where Are the 
Efficiencies? FEDS Paper, No. 2000: 36.  
267
 De Nicolo, Gianni, et al. (2003). Bank Consolidation, Internationalization and 
Conglomeration: Trends and Implications for Financial Risk. IMF Working Paper, 3(158) 
268
 Adegbaju and Olokoyo (n.264) 3 
269
 Lemo, T. ‘Regulatory Oversight and Stakeholder Protection’ A Paper Presented at the 
BGL Mergers and Acquisitions Interactive Seminar, held at Eko Hotels & Suites. V. I., on 
June 24 2005.  
 84 
 
towards attaining a diversified and strong financial system in the country 
with adequate guarantee of depositors’ investments. Adegbaju and Olokoyo 
examine recapitalization as a means of increasing the debt stock of the 
company either through issuing additional shares with existing shareholders 
or obtaining new shareholders or both.
270
 Apart from consolidation in terms 
of mergers and acquisitions, recapitalization can also take the form of 
foreign direct investment.
271
 The aim, in the long run, is to increase the 
capital stock of the bank and to sustain the development of the national 
economy. However, writers argue that recapitalization may only raise 
liquidity in short term and may not guarantee the required macroeconomic 
environment necessary for asset quality and profitability.
272
 
The table below summarises the various stages of revolution and reform 
experienced by Nigerian banks. 
Table 2: The stages of banking reforms in Nigeria 
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1
st
 Reform Era                              2
nd
 Reform Era                                    Third Reform Era        Fourth Reform Era                                                                                                                                                                     
1929-1951                                       1952-1971                                            1982-2004                                2004-Date 
Over 100 Banks 
established In the 
Banking boom between 
1940 and 1950 
 
Attrition of 30 private 
banks due to poor 
management, low 
capital, debt overhang 
and the financial shock 
caused by the 1930’s 
recession 
 
 
 
 
British and French 
Banks established in 
1949 
 
 
Agbonmagbe (Wema 
bank) established in 
1945, ACB IN 1948 
Enactment of the 1952 
Banking Ordinance 
Establishment of the 
CBN 
No. of tradable financial 
instruments increased 
in Money market: 
Treasury bills (1960), 
Money Fund (1962), 
Commercial Bills 
(1968), Treasury 
Certificates (1968), 
Certificates of Deposits, 
Bankers Unit funds and 
Eligible Loan Stocks 
(1968) 
 
Banking amendment of 
June 1962 raised 
minimum share capital 
to GBP250,000.00 
 
Banking Decree No. 1 of 
February 1969 and the 
Banking amendment 
Decree No. 3 of 1970 
imposed more stringent 
conditions in the 
Industry 
Industry dominated by 
government owned 
banks via Indigenisation 
Act of 1971 
Share Capital raised to 
GBP600,000 (local) and 
GBP1.5m (foreign) 
By 1980, there were 26 
banks 
National Economic 
Emergency Decree in the 
wake of financial distress in 
the 1980’s and 1990’s (SAP) 
Era 
120 Banks (66 Commercial, 
24 Merchant) 
Prudent Guidelines 
introduced in 1990 
Bank branches increased 
from 40 in 1985 to over 
2000 in 1992 
 
 
Public Sector accounts 
transferred from CBN to 
banks in 1999 
 
 
 
Universal banking in 
2001with N1bn capital base, 
which later increased to 
N2bn with 2004 as deadline 
Increase in 
capitalisation 
requirements by 
1150% to N25 billion 
No. of banks reduced 
from 89 to 24 
Increase in competition 
leading to Economic 
growth 
Total asset rose by 
439% to N15trn 
Nigerian banks 
accounted for over 
65% of stock market 
capitalisation  
Global economic crisis 
and structural lapses in 
the NSE leads to 
collapse of the stock 
market with banks 
exposed to increased 
NPL’s 
Sharp turndown in oil 
prices leading to 
introduction of 
unorthodox policies 
Standard and poor 
downgrades 
New CBN governor 
takes over intending to 
sanitise the banking 
system with emphasis 
on Regulation, 
Reporting and Risk 
Management 
8 CEO’s and their 
respective boards were 
sacked, CBN injects 
N420bn ($2.8bn) into 
the distressed banks 
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Source: Atuche F, CBN Seminar, May 2009.
273
 
As seen above, a major reform in the banking industry took place in 2004 
and will be examined below. 
In 2004, the then CBN governor, Professor Charles Soludo announced a 13-
point reform agenda for Nigerian banks.
274
 According to him, total banking 
sector assets were less than 20% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) and bank loans contributed to about 4% of the country’s GDP at the 
time.
275
 Low capitalization therefore made banks more risky and therefore 
more susceptible to professional misconducts and unethical practices, and 
ultimately leading to inability to finance the economy. This is because the 
CBN believed that banks’ unethical practices, that is, weak corporate 
governance practices resulted in low capitalization. It was therefore thought 
that recapitalization would; among other things result in sound corporate 
governance in Nigerian banks.  
It is important to state that a set of corporate governance rules was put in 
place in 2006 (the first of its kind in Nigeria) as an aftermath of the reform 
which banks were encouraged to follow. This is known as the CBN Code 
for corporate governance for banks and other financial institutions (post 
consolidation), 2006 which was intended to embrace international standards 
of corporate governance in Nigerian banks, to promote greater transparency, 
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disclosure, and also strengthen the functional role of board of directors by 
eliminating the role of executive chairman.
276
 
The reason for this is because according to the CBN, consolidation through 
mergers and acquisition requires risk management and supervision, and 
most importantly, new corporate governance standards.
277
  
Furthermore, the main objective of the reform is to promote an efficient and 
sound financial system; this was to be achieved by improving core themes 
of corporate governance such as checks and balances, accountability of 
directors, duties and functions of the board, audit committee and 
shareholders responsibility. It can therefore be said that in effect, the 
recapitalization exercise was meant ensure effective corporate governance 
within Nigerian banks.  
The 13-point reform agenda by the CBN included the following:: 
- Minimum capital requirement of N25 Billion ($200 million at the 
time) by the end of December 2005 
- Adoption of risk-focused and rule-based regulatory framework 
- Phased withdrawal of public sector funds from banks 
- Consolidation of banks through mergers and acquisitions 
- Zero tolerance for weak corporate governance, misconduct and lack 
of transparency 
- Completion of Electronic Financial Analysis Surveillance System (e-
Fass) 
- Establishment of Asset Management Company 
- Promotion of the enforcement of dormant laws 
- Revision and update of relevant laws 
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- Establishment of Financial Intelligence Unit and closer collaboration 
with the Economic and Financial Services Commission (EFCC) 
The banking revolution was to be completed within 18 months and involved 
both foreign and local banks in Nigeria. It was recorded that the policy 
revolution was the first of its kind in Nigeria.
278
 The CBN, through support 
from the president, senate and house of parliament set up a ‘war room’ with 
competent professionals such as government officials, accountants and 
lawyers with the aim of creating an operational structure for the revolution. 
According to Soludo, the exercise saw the collaboration of corporate 
agencies of the government such as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), Federal Inland 
Revenue Service (FIRS) and National Deposit Insurance Commission 
(NDIC) in supporting the CBN with the revolution.
279
 The entire exercise 
led to reduction of the 89 banks in Nigeria to 25 banks through mergers and 
acquisition and 14 banks also had their licenses revoked.
280
  
The CBN proudly announced that it was the first time the banking sector 
experienced a consolidation of such nature without recourse to public 
treasury and this indicated a new dawn for Nigerian banks. 
By the following year, the banking reform seemed a success. In 2007, 14 
Nigerian banks were recorded among the top 1000 banks in the world and 
by 2008, 2 Nigerian banks were among the top 300 in the world. It suffices 
to say that the banking reform of 2004 was a ‘perfect solution’ in the wake 
of global corporate governance revolution. Regrettably, as will be seen 
shortly, the banking revolution was not enough in itself to prevent control 
fraud in banks and neither did it prevent financial scandals in other 
companies. 
                                                          
278
 Ibid 
279
 Ibid 
280
 Ibid. The number subsequently reduced to 24 due to voluntary merger and acquisition of 
two of the banks 
 89 
 
4.3.2 Cadbury’s financial reporting scandal 
In the periods leading up to the Cadbury scandal, Nigeria witnessed notable 
downfall of major companies and financial institutions, most importantly, 
the banking sector. The NDIC reported that in 1989, seven banks were 
distressed; 1990 also witnessed a total of nine; eight in 1991; thirteen in 
1992; twenty four in 1993 and four Banks were actually liquidated in 
1994
281
; five in 1995 and a shocking number of twenty six banks as at 
January 16, 1998
282
. 
In view of this, on June 15, 2000, a seventeen-member committee was 
inaugurated by the SEC
283
 in collaboration with the CAC
284
 headed by Mr 
Atedo Peterside, the then chairman of Cadbury Nigeria Plc.  The aim of the 
committee included identifying weaknesses in the current corporate 
governance practices in Nigeria with respect to public companies, 
examination of practices in other jurisdictions with a view to adopt 
international best practices in Nigeria, making recommendations on 
necessary changes to current practices and to examine any other issue 
relating to corporate governance in Nigeria.
285
 
It is worth mentioning that Cadbury Nigeria Plc was a notable contributor to 
the work of the Committee whose report formed the basis of the Code of 
Best Practices of Corporate Governance for public listed companies 
published in 2003. The company’s weighty contribution is also attributed to 
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its connection with Sir Adrian Cadbury, the reputable Chairman of Cadbury 
Schweppes in Nigeria and the Chairman of the Cadbury Commission which 
published the Corporate Governance Guidelines in the United Kingdom in 
1992
286
. 
From the above, it is important to therefore examine the scandal of Cadbury 
Nigeria Plc as one of the notable early cases of control fraud in Nigeria, 
soon after the establishment of the first corporate governance code in 
2003.
287
 The Cadbury financial scandal can be said to be the ‘Enron’ of 
Nigeria. It therefore becomes imperative to examine the facts of the case. 
Cadbury Nigeria Plc was incorporated in Nigeria in 1965 as a 100% owned 
subsidiary of Cadbury Schweppes.
288
 The company mainly deals with the 
manufacture and sale of sugar, gum and beverages in Nigeria. In 1976, the 
company sold 40% of its shares to Nigerian investors and Cadbury 
Schweppes owned majority shares of 60%. The company was listed on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange with N750,000,000.00 authorised share capital 
and N500,424,423.00 paid up capital.
289
 Over the years, Nigeria grew to 
become an important marketer for Cadbury Schweppes group and became 
the second largest marketer within the African region after South Africa; 
and is (joint) 4
th
 largest within Europe.
290
 In terms of employees, there has 
been a massive increase from 50 in 1950 with a yearly turnover of £120,000 
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to 2,429 with yearly turnover of $200million.
291
 In 2003, it was among the 
top 10 of the 258 quoted companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange.
292
 By 
the end of January 2006, the company had a net value of £120million with 
annual profit of £20million.
293
  
However, on 16
th
 November 2006, upon alleged accounting irregularities, 
Cadbury Schweppes conducted a preliminary accounting investigation 
which confirmed a significant amount of financial overstatement that 
continued for a number of years.
294
 The investigation revealed that the 
financial falsification was a collaborative act by Akintola Williams Delloite 
(AWD) and the Managing Director (MD)/CEO, Bunmi Oni and the Finance 
Director, Ayo Akadiri who were immediately sacked and replaced by 
expatriates. The company also predicted a loss of around £5 to £10 million 
in 2006.
295
 Cadbury Nigeria Plc was quick to refute these allegations and 
employed an audit firm, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to conduct an 
independent audit of the firm. This then necessitated the involvement of the 
SEC which launched its own investigations and the issues for determination 
included inadequate disclosure and non-compliance with Corporate 
Governance Codes, deteriorating cash flows, declining profitability, 
worsening leverage flow and obtaining loans for the payment of dividends 
to shareholders.
296
  
On 12
th
 December 2006, Cadbury Nigeria Plc issued a statement to the 
stakeholders of the company, upon investigation by PwC confirming a 
significant and deliberate overstatement of the company’s account over a 
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period of years which will lead the company to announce a loss of between 
N1 to N2 billion. In addition, the company will also make exceptional 
charges of around N13 to N15 billion due to profit and balance sheet 
overstatements which will significantly impact on the company’s’ 
reserves.
297
 
Consequently, the directors and management were invited for questioning 
regarding violations of the provisions of the Investments and Securities Act, 
1999, the SEC Rules and Regulations 2000 (as amended), the Code of 
Conduct for Capital Market Operations and their employees as well as the 
Code of Corporate Governance of Nigeria. The Commissions 
Administrative Proceedings Committee (APC) was particularly interested in 
AWD as external auditors involved in two ongoing scandals at the time.  
The investigation of the committee, which was concluded in March 2008, 
revealed a number of findings, especially on the involvement of AWD in the 
companies involved. Specifically, APC found that: 
‘Professional scepticism generally requires that an auditor 
should not believe documents presented by a client till it 
sees evidence that they are genuine. In the company’s 
case, AWD did not probe any further or doubt documents 
presented by the company in spite of the internal control 
lapses detected and revealed in the management letters. 
AWD and in particular the partners that handled the 
company’s  account, did not carry out their assignment 
with high level of professionalism and diligence expected 
of a reputable accounting firm of its calibre.
298
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It was also found by the commission that the companies had filed annual 
report and accounts which contained mis-statements, that the completed 
audit report of PwC which was submitted to SEC revealed a mis-statement 
of approximately N13billion for the companies as at September 2006 and 
both the company directors, auditors and persons in charge of and 
responsible for the financial documents were liable. Consequently, the MD, 
Bunmi Oni and the Finance Director, Ayo Akadiri were banned from 
operating in the Nigerian Capital Market and holding directorship positions 
in any public company in Nigeria, and their names were passed to the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). AWD was also 
ordered to pay a fine of N20 million.
299
  
It is important to note that in the periods leading to the crisis, the Cadbury 
scandal was very well pronounced and can be said to have contributed to the 
commencement of corporate governance regime in line with international 
standards in Nigeria.  
4.4 Control fraud of the five CEOs 
On the 4
th
 of June, 2009, a new CBN governor was appointed. The CBN 
Governor, Mallam Sanusi Lamido Sanusi realised at the time that a total of 
N256.571billion was outstanding due to the use of the Expanded Discount 
Window (EDW),
300
 majority of which was owed by five banks: Oceanic 
Bank, Intercontinental Bank, Fin Bank, Afribank and Union Bank. Although 
the five banks are not the only banks in use of the EDW, it is their persistent 
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use that points to a more in-depth problem, which the CBN identified as 
financial instability due to huge amounts of non-performing loans.
301
 
The problem in the said banks certainly had a negative effect on the market 
due to the problems in their balance sheet and led to a destabilization of the 
inter-bank market. The CBN had to guarantee the inter-bank market and 
stopped access to the EDW.  By so doing, the CBN could then conduct a 
thorough investigation of the banks. At the end of their investigation, it was 
discovered that the banks were struggling to meet their commitments to 
depositors and were in grave financial difficulty.  
Following the investigation, on the 14
th
 of August 2009, the Central Bank 
Governor, fired and replaced the CEOs and Board of Directors of the five 
banks in accordance with Sections 33 and 35 of the Banks and Other 
Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA) 1991.
302
 
The investigation further revealed that the non-performing loans that were 
granted by these banks amounted to 39.9 per cent of total loans in the 
banking sector.
303
  
The table below lists the five banks and their respective loans. 
         Table 3: Non-performing loans of five distressed banks 
S/N Bank Size of Loan (N) 
1. Oceanic Bank Plc 278.2 billion 
2. Intercontinental Bank Plc 210.9 billion 
3. Afri Bank Plc 141.9 billion 
4. Union Bank Plc 73.6 billion 
5. FinBank Plc 42.5 billion 
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Total  747.0 billion 
Source: Newswatch, 24 August 2009, This Day, 27 August 2009. 
The CBN then declared intervention in the distressed banks in order to 
prevent their collapse by injecting a total of about N400billion ($1.9billion) 
in form of Tier 2 Capital which is to be repaid from future capitalization.
304
 
In the investigations conducted by the CBN, it was discovered that the 
CEOs and Board of Directors of the below five banks were allegedly guilty 
of a number of corporate frauds, particularly in the granting of unsecured 
loans to both themselves and their friends which later became ‘bad loans’ 
and mismanaged bank funds with unexplainable transfers and withdrawals 
from the bank. 
 The cases that follow explore the control fraud of the CEOs of the top five 
banks. 
4.4.1 Oceanic Bank – Cecilia Ibru 
In 2007, Oceanic Bank International ranked 110 in the list of 200 top 
African businesses, at number 12 in the West African sub-region and 16 in 
sub-Saharan Africa.
305
 The CEO at the time, Mrs Cecilia Ibru (OFR), a 
onetime renowned dignitary in the country became the first female CEO to 
declare over N1billion ($4.9million), in profit in April 2007.
306
  
In 2009, the bank was however, found to be in distress by the CBN and 
Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) due to a wave of fraudulent 
practices of the CEO. It was discovered that although the maximum limit for 
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loans was N1 billion, the CEO had approved loans of over N3billion 
without prior consultation to the board. Some of which were granted to 
people whom she was affiliated with, contrary to Section 17(1)(a)(b) and 
punishable under Section 17(2) of BOFIA.
307
Instances of unaccountable 
diversion of depositors’ funds were also discovered contrary to Section 
283(1) of Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA).
308
  
It was discovered that the former CEO used companies to loot funds 
belonging to depositors. It was revealed that she acquired over 430 million 
shares in Oceanic Bank Plc in the name of a company called Africa 
Lloyd.
309
 It was also discovered that in the name of different companies 
(such as Cloudy Heights, Enifor, Prisky Gold, Bliss Bloss, Velvox and 
Circular Global Ltd), she acquired over 275 million shares in First Bank 
Nigeria plc valued at N273,795,139, over 64 million shares in Union Bank of 
Nigeria valued at N64,218,000; 93 million shares in the United Bank for Africa at 
N93,750,000 and shares in Oceanic Bank for N1,076,220,421.
310
 The CEO had 
presented manipulated documents to both the CBN and other regulatory 
agencies contrary to Section 28(1) of the BOFIA which requires that every 
balance sheet and profit and loss account of the bank shall reveal the true 
and fair view of the state of affairs of the bank. 
It was further discovered that she had bought properties in the USA in the 
names of her daughter-in-law, Kemi Da Silva, her granddaughter, Janet and 
her son, Obaroor, and also bought a total of 57 properties in Lagos, Abuja 
and Port-Harcourt.
311
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On a 25 count charge, the former CEO pleaded guilty and entered a plea 
bargain, thereby reducing her charges to three and she was sentenced to 
eighteen months imprisonment for all the three counts. This means six 
months imprisonment for each of the three counts. However, the jail terms 
are to run concurrently, which implies that she will only spend six months in 
prison for the three counts. Justice Dan Abutu in his judgment also ordered 
that the former CEO forfeit funds worth over N1.2billion in cash and 
assets.
312
 Oceanic bank was subsequently merged with Eco Bank and has 
since ceased to exist. 
The decision of the court is quite surprising, bearing in mind the gravity of 
the offence. The question that comes to mind would be ‘is six months 
adequate enough to prevent others from doing the same?’ what is the 
yardstick for the court’s decision?’ This would also lead to further questions 
on the judiciary and its independence. As will be seen in the course of this 
thesis, the judiciary was used as a tool for manipulating justice during in the 
aftermath of the control fraud. It can therefore be said that the judgment of 
the court is perhaps a reflection of political influence from the CEO, so that 
her sentence is mitigated.  
Furthermore, after the court judgment ordering Cecilia Ibru to forfeit her 
assets to the tune of N191billion upon allegations of fraud brought by the 
CBN through the EFCC, the EFCC is yet to account for the whereabouts of 
these assets to the investing public, particularly shareholders. Upon a suit 
filed by the President of the Shareholders Association of Nigeria, Mr Chuks 
Nwachukwu under the Freedom of Information Act, the court ordered a 72 
hour ultimatum for the declaration of both the whereabouts of the assets as 
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well as the total amounts spent during prosecution.
313
 This order saw the 
CBN filing an appeal, arguing that disclosing the whereabouts of the assets 
of Cecilia Ibru would mean disclosing the money it also paid to the lawyers 
which is confidential information. Nwachukwu, who represented the 
shareholders, accused the CBN of approving the sale of Oceanic Bank to 
Ecobank for N25billion where there were assets that could be put to the 
bank for up to N191billion.314 
While delivering its ruling, the Appeal court directed that the required 
information should be provided; noting that none of the information sought 
threatens national security and compelled the EFCC to abide by the 
Freedom of Information Act which requires all public institution to disclose 
information regarding their process and structures.
315
 
To date, the CBN refuse to disclose the whereabouts of the assets, and this 
has raised a number of concerns.
316
  
4.4.2 Intercontinental Bank Plc – Erastus Akingbola 
For two decades, Intercontinental Bank was ranked as one of the country’s 
top five banks; in 2008, it became the only Nigerian financial institution in 
the top 500 banks in the world according to Financial Times and was widely 
known across the country for international recognitions and awards.
317
  
However, in 2009, following allegations of granting non-performing loans 
worth N210.9billion, the former Executive Vice Chairman and CEO, 
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Erastus Akingbola, was removed by the CBN as the bank showed distress 
and liquidity tendencies with the inappropriate use of the EDW and 
engaging in business activities prejudicial to the interests of its creditors and 
customers. 
According to the CBN: 
‘Intercontinental Bank Plc showed signs of a troubled 
bank with its inability to meet its maturing obligations 
without persistent recourse to the ‘expanded discount 
window’ of the CBN and is in dire need of capital...the 
bank was contravening the BOFIA, especially with 
regards to maintenance of minimum capital and liquidity 
ratios, treatment and use of commercial papers and book 
keeping and accounts reflecting a true and fair view of the 
financial position of the bank. Worse still, the bank had 
insufficient assets to cover its liabilities...’318 
Upon further investigations by the EFCC, it was discovered that despite the 
financial distress of the bank, the board constantly approved holiday 
packages worth $10,000 to its non-executive directors. This was contrary to 
the Code of Corporate Governance for banks which in fact limits non-
executive directors to sitting allowances and surely can be said to be a 
mechanism devised to bribe and get them on board, using fat pay packages 
to command subordination. The former CEO was also discovered to have 
granted loans to customers with accurate financial statements as well as 
Memorandum and Articles of Association and with less valuable collaterals 
contrary to Section 17(b) of BOFIA. 
The type of control fraud in Intercontinental Bank can be linked to what 
Black calls ‘The Yes Men’ as explained in the previous chapter. This is a 
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type of fraud where the CEO uses constant praises and monetary benefits to 
win the necessary people on board. They use their power and influence to 
‘bully and bamboozle’ their allies. 319  The approval of excessive pay 
packages for non-executive directors goes to show the extent to which 
control frauds will go to conceal their intention. The audited statements of 
the bank also reflected insider loans worth N26.78billion of which 
N20billion was non-performing. A total of undisclosed non-performing loan 
facility of N87.61billion was discovered as a violation of Section 28(1) of 
the BOFIA.
320
 
The EFCC in conclusion of its investigations charged the former CEO for 
alleged corrupt practices on a 22 count money-laundering charge of tax 
fraud, theft, criminally granting of loans, share price manipulation, insider 
trading, reckless consideration of credit facilities, obtaining by false 
pretence and abuse of office. The EFCC further alleged that the bank 
engaged in serious economic and financial crimes to the total of 
N346.19billion. Further analysis discovered illegal transfer of about 
N10.7billion from Intercontinental Bank to the client account of Fuglers 
solicitors in London, a group of solicitors unknown to the bank.
321
 It was 
further discovered that the MD had also transferred money illegally to a 
number of companies of which he was major shareholder. Further 
investigations conducted by the EFCC revealed that between May and June 
2009, a total amount of N8.685billion was looted and transferred from the 
bank and its subsidiaries to Tropic Finance Limited and other companies in 
which the CEO, together with his wife, were major shareholders.
322
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The investigation further led to the arrest of seven non-executive directors 
and members of the board of directors who were also arraigned on an 18 
count charge for collusion with the CEO in granting unsecured loans of over 
N36billion to companies in which they were also directors; and taking 
$10,000 holiday packages in contravention of the BOFIA, together with 
manipulation of the balance sheet to conceal the existence of non-
performing loans worth N87.6billion.
323
  
The case was commenced in the Nigerian Criminal Court and is awaiting 
hearing after a plea of not guilty has been entered by the former CEO and all 
the seven non-executive directors. However, after being sacked by the CBN, 
the former CEO moved to London where a civil case was commenced 
against him. In the case of Access Bank V. Akingbola & Ors, the former 
CEO was charged with diverting billions of depositors’ funds to purchase 
properties in the UK and for devising an illegal share buyback scheme.
324
 
According to Judge Michael Burton of the High Court of Justice, Queens 
Bench division: 
‘I cannot see that, in the light of the findings I have made, 
the Defendant can be said to have acted, either in relation 
to the first and second heads of claim, to which alone this 
issue is directed, “honestly and reasonably” ...Quite apart 
from being contrary to Nigerian Law, it was simply 
wrong-headed, and was plainly a substantial contributing 
factor to the collapse of the bank’325 
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The court ruled that Akingbola was liable for directing the bank to buy back 
its own shares at a loss of about N145billion ($902million), diverting 
monies to companies controlled by him or his family and using 
Intercontinental funds to buy real estate in the UK. He was therefore ordered 
to return N165billion looted from bank funds.
326
 
The case of Intercontinental Bank is a rather surprising one. In Nigeria, the 
case was commenced at the criminal court but due to the fact that the CEO 
had fled to the UK and also because he had purchased some properties there 
as well which became questionable, a civil case was therefore commenced 
in the UK. The swift judicial system in the United Kingdom meant that he 
was tried and found guilty in 2012, three years after the banking crisis.  
Upon Akingbola’s return to Nigeria, the CBN continued his trial at the 
criminal court and this went on for three years. In that time, all possible 
efforts were made to frustrate the case and strings were being pulled by the 
CEO. It is important to say that the judiciary was being used to frustrate the 
case. According to the CBN governor, after three years of long trial, the 
case was established before the court and to the amazement of everybody, 
just two weeks before a decision was made, the judge was being transferred 
to the Federal High Court; at the very end of trial!
327
 A lot of questions were 
raised as to the legality or otherwise of the judge’s miraculous promotion. 
This no doubt, raised suspicion regarding the political and judicial influence 
in the case. To date, the CEO was never found guilty of the allegations 
against him.  
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4.4.3 FinBank – Okey Nwosu 
Before joining First Atlantic Bank in 2002, Okey Nwosu worked was an 
engineer with Dowell Schlumberger. He also worked with Arthur Anderson 
as an accountant. In 1991, Okey Nwosu joinged Diamond bank and later 
became the general manager in 2003, he was made the managing director 
and chief executive officer of First Atlantic bank.The bank later merged 
with other banks and was known as FinBank. 
Between 2008 and 2009, the CEO; Okey Nwosu was accused of failing to 
produce a true and fair report of the financial state of the bank to the CBN 
by incorrectly importing N47.6billion of commercial papers in its statement 
of assets and liabilities thereby obtaining credit facilities under the 
Expanded Discount Window.
328
  
The former Managing Director of the bank, Okey Nwosu, was accused by 
the EFCC of looting N19.2 billion from the bank by recklessly granting 
unsecured loans worth over N9.3billion and using a number of companies to 
secure a total of 612,558,934 shares at FinBank at about N6.1billion in order 
to raise the financial value of share prices on the stock market, thereby 
misleading others to purchase shares in the bank.
329
 This is contrary to Rule 105 of 
the Investment and Securities Act prohibiting activities intended to create false or 
misleading appearance of active trading. The companies include Eureka Global 
Venture Ltd, Coast Lake Nig. Ltd, Scannel Investment Ltd, Frebond Real Estate 
Ltd, Tyco Food Processor Ltd, Busch Machine and Tools Ltd and Ondden Oil and 
Gas Ltd.
330
 The MD was also accused of laundering N33.2billion from the 
bank and to have conspired to launder a total of N24.3billion in 
collaboration with three other directors of the bank which they allegedly 
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purchased over 20 billion shares in several transactions under the name of 
various companies valued at N18,188,083,059.35.
331
 
In Charge No: ID/115C/2011 between Okey Nwosu, Dayo Famoroti, Agnes 
Ebubedike and Danjuma Ocholi V. Federal Republic of Nigeria, the 
plaintiffs pleaded not guilty to a 90 count charge against them by the EFCC 
which included alleged stealing and illegal conversion of N19.2 billion, 
money-laundering amounting to N100 billion, insider abuse and share 
manipulation and all of them were granted bail. They then launched an 
appeal at the Lagos High court requesting that the EFCC quash the charges 
made against them. This was refused by Justice Lateefa Okunnu of the 
Lagos High court on 8
th
 October 2013 and the plaintiffs launched another 
appeal at the Court of Appeal. On 21
st
 November 2013, in Appeal No: 
CA/L/601/2011, the Court of Appeal overruled the earlier ruling of the 
Lagos High Court refusing to quash the charges by the EFCC against the 
appellants. The effect of this meant that the charges against the appellants 
were quashed. In fact, the Court of Appeal held that the Lagos High Court 
had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter in the first instance. The decision 
is presently under appeal at the Supreme Court of Nigeria.
332
 
4.4.4 Union Bank – Bartholomew Ebong 
In the case of Union bank, the former group MD was alleged to have 
granted unsecured loans worth over N150billion to a number of companies 
between 2007 and 2008, as well as unsecured credit facilities of over 
N80billion. The CEO was also accused of financial manipulation towards 
monthly bank returns to the CBN. 
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Furthermore, the former MD together with its subsidiary (Union Trustees 
Ltd) and the directors of the bank were alleged to have been involved in 
share price manipulation and dubiously conniving with stockbrokers Peter 
Ololo and Falcon Securities Ltd between 2007 and 2009, in order to 
artificially raise the bank’s share price for future public offers.333 
In an investigation carried out by the CBN and SEC, it was discovered that 
the bank had obtained credit facilities of N30.477 from foreign institutions 
between October and November 2007, which it subsequently transferred to 
Falcon Securities Ltd, who then acquired over 620 million units of Union 
Bank shares in contravention of Section 105 of the Investment and Security 
Act (ISA) 2007 with regard to false and misleading trading. Thus the 
acquisition was funded by Union bank in order to artificially increase Union 
Bank’s share price towards future public offers. 
It was also discovered that the bank connived with former executive 
director, risk management and compliance, Samuel Ayininuola, former 
managing director of Union Trustees, Henry Onyemem, Managing director 
of Falcon Ltd, Peter Ololo and other members of the board, in a share 
buyback scheme which involved illegal purchase of shares. Notably, the MD of 
Falcon Trustees, through its Peter Ololo traded in Union Bank shares with the 
intention to artificially inflate the share price in contravention contrary to SEC 
Rule 109b and pursuant to ISA 2007 which provides that shares should only 
be repurchased out of share premium account or on accumulated profits of 
the company which would otherwise be available for dividends and must be 
reflected on the audited accounts.
334
 
The EFCC in its suit sought injunctions and financial penalties due to the 
violations of the ISA. The former CEO and the board of directors were 
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faced with a 28 count charge and they pleaded not guilty to the charges .The 
case remains pending in court. 
4.4.5 Afribank – Sebastian Adigwe 
Sebastian Adigwe’s career began in 1986 in Chase Merchant Bank. The 
former MD and CEO of Afribank, Sebastian Adigwe was appointed in 2006 
given his successful career as a deputy manager in Ecobank.
335
  
With regards to Afribank, it was alleged that a total of N91billion worth of 
unsecured loans was granted by the bank to Falcon Securities Limited, 
Rehobet Assets Ltd, Kolvey Company Ltd and several other companies.
336
 
The CEO and board of directors were also alleged to have provided true and 
fair statements to the CBN from October 2008 - May 2009 and had failed to 
disclose the actual financial state of the bank contrary to Section 28(1) of 
BOFIA. The EFCC accused the CEO and a number of individuals 
connected to the bank, including Peter Ololo of Falcon Securities (a 
customer of the bank) for allegedly stealing about N87.5 billion from the 
bank.
337
 This includes N15million which was approved in board meeting as 
a loan by the CEO through his company called Rehoboth Asset Limited. It 
was believed in the meeting that the money will be used to buy shares in the 
stock market.
338
 The money was however transferred to a company known 
as AIL Securities Limited through cheques written on 15 September 
2008.
339
 The same method was also done in October 2008 to transfer 
another N15 billion into AIL Securities Limited and in 2009, just before the 
crisis, another sum of N12 billion was transferred under false pretence and 
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using fraudulent documents. Loans were granted with no adequate collateral 
which subsequently became non-performing.
340
 
A 36 count charge brought by the EFCC against Sebastian Adigwe and 
some members of the board of directors to which they all pleaded not guilty, 
Sebastian Adigwe pleaded that the Federal High court (presided over by 
Justice Dan Abutu) should dismiss the alleged charges of corruption against 
him.
341
 The case has been ongoing since and remains pending in court. 
It is imperative to mention that the case of Afribank raised concerns by 
shareholders regarding the sacking of the bank’s CEO and ultimate merger 
of the bank. The role of other bodies such as the CBN and Association of 
shareholders will be analysed in more detail over the course of this thesis. 
4.5 The Big Five: What Went Wrong? 
According to the special investigation that was conducted by the CBN and 
NDIC: 
1. ‘Excessive high level of non-performing loans in the 
five banks which was attributable to poor corporate 
governance practices, lax credit administration process 
and non-adherence to the banks’ credit risk 
management practices’.342  
Total amount of non-performing loans was therefore between 19 – 48%, 
meaning that the banks will need to provide additional N539.09 billion. 
Granting of non-performing loans is contrary to Section 20 of BOFIA 
restricting certain banking activities. Section 20(1) prohibits banks from 
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granting any loan, credit facility or financial assistance that is more than 
twenty percent of shareholders’ funds without prior approval of the CBN, 
and where necessary adequate security must be provided which should be 
deposited in the bank.
343
  
2. ‘The total loan portfolio of these five banks was 
N2,801.92billion. Margin loans amounted to 
N456.28billion. Exposure to the Oil and Gas Sector was 
N487.02billion, while aggregate non-performing loans 
stood at N1,143billion representing 40.81%’.344 
3. From the above two points, it is quite clear that the five banks had 
superfluous exposure to both the Capital Market and the Oil and Gas 
Industry with high risk areas for other banks in the industry.
345
 
4. Due to undercapitalization, the CBN will have to inject capital into the 
banks to enable it meet its minimum capital adequacy ratio of 10%. 
 5. The five banks had become over dependent on the CBN and inter-bank 
market and were unable to meet their obligations to depositors without 
liquidity support from the CBN or inter-bank market.
346
  
The CBN also stated that as at the end of July 2009, the total amount of 
EDW of the five banks was N127.85billion, a value which represented 
89.81% of the total industry exposure to the CBN on its discount window 
and their aggregate inter-bank loan stood at N253.30billion. This means that 
their liquidity ratio was ranging between 17.655 to 24% when the minimum 
liquidity ratio stood at 25%.
347
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It is important to mention that the CBN in its address stated that ‘We will 
not allow any bank to fail. However, we will also ensure that officers of 
banks and debtors who contribute to bank failures are brought to book to the 
full extent of the law and that all proceeds of infraction are confiscated 
where legally possible’. 348  It becomes imperative to analyse how these 
control frauds were perpetrated in order to explore the gravity of the 
problem. 
4.5.1 Control Fraud through CBN’s Expanded Discount Window 
(EDW) Operations 
A closer look at the cases above suggests that the banks fraudulently and 
persistently took advantage of the EDW which is only meant to be a last 
resort, tendering inflated records of accounts thereby deceiving the CBN to 
act. Control fraud through the use of EDW was perpetrated using regulatory 
weakness as a tool. This is examined below. 
As the apex regulatory body, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) is 
responsible for the administration of the Banks and Other Financial 
Institutions Act (BOFIA) 2004 and in promoting adequate banking 
standards in the country and ensuring efficient payment system.  
Essentially, the CBN is charged with the ‘issue of legal tender, maintenance 
of external reserve to safeguard the value of legal tender, promotion of 
financial stability and sound monetary environment and serving as banker 
and financial adviser to the government’.349  
As a regulator, and in performance of its functions under Section 30 of the 
CBN Act 2007 regarding liquidity management, the CBN, notwithstanding 
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its recognition of Open Market Operations
350
 has in place a Discount 
Window operation, which applies to Deposit Money Banks and Discount 
Houses. The Discount Window is to serve as a complementary scheme for 
institutions facing liquidity problems.
351
 The Discount Window became the 
Expanded Discount Window upon Introduction of the CBN Guidelines on 
the Expanded Discount Window (EDW) in October 2008 in order to allow a 
more sound process of absorbing more liquidity in the money market. The 
EDW is to be utilised as a last resort facility and only on a secured basis 
with adequate collateral.
352
 Furthermore, credits by way of outright or 
advanced borrowing must be secured by eligible instruments.
353
  
It is important to mention vital provisions relating to access to the EDW. 
Paragraph 5 (i) (ii) (iii) of the Expanded Window Guidelines provides that: 
‘All DMBs and DHs shall have direct access to the DW. 
The Bank through its Banking Operations Department 
shall exercise good judgment and discretion in the 
administration of the DW in order to ensure that the DW 
objectives are met. In particular, institutions may be 
denied access to the DW in the following circumstances:  
(i) If the Bank observes an act of undue rate arbitrage in 
the operations of the institution’s dealings;  
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(ii) If an institution is found to have contravened the 
provisions of the Bank’s monetary and credit policy 
guidelines;  
(iii) If the Bank discovers that the institution is be over-
trading or engaged in undue mismatch of its assets and 
liabilities’354 
Furthermore, Section 28 of BOFIA provides that the financial statements of 
banks should give a true and fair state of affairs of the bank as at the end of 
the report period and should comply with necessary requirements that have 
been issued.
355
 
Going by the above provisions, a fraud on the CBN would be a 
contravention of the CBN statutes, which include the BOFIA and respective 
Guidelines, carefully conceived to be concealed from the CBN and utilised 
to fraudulently take advantage of the EDW.  
The CEOs involved had failed to give a true and fair report of the state of 
affairs of the banks to the CBN, producing false accounting records that 
conceal the financial position of the bank.
356
 For instance, the CEOs of 
FinBank and Intercontinental Bank were alleged to have failed to provide a 
true and fair report of the state of affairs of the bank to the CBN, leading the 
CBN to grant credit facilities to them under the EDW. As earlier mentioned, 
in the case of FinBank, the CEO, Okey Nwosu, was accused of failing to 
produce a true and fair report of the financial state of the bank to the CBN 
by incorrectly importing N47.6billion of commercial papers in its statement 
of assets and liabilities thereby obtaining credit facilities under the EDW. 
This also contravenes Section 2 of the Annexure to the CBN Guidelines 
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which lays down eligibility criteria to qualify for the EDW, including sound 
management statutory minimum capital and specified cash reserve.  
In the case of Intercontinental Bank, the CBN found that the bank was 
contravening Section 24-29 of BOFIA with regards to maintenance of 
minimum capital adequacy and liquidity ratios, treatment and use of 
commercial papers, and keeping of books of accounts which reflect a true 
and fair view of the financial position of the bank and the fact that the bank 
had insufficient assets to cover his liabilities.
357
 
The excessive use of the Expanded Discount Window made the banking 
crisis much worse. Fraud using this means is apparent from its persistence. 
As enumerated above, According to the CBN, by the end of July 2009, the 
total outstanding balance on the EDW of the five banks amounted to 
N127.85billion, where the total access on the window for all the banks was 
N256.571billion, amounting to 89.81%. The banks therefore were 
insufficiently illiquid with, having an average liquidity ratio of 24% where 
the regulatory minimum was 25%.
358
 It is however important to stress that 
although these banks were not the only banks to have taken advantage of the 
EDW, the problem lay in their frequent and persistent use which no doubt 
pointed to a bigger problem of financial instability due to non-performing 
loans. The banks in question were heavily dependent on the discount 
window.
359
 They used the availability of the window to their advantage, 
flaunting unsecured loans and causing the CBN to continually grant access 
to them.  
The ability of the CEOs to get away with these frauds for so long is not very 
surprising considering the calibre of people involved. However, it suffices 
to say that the CBN’s regulatory weakness might have contributed to the 
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fraud.
360
This may be due to fear of touching the people involved or simply 
because they were a part of the fraud, having a share of the money.  
Why then did the fraud go undetected? One way of looking at it is through 
what Black identifies as ‘The Yes Men’.361 The web of people involved, 
such as members of the boards and employees could have been afraid to 
expose these activities in fear that they will lose their share of the money or 
even their job! It is important to be reminded that the problem started long 
before the CBN governor (Sanusi) came to power. The problem had 
commenced even before his predecessor, Charles Soludo came in, and had 
continued up until Sanusi became the governor.
362
 
4.5.2 Control Fraud through collaborative embezzlement 
Control fraud through collaborative embezzlement involved looting of 
funds; that is, defrauding the banks by diverting money for personal gain 
using accounting frauds and schemes that tend to front the legitimacy of the 
fraud. This calculated form of control fraud is usually done in collaboration 
with other individuals through reckless granting of unsecured loans contrary 
to Section 20 of the BOFIA or granting of loans above the statutory limit 
which would later become non-performing. This seemingly legitimate 
process involved unlawful diversion of bank funds for direct or indirect 
personal gain was in fact a contravention of Section 17(c) of the BOFIA 
which prohibits directors from benefiting from any advance, loan or credit 
facility from the bank.
363
 Furthermore, as the cases revealed, most of the 
loans were granted to companies directly affiliated with the CEO. The 
resulting effect of the diversion would mean money-laundering mostly 
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through the purchase of properties and assets in a bid to turn ‘bad money’ 
into ‘good money’.364 
The type of fraud perpetrated by the directors in Nigerian banks during the 
crisis can be said to be a collaborative fraud, which included the directors 
themselves, members of the board of directors and outsiders. This is seen 
where the fraud is perpetrated using various schemes such as setting up 
companies in the names of friends or families and using the companies to 
secure loans with the banks, which will then become non-performing.
365
 
The effective management and day-to-day running of the company is the 
responsibility of directors headed by the CEO. Directors are generally 
charged with the duty of decision-making, although it should be borne in 
mind that they do have the power and duty to conduct the general 
management of the company as illustrated in the Cunninghame Case above, 
however, where directors use their legal power of management as a means 
of fraud, then it becomes a problem for the company, and in the case of 
Nigeria, the result with the big five was financial crisis owing to a trend of 
excessive borrowing from the CBN and overuse of the discount window by 
fronting ‘bad loans’.  
The use of power and position is a tool for embezzlement of funds 
particularly in banks with weak internal corporate governance and also 
where the CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors, creating 
duplicity of power. A close look at the five banks analysed above reveals 
that this was the case for most of the banks whereby the CEOs are placed in 
combined positions of authority at the same time and frauds in these 
situations could easily be concealed (CEO duality).
366
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In the case of the five banks, it was revealed that each of the CEO’s looted 
funds in different forms. For instance, the CEO of Oceanic bank was said to 
have approved loans worth over N3billion without prior consultation to the 
board. It was subsequently discovered that she had purchased a vast amount 
of shares in the name of her families and also using various companies as 
cover up. This can be said to be a calculated form of control fraud 
perpetrated in collaboration with other individuals. As seen in the five cases 
examined above, all the CEOs were charged with other members of the 
board. Embezzlement of funds remains a very paramount type of fraud 
perpetration in Nigeria.  
For the purpose of analysis, it is important to mention the statement of 
Sanusi in relation to diversion of funds by the CEOs: 
‘There was one chief executive officer that took away 
from her bank over 200billion naira. Okay that was over a 
billion dollars. And where was this money taken to? 
Purchase of property. We recovered from one CEO 200 
pieces of real estate in Dubai, real estate in Johannesburg, 
real estate in Potomac in Washington apart from shares in 
over 100 companies. And all of those were purchased with 
depositors’ funds’.367 
Where directors are in breach of their duties, a number of cover up schemes 
are being utilised to cover their tracks. This includes hiring of the ‘yes men’ 
and creating a fraud-friendly corporate environment made up of auditors, 
accountants and employees that can be manipulated for fraud purposes. It 
remains to be seen whether these collaborative webs led to complicit or 
ignorant fraud participation and whether the actions or inactions of the 
participants can be said to be a contribution to the fraud and this issue is 
addressed accordingly in their respective chapters.  
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4.5.3 Control fraud against the Public 
As will be shown below, during the periods leading to the crisis, unlawful 
share purchases in the form of share buy-back scheme were devised by the 
CEOs in order to deceive the public into believing in the future of these 
banks, thereby investing in them. It was seen that the CEOs approved loans 
for companies under false pretence, and then used the money to buy back 
their own shares. This is used to artificially raise the price of their shares 
and flaunt a liquid and fast growing bank which prospective investors and 
shareholders are encouraged to buy into. The whole point here is deception 
under false pretence, a clear contravention of the ISA. This is another major 
attribute of control fraud as it involves calculation and collaboration. It 
therefore becomes necessary to examine the legal provision regarding share 
buy-backs in order to understand the extent of the control fraud. 
Prohibition of any form of activities created with the intention of creating 
false or misleading forms of active trading is provided for in Section 105 of 
the ISA. The ISA identifies this as ‘False Trading and Market Rigging 
Transactions.’ Fraud on shareholders as in the case of the five banks took 
the form of unlawful share purchase whereby the CEOs had indirectly 
purchased shares in the banks, mostly through other banks. This then led to 
artificial rise in the market value of the shares, thereby misleading the 
investing public, including existing and potential investors to invest in the 
bank.  
Section 159 of CAMA defines financial assistance to include ‘a gift, 
guarantee, security or indemnity, loan or any form of credit and any 
financial assistance given by a company, the net assets of which are thereby 
reduced to a material extent, or which has no net assets’.368 The section goes 
further to limit cases where it is lawful for financial assistance to be 
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provided, for instance, where a person is intending to purchase shares in a 
company and /or liability has been incurred.
369
 
Section 160 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act in Nigeria generally 
prohibits a company from buying back its own shares grants except in 
certain circumstances which are provided for in Section 160(2) to include 
when the company is settling or compromising a debt, eliminating fractional 
sales, fulfilling terms of a non-assignable agreement under employee stock 
programmes, satisfying the claims of a dissenting shareholder or complying 
with a court order. However, such repurchases may only be made out of 
profits that would otherwise have been dividends or proceeds from a fresh 
issue of shares made for the purpose of the purchase.
370
 It suffices to say 
that a company cannot invest in itself in the form of share buy backs except 
in the above cases;
371
therefore, if a CEO is party to an unlawful share 
purchase scheme that results in unlawful expenditure of the banks funds, 
this is in clear breach of directors’ duties under Section 283(1) of CAMA 
(discussed above). 
Furthermore, although the CBN is saddled with the responsibility of 
ensuring that directors act in accordance with their duties, it is the joint 
responsibility of all corporate participants to secure this provision and raise 
concerns if necessary. This is the premise on which this thesis is based; that 
is, to influence other actors to become aware of the need for a collective 
enforcement of corporate governance.  
In Nigeria, the peculiarities of the country would mean that prohibition of 
share buyback scheme is well founded. The institutional problem of 
corruption that has become endemic in the country will lead control fraud to 
manipulate share buyback schemes to their advantage. As the cases above 
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revealed, the CEOs were very well into devising means to buy back their 
own shares, notwithstanding the provisions of the ISA and CAMA to the 
contrary. 
4.6 Who bears the risk? 
Following the financial crisis in Nigeria, the people who suffered the most 
were the depositors and taxpayers. According to Sanusi, banks do not fail; it 
is the people who run the banks that cause banks to fail.
372
 The impact of 
bank failure is massive, especially in a country like Nigeria where poverty is 
apparent and there is a big difference between the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’. 
Workers such as civil servants who have saved their pension in the bank for 
35-40 years of service have to suffer when banks fail, because all their 
savings are gone. This may also include monies set aside for children’s 
education and businesses.  
It is impossible to quantify the extent of damage done due to bank failure 
and losses arising from inability to make ends meet. It suffices to say that 
some people may have lost their lives from inability to pay for medical bills 
simply because the money set aside had been lost due to bank failure. 
So did these banks fail? According to Sanusi, it is like saying ‘a man whose 
throat has been slain died, the man did not die; he was killed.’373 This is the 
case for Nigeria; the crisis was caused by the fraudulent activities of the 
CEOs, who murdered the banks, hoping to walk away, leaving millions of 
poor Nigerians to suffer the loss. The total amount of deposits for the banks 
saved amounted to N4.4trillion, which came from 8-10 million customers so 
that the depositors will not lose.
374
 It must be mentioned that the CBN and 
NDIC realised the impact of this crisis especially on the depositors bore the 
risk to protect their interests and secure their future. The provisions of these 
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two regulators with regards to insurance of depositor funds are discussed 
next. 
The Nigerian Banking System is regulated by two institutions, the CBN and 
the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Commission (NDIC), it is therefore 
imperative to consider the provisions of the NDIC with respect to 
depositors.  
The NDIC is charged with the responsibility of protecting depositors in the 
event of bank failures by guaranteeing payment of deposit up to the 
maximum insured sum (N500,000.00 to a depositor in universal banks and 
N200,000.00 to a depositor in MFBs and PMIs).
375
 Insured deposits include 
Current Account deposits, Savings Account Deposits, Term or Time 
Deposits and Foreign Currency Deposits. However, deposits such as inter-
bank placements, insider deposits (that is, deposits made by Staff, directors 
and other connected parties), deposits held as collateral for loans, 
investments in stocks, bonds, commercial papers, mutual funds, annuities 
and debentures, as well as federal government treasury bills, bonds and 
notes are uninsured by the NDIC.
376
 
Insured institutions include Deposit Money Banks (DMBs), Micro finance 
banks (MFBs) and Primary Mortgage Institutions (PMIs).
377
 Although the 
primary responsibility of the NDIC is to protect depositors, the NDIC and 
CBN to actively take preventive measures to halt the occurrence of 
insurance incidents, through regulation and supervision of the banking 
institutions; therefore when a financial institution is at the verge of 
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experiencing troubles, the NDIC sends out early warning signals through the 
use of off-site monitoring and assistance in order to restore sound operations 
to the bank.
378
 However, it can be concluded that routine checks and 
investigations conducted on banks failed to reveal the inherent and recurrent 
problems prevailing in the Nigerian banking system.  
4.7 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter examined the role of CEOs in Control fraud. It can be said that 
the majority of bank failures which Nigeria has experienced since the 1990s 
is a reflection of the country’s socio-political and economic disorder in the 
wake of the endemic nature of corruption and lawlessness.  
It must be mentioned that the consolidation exercise and also introduction of 
corporate governance codes did nothing to stop the crisis; it rather put 
financial pressure on banks which contributed to control fraud. While laws 
and policies are relevant, it is important that they are backed up with 
adequate enforcement strategies. 
In Nigeria, Managing Directors, or CEOs as the case may be, are regarded 
as knowledgeable, particularly in the management of the bank. As an 
employee of the organisation, the CEO is appointed by the board of 
directors, normally majority non-executives who empower him with specific 
managerial duties and responsibilities as delegated to him by the board. 
Being the head of the executive management, the CEO’s training, 
knowledge, skill and experience becomes vital to his appointment, duties, 
powers and responsibilities. The possession of adequate skills necessary to 
identify the existence of opportunity and develop means of exploitation 
would lead to perpetration of fraud. 
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The corporate environment is therefore filled with people who are very 
knowledgeable in the system. They know how to get away with things. The 
greed and selfishness that hovers in the country means that people can easily 
be bought and those that prove stubborn can be silenced.  
The CEOs have been identified as having two weapons only: money and 
power.
379
 They manipulate people around them, turning them into allies for 
their fraud. They basically ask two questions according to Sanusi. The first 
is: ‘How much do you want?’ And if you are not willing to be bribed, they 
tell you: ‘I’m going to destroy you’.380 In the corporate world, considerable 
importance is attached to success with less focus placed on the need to 
utilise socially acceptable means for such success. The consequent loss and 
hardship that is imposed on depositors, creditors, shareholders and investors 
as victims of control fraud could be overwhelming.  
The Vested Interests as identified by Sanusi are people who profit from the 
poverty, underdevelopment and corruption of the country, they are not 
intelligent people, neither are they smart; else they will not be doing what 
they do.
381
 It is not the inability to reveal control fraud that is the problem, 
but the courage to actually go ahead and do so taking into consideration the 
calibre of people involved.  
Perhaps a deeper understanding of the depth of ‘vested interests’ will lead 
one to conclude that Nigeria indeed suffers from an institutional problem of 
corruption where people care less about the problems of others and are 
willing to deprive others for their personal advantage.
382
 This therefore calls 
for a more structural approach that tends to focus not only on legal and 
regulatory responses (as these have not been very helpful so far in 
preventing control fraud), but also effective enforcement strategies to ensure 
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compliance with corporate governance practices and ethics that will 
safeguard the banking sector from the control fraud and financial corruption 
as a whole. However, it must be stressed that enforcement remains a 
collective responsibility and not the job of any one single corporate 
participant. 
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Chapter 5 
The role of the regulatory framework in the perpetration of 
control fraud in Nigerian banks 
5.1 Introduction  
The 2008 credit crunch, which saw major scandals across the world, has 
raised questions on the credibility of banking regulations across the 
world.
383
 The UK was gripped by the aftermath of the Royal Bank of 
Scotland Plc affair and, in particular, the remuneration of both its current 
CEO, Stephen Hester, and the former ‘Sir’ Fred Goodwin (its ‘retired’ 
CEO). However, this is but one example of the many corporate scandals that 
have occurred throughout the world. 
Likewise, Nigeria has also had its fair share of corporate scandals, 
particularly in the banking sector with the 2009 scandal, which nearly saw 
the collapse of the Nigerian Stock Exchange.
384
 
In any economy, credibility in financial market regulation is the basis for 
increased financial investment. The financial system is made up of the 
money market and the capital market. Whereas the money market provides 
for prices of funds on a short-term basis, the capital market deals with prices 
of funds on a long-term basis. Maintaining stability in the financial market 
is very essential because the market is a reflection of the overall corporate 
environment of the country. Corporate practices of market operators are 
therefore important and this is where corporate governance comes in. It is 
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imperative that markets conform to rules and procedures with due 
diligence.
385
  
In Nigeria, despite the claims that the financial system was immune from 
the global economic crisis, the Nigerian Stock Exchange, a prominent 
component of the financial system, was shaken by the end of 2008-2009 
financial years and this nearly saw the collapse of not only the stock 
exchange, but also public companies including banks. The Nigerian Stock 
Exchange is mainly an equity dominated stock market with market 
capitalization at the forefront of measuring market depth, stability, liquidity 
and volume of trade.
386
 The collapse of the Nigerian Stock Exchange soon 
saw the rise of numerous demands for answers by investors and the general 
public. It remains unclear whether the regulators of the Nigerian Capital 
Market have been ignorant over the years or whether the country is being 
caught up by past actions and omissions of a number of regulatory bodies.  
Be that as it may, the success of any corporate environment is dependent on 
the level of compliance to rules, regulations, laws, policies and procedures 
in place. Simply put, a combination of hard and soft laws. The 2009 banking 
crisis is a good example of non-compliance with corporate governance 
regulations in Nigeria. Corporate governance regulations include a 
combination of hard laws, soft laws and corporate practice.  
In view of the above, it is the aim of this chapter to examine the totality of 
Corporate Governance Regulations in Nigeria. The chapter begins by 
examining the pre-crisis era of corporate governance and analyses company 
law and corporate governance codes in place in order to emphasize 
regulatory inadequacies that led to the crisis. This will be followed by a 
discussion of the corporate governance regulations post-crisis and whether 
improvements have been made that could prevent future control fraud. The 
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institutional problem of Nigeria is stressed here to indicate that the codes 
were copied from developed countries without taking into account the 
specific configurations of Nigeria. Other factors faced by Nigeria’s 
corporate governance regulation will also be discussed including regulatory 
multiplicity and areas of conflicts within the code will be analysed. The 
chapter aims to provoke further thoughts on how the regulatory framework 
can be improved to prevent or reduce the likelihood of future control frauds 
in Nigerian banks.  
5.2 The Pre-Crisis Era of Corporate Governance in Nigeria (1990-2009) 
During the period before the banking crisis, the main law governing 
companies in Nigeria is the Companies and Allied Matters Act, which also 
governs Nigerian banks. As mentioned above, the Act is to apply to all 
companies registered in Nigeria. However, Nigerian banks are also 
governed by the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA) and 
are to specifically comply with the provisions of the Act. Both CAMA and 
BOFIA came into operation in 1990 as a major economic initiative to allow 
for proper management of companies.  
5.2.1 Companies and Allied Matters Act, 1990 (Now 2004) 
The right to form a company is provided for in Section 18 of CAMA where 
it is stated that: ‘any two or more persons may incorporate a company by 
complying with the requirements of the Act with regards to registration of 
the company’.  
Section 20 lists certain groups of people that are disqualified from forming a 
company and this includes individuals less than 18 years of age, persons of 
unsound mind, an un-discharged bankrupt or persons or a corporate body in 
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liquidation.
387
 CAMA also identifies six types of companies which are: 
public and private companies
388
, companies limited by shares, companies 
limited by guarantee
389
, unlimited companies
390
, incorporated trustees
391
 and 
unit trusts.  
Section 79(1) of CAMA states that once a person has subscribed to the 
memorandum of association of a company, he is considered to be a member 
of the company upon registration of their name in the register of members. 
Section 81 of CAMA spells out the rights and liabilities associated with 
membership. This includes the right to attend general meetings, the right to 
receive notice of meetings and the right to speak and vote on any resolution. 
Ancillary rights include the right to seek redress against unfair treatment and 
the right to apply to the court or Corporate Affairs Commission where 
possible.
392
  
CAMA lays a good foundation for companies to observe basic corporate 
governance principles in a bid to ensure transparency and accountability in 
the organisation. Companies are generally enjoined to keep accounting 
records by virtue of Section 331 of the Act. The record is to be made in the 
prescribed manner and kept accordingly.
393
 Failure to do so constitutes an 
offence for every officer liable.
394
 
The Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) has the power to investigate the 
affairs of the company through the appointment of inspector(s) on 
application of members holding not less than one-quarter of shares or as the 
                                                          
387
 CAMA, 2004, s. 18. It should be noted that by Section 18(2), an individual less than 18 
years can be allowed to form a company provided that two other persons not disqualified 
have subscribed to the memorandum. 
388
 Ibid s.22 and 24  
389
 Ibid s. 26 
390
 Ibid s.25  
391
 Ibid s.673-695 
392
 Ibid s. 81 
393
 Ibid s.331-332 
394
 Ibid s. 333(3) 
 127 
 
case may be.
395
 The commission shall also investigate the affairs of the 
company where the court orders such investigation due to a number of 
factors, such as where there is reason to believe that the company’s affairs 
are being or have been conducted to defraud its creditors or in an unfair 
manner prejudicial to some of its members or where persons concerned with 
the company’s formation have been guilty of fraud or where the company 
was formed for a fraudulent purpose.
396
 
It is the duty of directors to prepare individual financial statements every 
year and this statement should include the balance sheet as at the last day of 
the year, the profit and loss account of the company, auditors’ reports, 
directors’ reports, notes on accounts, etc.397 It is to be noted that CAMA 
fails to provide the form in which the individual financial account should 
take but according to Section 335, the form and content of the account is to 
be prescribed by the National Accounting Standards Board and the balance 
sheet shall give a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the company. In 
addition to this, directors must also provide a group financial statement, 
which should reflect the true and fair view of the state of affairs of the 
company and its subsidiaries. Unlike the individual financial statements, the 
group financial statement is to be prepared in accordance with the second 
schedule of the Act.
398
 
It is also the duty of directors to lay and deliver up to date financial 
statements to the company in general meeting not exceeding nine months 
previous to the date of the meeting and not later than 18 months after the 
date of incorporation of the company.
399
 Furthermore, each year, directors 
are to deliver with the annual returns of the company, a copy of the balance 
sheet of the company, together with profit and loss accounts, and notes that 
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were delivered to the company in general meeting.
400
 Penalty for non-
compliance to the above provision would mean that every director liable 
shall be guilty of an offence and a fine except if it can be shown that 
reasonable steps were taken to ensure compliance.
401
 Furthermore, 
shareholders have the right to obtain copies of financial statement, failing 
which the company and every officer guilty shall be liable for a fine.
402
 
It suffices to say that in a control fraud; regulatory compliance is achieved 
based on falsification of accounts and merely showing records to prove that 
all is well, to the ignorance of the regulators. This is not to say that the 
regulators could not have done more to prevent the fraud, but only goes to 
reveal the extent to which control frauds will go to conceal their activities. 
In the periods shortly before the financial crisis, the accounting books and 
balance sheets of the banks failed to reveal any notable sign of distress. This 
was the case, not only for Nigerian banks but for also for banks in 
developed countries such as the UK just before the credit crunch. In Nigeria 
however, bad loans were used to secure funding at the discount window, 
fronting no apparent sign of financial problems when the reverse was 
actually the case. Annual financial statements were manipulated to reveal 
success and lure investors to invest in the banks. There were also systems 
developed by the company to buy back its own shares in a bid to deceive the 
public into investing in the banks. This was particularly the case for Union 
bank and Intercontinental bank. Mention must be made at this juncture that 
details of the activities of CEO’s fraudulent activities and how they 
breached legal and regulatory measures for financial disclosure are 
examined in the chapter on CEOs. 
Furthermore, CAMA also provides for appointment of auditors, whereby 
every company at each annual general meeting shall appoint an auditor or 
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auditors to audit the financial statement of the company for the next 
financial year.
403
 Appointment of auditors is a legal requirement, which is to 
ensure accountability and transparency in the company. The auditors are to 
make a report, known as auditors’ report on the financial statement 
examined by them and on every balance sheet, profit and loss account laid 
before the company in a general meeting.
404
 In the case of a public 
company, in addition to this, the auditor shall also make a report to the audit 
committee set up by the company.
405
 The audit committee in question shall 
consist of equal number of directors and representatives of shareholders of 
the company.
406
 
Every auditor of the company is to have an open access to all the company’s 
accounts, books and such information as they think necessary for the 
performance of their duties and it shall be the duty of the auditor in 
preparing their report to carry out necessary investigations that may enable 
them to form an opinion whether proper accounting records have been kept 
by the company and whether the balance sheets are in accordance with the 
accounting records and returns.
407
 
It is important to also say that the accounting requirement of CAMA on the 
appointment and duties of auditors is dealt with in detail in the chapter on 
auditors. The chapter considers the role of auditors in the banking crisis and 
whether their actions or inactions as the case may be can be said to be as a 
result of negligence or compliance in the web of frauds. 
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5.2.2 Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act 1991 (Now 2004) 
The Banking and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA) was developed 
as an Act to regulate banks and other financial institutions in Nigeria.
408
 The 
Act is to complement CAMA and to help promote corporate governance 
practices across financial institutions. Originally established as a Decree in 
1991, BOFIA grants supervision of banks to the CBN subject to the overall 
supervision of the Minister.
409
  
In furtherance of the duty to keep proper books provided by CAMA, BOFIA 
also provides in Section 25 that every bank shall submit to the CBN not 
later than 28 days after the last day of each month or such other interval as 
the CBN may specify, a statement showing: the assets and liabilities of the 
bank, an analysis of advances and other assets, at its head office and 
branches in and outside Nigeria in such form as the CBN may specify, from 
time to time. Furthermore, every bank shall submit such other information, 
documents, statistics or returns as the CBN may deem necessary for the 
proper understanding of the statements and must be done within a specified 
time.
410
  
Another provision of BOFIA that gives the CBN power to monitor, 
supervise and regulate the activities of banks in Nigeria is the appointment 
of the approved auditor. Thus, every bank shall appoint annually a person 
approved by the CBN, in this section referred to as “the approved auditor”, 
whose duties shall be to make to the shareholders a report upon the annual 
balance sheet and profit and loss account of the bank and every such report 
shall contain statements to the matters and such other information as may be 
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prescribed, from time to time, by the CBN.
411
 Through this provision, the 
CBN should be able to monitor the financial activities of banks.  
Additionally, by virtue of Section 31 of the Act, the Governor of the CBN is 
empowered to appoint an officer of the CBN who shall be known as the 
Director of Banking Supervision or by such other title as the Governor may 
specify, and who is to carry out supervisory duties in respect of banks and 
other financial institutions, and also to examine the books and affairs of 
each bank, with unlimited right of access at all times to the books, accounts 
and vouchers of banks. He also has the power to require from directors, 
managers and officers of banks relevant information for the performance of 
his duties.
412
 
The power to remove a manager or officer of a bank in distress is contained 
in BOFIA. In fact, Section 33(2)(c) of the Act states that ‘if after a special 
investigation or examination of the books of a bank, it is discovered that the 
bank cannot execute its functions, the Governor of the CBN has the power 
to remove the manager or officer of the bank.’ This is one way where the 
CBN can regulate banks in cases that call for concern, for instance where 
there is allegation of financial misconduct. Again, if after taking such steps 
stipulated in section 35 of this Act, such other measures as in the opinion of 
the CBN may be appropriate circumstance, the state of affairs of the bank 
concerned does not improve, the CBN may turn over the control and 
management of such banks to the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(NDIC) on such terms and conditions as the CBN may stipulate from time 
to time.
413
  
From the above, it can be rightly said that BOFIA clearly contains 
provisions relating to accountability and financial disclosure particularly for 
banks. This legal requirement was overlooked by CEOs and according to 
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the CBN governor at the time, one of the major reasons for the crisis was 
financial misrepresentation and concealment of banks’ financial status due 
to fear of being caught out. It is also important to say that the CBN has 
argued that Section 35 of BOFIA is the reason why it sacked the five CEOs 
and injected money into the banks while replacing the banks with new 
CEOs. At the time of their sacking, Nigerians were shocked at the fact that 
the CBN did not publish the results of the special investigation that led to 
the sacking of the CEOs and challenged the authority of the CBN to do so.  
However, what is important to note is that legal powers are granted to the 
CBN by BOFIA, leading one to believe that there exists adequate legal and 
regulatory provisions when it comes to corporate governance regulation but 
what is really missing is enforcement and implementation of the codes in 
the face of fraud. 
5.2.3 SEC Code of Best Practices on Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
(SEC Code) 2003 
Notwithstanding the above provisions of CAMA and BOFIA, the increasing 
global concerns for corporate governance across the world gave rise to the 
need for Nigeria to align with international best practices of corporate 
governance. 
The Enron collapse contributed to the birth of the first corporate governance 
code in the country, which is the SEC code of 2003. Being the first code to 
regulate companies in the country, it helped in providing awareness of good 
corporate governance practices and also in improving the corporate 
environment of the country, stressing the need to enhance accountability, 
transparency and corporate discipline.
414
 The SEC Code mainly focuses on 
board of directors and their duties; however, attention is also given to the 
role of other stakeholders such as shareholders and professional bodies in 
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order to create awareness of the roles of participating bodies to effective 
corporate governance.
415
 The Code stressed transparency in financial and 
non-financial reporting, establishment of audit committee made up of at 
least three non-executive directors and the fact that external auditors should 
not be involved in business relationships with the company.
416
 Notably, the 
code separated the role of MD and CEO and stresses that no one person 
should perform both roles.
417
  
Furthermore, Shareholders’ rights and privileges are also stated in the Code 
to the effect that the board should ensure that all shareholders should be 
treated equally, however large or small their shares may be and shareholder 
activism, whether by institutional shareholders or through shareholder 
groups is encouraged. Organisations are encouraged to inculcate relevant 
parts of the Code to their companies so that the Code serves as a model for 
corporate governance in Nigeria.  
On the issue of compliance, it was stated in the SEC Code that although 
voluntary compliance is generally encouraged; SEC will apply appropriate 
sanctions as necessary and give consideration to the compliance or 
otherwise in cases brought before it.
418
  
It should be noted however, that the Code lacked enforcement strategies. Its 
voluntary nature also contributed to its slow implementation and efforts to 
update the Code were not made till 2008.
419
 Furthermore, regardless of the 
Code, companies still experienced insider abuse and poor disclosure and the 
subsequent Cadbury scandal in 2006 says more on the inadequacy of the 
Code to govern public companies in Nigeria 
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5.2.4 Code of Corporate Governance for Banks and Other financial 
Institutions Post Consolidation (CBN Code), 2006 
Two major factors necessitated the CBN Code of 2006. These include the 
2004 banking reform and also the Cadbury financial reporting scandal of 
2006. This awakened various debates on the effectiveness of the 2003 Code 
of Corporate governance and the need to improve corporate governance in 
Nigeria. 
Soon after, the 2006 Code of Corporate Governance of Banks and other 
Financial Institutions in Nigeria was introduced as a mandatory Code by the 
CBN intended to apply to all Banks and financial institutions in Nigeria.
420
 
The CBN referred to an earlier survey by SEC, which revealed that 
corporate governance was at its rudimentary stage in Nigeria, with only 
about 40% of companies adhering to corporate governance principles.
421
 
The Code was to complement the 2003 CBN Code, which applied to all 
public companies in Nigeria, but unlike the 2003 Code, compliance to the 
2006 Code of Corporate Governance for Banks (Post Consolidation) was 
mandatory.
422
 As discussed in the previous chapter, shortly before the 2006 
Code, particularly in 2004, Nigeria experienced a recapitalization/ 
consolidation scheme in banks. The recapitalization scheme encouraged 
bigger banks to enter into merger/acquisition arrangements with smaller 
banks in consolidation in order to strengthen competition both locally and 
internationally and most importantly to promote good corporate governance 
practices. 
The 2006 CBN Code was aimed at complementing the existing CBN and 
SEC Codes. According to Section 1.5 of the Code, Banks are expected to 
comply with both SEC and CBN Codes. The Code identified major 
weaknesses of Corporate Governance in Nigerian Banks such as ineffective 
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board oversight functions, fraudulent and self-serving practices among 
members of the board, management and staff, overbearing influence of 
chairman or MD/CEO, especially in family-controlled banks, weak internal 
controls, non-compliance with laid-down operation procedures, passive or 
ignorant shareholders, excessive lending and technical incompetence. In 
addressing the problems identified above, the Code broadly highlighted a 
number of principles that promote good governance. These include:  
- Establishment of strategic objectives and a set of corporate values, 
clear lines of accountability and responsibility 
- Balance of powers and authority so that no one individual is 
unfettered with decision- making 
- Number of non-executive directors should exceed that of executive 
directors 
- Installation of a committed and focused board of directors that will 
exercise its oversight functions with high level of independence from 
management and individual shareholders 
- Regular meetings of board of directors, at least four times a year 
- Directors should be fully competent in financial matters and 
experience 
- Internal monitoring and enforcement of Code of conduct and ethics 
for director, management and staff 
- Effective and efficient audit committee and board 
- Compliance with Rules and Regulations 
- Shareholders need to be responsive, responsible and enlightened423. 
Going to a bit more detail, the Code prohibits executive duality by providing 
that the responsibilities of the chairman should be clearly separated from 
that of the managing director and provides that the post of executive vice-
chairman is not recognised under the Code and no two family members are 
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to operate the positions of chairman and managing director at the same 
time.
424
 
Also, the Code stresses that regular training of board members should be 
budgeted annually by banks and while the number of non-executive 
directors should exceed that of executive directors, the maximum board size 
should be 20 and at least 2 non-executive directors should be independent 
directors appointed by merit and who do not represent any particular 
shareholder interest and with no special interest in the bank.
425
 The Code 
also provides for the establishment of three committees, namely Risk 
Management committee, Audit Committee and Credit Committee. The 
Code provides that each of these committees is important in ensuring 
transparency, due process and disclosure requirements.
426
 Appointment to 
top management positions are to be based on merit and track records of 
appointees should be additional eligibility criteria.
427
 
A notable shortcoming of the Code lies in the provision relating to 
shareholders. While the Code provides that shareholders should be 
enlightened and responsible, no suggestion is given as to the way this should 
take place and how shareholders can be educated as to their rights and 
obligations.  
Furthermore, on the issue of enforcement, the Code also provided that banks 
should have a Chief Compliance Officer who should also monitor the 
implementation of the Code and Section 7.1.4 further provides that external 
auditors should render reports to the CBN on banks’ risk management 
process, internal controls and level of compliance with regulatory directives. 
Although internal and external measures are provided in ensuring 
compliance in the form of the Chief Compliance Officer and External 
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Auditor respectively, the Code fails to provide a regulatory form of 
monitoring enforcement and compliance by the CBN, despite the fact that 
the Code is mandatory. Furthermore, the Code provides in Section 6.1.4 that 
false rendition of accounts to the CBN shall attract a stiff sanction of fine 
plus suspension of the CEO for six months in the first instance and removal 
and blacklisting in the second, following which the erring staff would be 
referred to a professional body for investigation.
428
 These compliance 
provisions seem quite weak because, ironically, the CBN did not provide 
any measure for monitoring rendition to it. It can be said that the use of 
fines to ensure compliance is inadequate because mere payment of fine is 
not enough to prevent control frauds from been perpetrated. What is needed, 
however, is empowerment of all participants in the web of corporate 
governance so that each body plays its own role in effective corporate 
governance.  
The issue of enforcement becomes of great concern, especially in a 
developing country like Nigeria. The nature of the country’s corporate 
environment, which has been polluted with corruption and political 
influence, remains a hindrance to corporate governance and economic 
development in the country. It is important to reiterate that the main 
objective of this thesis is to investigate Nigeria’s corporate governance 
regulation in the wake of the 2009 banking crisis and to assess whether or 
not regulation can help prevent future control frauds in Nigerian banks. The 
problem of enforcement is stressed throughout the course of this research. It 
is an endemic regulatory problem in Nigeria which mere legal provisions 
cannot seem to solve.  
It can therefore be said that the problem of regulatory enforcement in the 
periods before the crisis opened the way for control frauds that were swept 
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under the carpet. Subsequently, lack of adequate regulatory enforcement led 
to the control frauds of 2009.  
5.3 The Post-crisis Era of Corporate Governance (2009-to date) 
5.3.1 Code of Corporate Governance for Public Companies in Nigeria, 
(SEC Code) 2011 
In 2009, Nigeria witnessed a major banking crisis which nearly saw the 
collapse of the Nigerian Stock Exchange. It is shocking to see that the 2006 
CBN Code did little or nothing to prevent the crisis. What is even more 
shocking is the fact that most of the problems identified by the Code seem 
to have reoccurred. This then suggests that the Code must be lacking in 
form to have failed to prevent further banking crisis at the time.  
The reason for the failure of the Code is not farfetched. Banks were able to 
get away with falsification of accounts while fronting figures that suggested 
success and implied compliance to the Code. Non-compliance can therefore 
be said to be the major reason for failure of the Code. It was not until the 
special investigation of the CBN that it was revealed that banks had indeed 
failed to comply with the Code. Whether this could have been detected 
sooner would be a question of regulatory failure. Although the banks were 
quick to inform the CBN that they complied to adequate standards of 
corporate governance, the persistent use of Discount Window, while still 
insisting that the banks were ‘booming’ ought to have led the CBN to 
investigate these banks from time to time, adequately checking their level of 
compliance to the Code. Perhaps the result may not have been as disastrous 
as it was and maybe the impact might have been less considering the 
amount of money that had to be injected by the CBN to the banks as a bail 
out mechanism. 
In 2008, SEC, in an attempt to revise the 2003 Code, published a draft Code 
of Corporate Governance for all public companies in Nigeria. Three years 
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after the draft Code was introduced, it finally became operational in 2011. 
The Code can be commended for its in-depth provisions. The Code 
reiterated some of the provisions of the CBN Code of 2006. It took into 
account the banking crisis and seemed to make recommendations that were 
thought would best help prevent further crisis in banks.  
On the issue of CEO duality, the Code stresses that the Chairman should not 
be involved in the day-to-day running of the Company as this is vested on 
the Managing Director and the management team.
429
 The main purpose of 
the separation is to avoid over-concentration of powers in the hands of one 
individual. The potential problems to be encountered with an all-powerful 
CEO can only be imagined. In Nigeria, this was practiced for a long time, 
even up till the period of the banking crisis. This no doubt would pose risks 
of fraud where the same person holds two separate positions and there are 
no adequate systems in place for checks and balances. The split role of the 
Chairman and CEO serves as a means of checks and balances and also help 
prevent abuse of power. However, it is to be said that the efficacy of 
separation of these roles have been contended by writers who believe that 
the benefits of separating these roles cannot be ascertained.
430
 While the 
separation will not be of great concern in countries with two-tier board 
structure, the reverse is the case for countries with unitary board structure, 
but even in such countries, it is becoming certain that their Corporate 
Governance Codes are tending towards prohibiting the same person from 
performing two roles.
431
 In Nigeria, the institutional problem of corruption 
would lead one to believe that separation of the two roles might go a long 
way in preventing future control frauds in banks. 
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Furthermore, it is important to say that only the 2011 SEC Code has 
adequate provisions for the responsibilities of the Managing Director/Chief 
Executive Officer as extensive provisions were lacking in CAMA.
432
 The 
2011 SEC Code has explicit provisions that clarify the role of the MD/CEO. 
It recognises the MD as head of management who is knowledgeable in 
necessary areas required to run the company and together with the senior 
management, helps to ensure a culture of legal compliance, which should be 
embraced by all levels of the company.
433
 
Apart from the day-to-day running of the company, the duties and 
responsibilities of the MD/CEO include promoting growth and development 
in the company and representing the company in its dealings with 
stakeholders.
434
 The Code further provides that both the authority of the 
MD/CEO as well as their relationship with members of the board should be 
clearly described in a letter of appointment.
435
 
Notably, the 2011 Code provides a definition for Independent Directors. 
Although the word ‘Independent Directors’ was not used in CAMA, 
Corporate Governance Principles of International best practices across the 
world tend to refer to Independent Directors and so does Nigeria’s 
Corporate Governance Codes. The 2003 SEC Code used the word 
‘independent director’ as a synonym to non-executive director436 and this 
can be said to be inadequate because whereas it every independent director 
must be a non-executive director, not every non-executive director is an 
independent director. Section 5.5 of the SEC Code, 2011 defines an 
Independent Director as a non-executive director who is not a substantial 
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shareholder of the company (that is, one whose shareholding directly or 
indirectly does not exceed 0.1% of the total paid-up share capital of the 
company); not a representative of a shareholder and has not been employed 
as an executive of the company or its subsidiary;  not related to anyone who 
has been employed or served as an executive of the company or its group in 
the past three years; is not an adviser to the company or group other than the 
capacity of a director, is not a significant customer to the company, has no 
contractual relationship with the company and is not or has not been a 
partner or an executive of the company’s audit firm, legal or other 
consulting firm that have a material association to the company.
437
In effect, 
an independent director should be free of any relationship which could 
affect his ability to act as a director and provide independent judgment. 
Furthermore, the issue of Shareholders’ rights and responsibilities is 
provided for more extensively in the Code, whereas the 2003 Code provides 
that shareholders should be responsive, responsible and enlightened; there is 
no provision as to how this should be achieved. Although CAMA has 
provisions regarding keeping shareholders informed of the affairs of the 
company,
438
 these provisions can be said to be inadequate in the face of 
changing demands of corporate governance. To further complement the 
provisions of CAMA, Section 35.4 of the SEC Code, 2011 recognises the 
changing face of the Nation’s technology and as such it introduces the use 
of websites and investor-relations portals where shareholders and indeed the 
general public can access information regarding the company and also 
notices of annual general meetings can be published.
439
 
Still on the issue of shareholders, the Code seems to elaborate more on 
disclosure and transparency where it provides for a number of reports that 
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public companies need to prepare and for same to be sent to their 
shareholders. This includes a comprehensive annual report that takes into 
account issues such as risk management, business ethics, compliance with 
the Codes, Human Resource Management, etc.
440
 
Also, the Code is credible as the first Corporate Governance Code in 
Nigeria to make provisions for sustainability issues such as global warming, 
climate change, environmental factors, etc. Furthermore, the Code identifies 
with health related issues affecting individuals and requires companies to 
have strategies in place aimed at managing the impact of diseases such as 
Malaria, HIV/AIDS and other related diseases on its employees.
441
 
Lastly is the issue of whistle-blowing, which is provided for in the Code. 
Section 32 provides that companies should have a whistle-blowing policy in 
place such as hotlines or emails targeted at exposing unethical and illegal 
practices. The anonymity of whistle-blowing will serve to encourage people 
to make use of the system when necessary.  
Having discussed the advantages of the Code, it is imperative to note the 
inadequacies of this Code in terms of preventing future control frauds. 
First is the issue of enforcement. It remains unclear whether the Code is 
meant to be ‘rules-based’ or ‘comply or explain’. Perhaps what is needed is 
a rules-based, legal sanction approach as practiced in the United States with 
the introduction of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002
442
.  The Code 
however also suggests that it is meant to be on a comply or explain basis, 
therefore making compliance self-regulatory like that of the United 
Kingdom. It is therefore difficult to ascertain which enforcement 
mechanism is anticipated in the Code. On the one hand, it seems to suggest 
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that that compliance is voluntary,
443
 and on the other hand, it suggests that 
mandatory is mandatory.
444
 It is important to state that non-compliance with 
corporate governance Codes could have catastrophic consequences, not only 
for the company but also for its investors and stakeholders.  
Furthermore, the Code fails to provide defined role for independent 
directors. According to the Code, a public company should have at least one 
independent director.
445
 Section 4.3 provides that the board should comprise 
both executive and non-executive directors of which at least one of them 
should be an independent director. Bearing in mind that an independent 
director is a non-executive director who is detached in the company and 
management so much so as to be independent in character and judgment and 
his main obligation is to promote the best interests of the company. The role 
of the independent director is therefore at the forefront of effective corporate 
governance and prevention of control fraud because he acts with the best 
interest of the company at heart and is therefore likely to be free and fair.  
It is important to also mention that all independent directors are non-
executive directors but not all non-executive directors are independent 
directors. It therefore follows that although a company may have a fair 
amount of non-executive directors on its board, it may still be lacking in 
independent directors who will be fair in character and judgment. Best 
practice will therefore be for the majority of members of the board to be 
independent non-executive directors so as to ensure an unbiased corporate 
environment, which may open the door for control frauds to take place. For 
instance, in the UK, Section B.1.2 of the 2012 UK Code of Corporate 
Governance provides that: ‘Except for smaller companies, at least half the 
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board, excluding the chairman, should comprise non-executive directors 
determined by the board to be independent.’446  
There is therefore no gainsaying that the role of independent directors is 
very important and unless they are substantial in number as to have 
collective impact most importantly in working together to prevent control 
fraud, their role may be undermined. The approach adopted in developed 
countries is that they constitute the majority of the board members.
447
 This 
is to ensure a situation where independent directors can influence board 
decisions, but in a situation where a public company only has a minimum of 
one independent director, the ability to influence decisions may be 
practically impossible.  It is therefore right to say that for Nigeria to tackle 
the institutional problem of fraud which has eaten deep into Nigerian banks, 
it is important to ensure that independent directors constitute the majority of 
board members as this is a positive step in the fight to help prevent future 
control fraud in Nigerian banks. 
5.3.2 CBN’s CEO Tenure Policy 
In the past, appointment of the managing director in Nigeria usually lasted 
for three years and was renewable by the board. This was done according to 
their discretion and based on satisfactory performance.
448
  
However, following the 2009 banking crisis, the CBN in 2010, stressed the 
need to improve corporate governance in the banking sector and to avoid 
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‘sit-tight’ situations which has led to abuse of the system and subsequent 
bank failures.
449
 The CBN therefore, announced a fixed tenure policy for 
CEOs which imposed a maximum two-term policy of five years each and 
was retroactive, and actually stated an exit date for the affected CEOs. The 
CBN in its prudential guidelines provided that CEOs of banks are only able 
to serve a maximum tenure of 10 years and all CEOs who would have 
served for 10 years by 31
st
 July, 2010 are to resign by virtue of Section 4 of 
the Guidelines.
450
 Furthermore, any person who has served as CEO for 10 
years in a bank cannot be appointed in his former bank or subsidiaries in 
any capacity until 3 years after expiration of his tenure as CEO.
451
 
It is however not surprising that the activities of the CBN’s CEO Tenure 
policy became a subject of discussion especially when it required that a 
number of serving CEOs should vacate their office by a certain date, bearing 
in mind that the last 10 years had seen them as ‘successful’ CEOs who (on 
the face of it) had caused the banks to acquire both local and international 
achievements.
452
  
Aburime et al. consider major concerns of the CBN’s action.453 First is in the 
legality of the policy. Critics believe that there are no explicit provisions in 
the BOFIA and CBN Acts that enable the enactment of this policy.
454
 This 
is notwithstanding the provision of Section 33(1)(b) of the CBN Act which 
gives the CBN power to issue Guidelines to any institution under its 
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supervision and also Section 42(1) of the same Act which charges the CBN 
with the responsibility of ensuring adequate standards of conduct and 
management in the system; however, the Act does not grant the CBN 
outright power to limit the tenure of CEOs in Nigeria. Similarly, although 
no explicit provisions in both the CBN Act and BOFIA stops the CBN from 
limiting the tenure of CEOs of Nigerian Banks, it is the interference with a 
pre-existing lawful employment contract that would have been a solid basis 
for arguments in favour of compensation to all contracting parties (that is, 
banks and their CEOs) for the inconveniences they suffered due to this 
policy.
455
 
Secondly, issues regarding performance, quality, tenure and pay are dealt 
with by the board of directors who have the duty to protect the interest of 
the stakeholders in the bank, have not decided to place a cap on the tenure 
of the CEOs, then the decision of the CBN to do so becomes 
questionable.
456
 
Also, putting a cap on CEO tenure would mean that the role of experience in 
bank performance is irrelevant. The general belief is that more experience 
means more efficiency because the longer they stay in office, the more 
motivated they become and this could lead to better decisions for the banks. 
The cap on CEO tenure may, therefore, be a hindrance to bank efficiency in 
Nigeria. The writers believe that on the one hand the CBN has the power to 
regulate banking activities in Nigeria; however, they argue that where such 
regulation may impact on banking efficiency, it is bound to raise 
concerns.
457
 
Furthermore, there are the dynamics and peculiarities of each CEO. Having 
the same cap for tenure for all banks is not taking into consideration the fact 
that CEOs are different, and each CEO should be addressed in view of their 
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qualities and parameters of performance. Also, banks’ specific peculiarities 
should be taken into consideration. These include ownership structure, 
nature of business, size and volume of transactions, etc. Perhaps CEOs of 
banks that take greater risks should serve longer tenures than those with 
lesser risks.
458
 
From the above, it can be said that the parameters to which the CBN 
considered the tenure and then came to the conclusion of ten years is 
questionable. Issues of Nigeria’s peculiarities are not considered because the 
institutional corruption of the country would mean that tenure of the CEO 
will do little or nothing to help the situation. A control fraudster can 
perpetrate fraud in a bank given a minimum amount of time, regardless of 
how long he serves as CEO. 
Lastly, there is the question as to whether or not the tenure policy usurps the 
powers of shareholders and boards who should freely determine who should 
run the affairs of the company and how this should be done. This is a 
fundamental principle of corporate governance. There is yet no principle of 
corporate governance that grants power to the CBN to regulate tenure of 
CEOs. Although this is not new to the universal governance of states across 
the world, it is yet to be recognised in corporate governance.
459
 
That notwithstanding, taking into account the specific peculiarities of a 
country like Nigeria, while the tenure policy remains controversial, it is 
important to understand that the policy came shortly after the banking crisis 
and should be seen as a positive gesture on the part of the CBN in 
preventing future control frauds in banks. Whether or not the policy will 
work will depend on a number of other factors, as will be unravelled in the 
course of this thesis.  
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5.3.3 Code of Corporate Governance for Banks and Discount Houses in 
Nigeria 2014 
Recently, the CBN published another Code of Corporate Governance for 
Banks and Discount Houses intended to be effective from the 1
st
 of October 
2014. The new Code is meant to be a uniform Corporate Governance Code 
applicable to Banks and Financial Institutions throughout the country and is 
to repeal the 2006 Code.
460
 The Code was published together with 
Guidelines for whistle-blowing for Banks and Other Financial Institutions in 
Nigeria. Notably, the Code has been extended to Discount Houses and 
compliance is made mandatory as with the previous Code.
461
 
The Code begins recognising the problems faced by the banking sector since 
the last Code, that is, the 2009 banking crisis. The Code therefore begins by 
focusing on ensuring compliance. It is worth mentioning also that the Code 
also provides that external auditors are required to report annually to the 
CBN, the extent of the banks compliance with the Code. It therefore follows 
that the external auditor is to be adequately competent and knowledgeable 
with the governance systems operating in Banks and Discount Houses.
462
  
It is to be noted that although this new Code, when it becomes effective, 
will perhaps be the most comprehensive Code governing Banks in Nigeria 
to date and the Guidelines on whistle-blowing policy will be the first of its 
kind in Nigerian Banks and this in itself seems to be a positive move, 
however, the Code is quite similar in form to the SEC Code discussed above 
and to avoid repetitions, not much of the Code will be further discussed. 
However, as an improvement from the 2006 Code, certain provisions will be 
considered.  
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Firstly, the Code clearly provides for more robust transparency and 
disclosure requirements for Banks in a bid to promote effective Corporate 
Governance. These additional requirements go beyond the statutory 
requirements of BOFIA, CAMA and other applicable Laws.
463
 Section 5.1.2 
of the Code provides for the list of information to be included in a 
company’s annual report. These include details of directors, directors 
remuneration policy, details and reason for share buy-backs, corporate 
governance including governance structure, composition of the board of 
directors, loan quality and insider-related credits, risk management, fraud 
and forgeries, regulatory sanctions and any other matter capable of affecting 
the financial condition of the bank or its status as a going concern. The legal 
requirement that this information be included in the annual report would 
serves as a warning to potential control fraud, knowing that the likelihood of 
being caught out has increased. It is then left to be seen whether these would 
in themselves help prevent fraud in Nigerian banks.  
Secondly, shareholders’ rights and duties are also spelt out and in addition, 
shareholder access to information has been further widened in the face of 
growing technology to include websites, emails, etc. as with the SEC 
Code.
464
 
A major development in the Code is in respect of Shareholder Associations. 
Section 3.5 of the Code provides that the board is to ensure that dealings of 
the bank with shareholder associations are in accordance with the Code for 
Shareholder Associations published by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. The recognition of the Shareholders Association Code 
suggests a wider purview of Shareholders’ rights and responsibility, bearing 
in mind that the Shareholders’ Association Code aims at developing and 
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educating shareholders, making them more active, rather than passive, 
thereby strengthening their role in preventing control fraud.
465
 
Further to the above, the Code also provides for transparency and integrity 
in reporting and stresses the need for banks to disclose all relevant 
information and Banks have the structure to independently verify and 
safeguard the integrity and quality of their financial reporting according to 
Section 5.2. Furthermore, the Banks Audit Committee shall consist of only 
non-executive directors with a minimum of at least three members and shall 
be chaired by an independent director.
466
 Another notable provision of the 
Code is the prohibition of non-audit services by the external auditor. The 
Code goes further to enumerate the said services. These include: 
- Bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting records or 
financial statements of the audit client;  
- Appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinion or contribution-in-
kind reports;   
- Actuarial services;   
- Internal audit outsourcing services; 
- Management or human resource functions including:  
- Broker or dealer, investment banking services and legal or expert 
services.
467
 
This is to prevent conflict of interests and ensure adequate independence. 
Whistle-blowing is provided for in Section 5.3 where Banks are required to 
have a whistle-blowing policy which should be made known to their 
employees and other stakeholders. The policy is to encourage reporting of 
any unethical practices of the Bank to the CBN without fear and in 
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confidentiality. Section 7 also provides for ethics and professionalism in 
banks and also talks about conflict of interest whereby directors are required 
to disclose any real or potential conflict of interest that they may have in any 
matter. 
On the issue of sanctions in a bid to ensure compliance, Section 8 provides 
that returns on the status of each institutions’ compliance to the Code shall 
be made every quarter or as directed by the CBN and failure to comply with 
the Code will attract the penalty provided in Section 60 of BOFIA 1991(As 
Amended) which may be a fine, suspension of licence or prosecution as the 
case may be. The Code also provides for the appointment of a Chief 
Compliance Officer (CCO) who, in addition to ensuring compliance with 
Anti-Money Laundering and Financial Terrorism issues, is to also monitor 
the implementation of the corporate governance Code. Therefore the duty to 
ensure compliance is placed in the hands of the auditors and Chief 
Compliance Officers whose appointments must be approved by the CBN.  
Although, it can be said that the 2014 Code is very comprehensive, taking 
into account past failures of corporate governance, and going the extra mile 
to ensure transparency and disclosure. Whether or not the Code will help 
prevent future control fraud remains to be seen. There is no doubt that a 
large percentage rests on ensuring compliance to the code and actually 
enforcing compliance mechanisms. Although the Code may have made 
adequate provisions on how compliance can be ensured, the problem of 
non-compliance clearly goes beyond setting up measures and standards to 
weigh compliance. As explained earlier in this chapter, control frauds go a 
long way to conceal their fraud and adequate enforcement measures 
becomes necessary.  
So how can this be done? Enforcement is not a matter of making sure rules 
are followed merely by looking at the books where it says and shows that 
rules are followed; rather, it comprises looking more closely at the 
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underlying factors that may prevent compliance to rules to know why 
control frauds take place in the first place and seeking to eradicate these 
factors. The factors in question include, social, economic, political and 
environmental factors and it ranges from poverty to corruption, illiteracy 
and ignorance to mention a few!  
5.4 The Problem of regulatory multiplicity in Nigerian banks. 
The Nigerian corporate governance regulatory terrain can be said to be a 
trail of conflicting laws where discrepancies occur both in compliance and 
in principle. Generally, corporate governance regulation in Nigeria suffered 
from a weak system of regulation as explored throughout the thesis.  
As earlier discussed, the major company law in the country governing both 
listed and non-listed companies is CAMA. The Nigerian banking sector is 
also regulated by the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA), 
which complements CAMA and makes provisions for specific disclosure 
and reporting requirements for banks.
468
 Nigeria has subsequently 
developed a stream of corporate governance regulations following the 
global financial crisis that occurred at the time.  
The occurrence and implications of corporate governance multiplicity at 
individual country levels have been understudied in literature. Osemeke and 
Adegbite
469
 examine the conflicts arising from different Codes of corporate 
governance in Nigeria using a conflict-signalling theory. The authors start 
by referring to Karl Marx’s thinking that human behaviour in social contexts 
arises from conflicts between competing groups.
470
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According to them, although Marx focused on social conflict, conflict 
theory subsequently evolved to focus on a common belief that social groups 
have unequal power, even though all groups struggle for the same limited 
resources.
471
 Conflict theory is not only concerned with the needs of the 
society but that of corporations and focuses on issues such as disagreement 
between stakeholders.
472
 Therefore in examining corporate governance 
multiplicity, conflict theory helps to understand why there is conflict and the 
rationale behind boards’ decisions of which Code to comply with 
notwithstanding the conflict within the Codes.
473
  
The theory according to Osemeke and Adegbite assumes that the inherent 
conflicts within the Codes impact on the behaviours of managers and 
members of the board who were presented with the opportunity to comply 
with a less rigid Code or outright non-compliance.
474
 The subsequent 
implication of this conflict therefore sends mixed signals, (what the authors 
call ‘signalling theory’) to regulators and investors where friction exists 
between stakeholders which may lead to bad corporate practices.
475
 The 
totality of communication between companies, individuals and regulatory 
agencies becomes the focus of the signalling theory. The consequence of the 
theory lies in its implication for corporate reporting and disclosures whereby 
managers may use their position and access to information for their own 
benefit rather than that of other stakeholders. This may create an avenue for 
control fraud whereby executives decide to comply with the Codes that can 
easily be manoeuvred for their own benefit. They use the Codes to their 
advantage by making sure they comply only in principle but not in action.   
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Furthermore, Rotchschild and Stiglitz suggest that companies with good 
information transparency can signal good corporate governance through 
good reporting.
476
 In this situation, signalling would act as a form of 
screening device for shareholders to select the best companies for 
investment. Signalling theory therefore helps to play a motivational role for 
company disclosure. Osemeke and Adegbite conclude that both conflict and 
signalling theories help to complement each other in understanding how 
regulatory cohesiveness guides the behaviours of managers and companies 
in terms of compliance to corporate governance regulation.
477
 However, the 
multiplicity of Codes on the other hand is problematic to the effect that 
where a company may cite multiplicity as its reason for non-compliance, 
using it to conceal the true nature the company and the multiplicity itself can 
be used as a shield and weapon for fraud. 
Osemeke and Adegbite investigate the growing dissatisfaction with regards 
to the conflicts among the Codes. They find that people believe the problem 
is that of the regulators’ quest for power and relevance, leaving companies 
to bear the cost. The constant irregularity and conflict with the Codes seem 
to be self-indulgent.
478
 In their survey, they found that there is a general 
belief that the industry-specific Codes are more effective than the SEC Code 
because of their mandatory provisions. The survey further revealed that the 
conflicts in the Codes can be likened to the fact that they were copied from 
developed countries, particularly the UK and USA.  
As emphasized by one of the participants: 
‘.....the CBN Code is copied from the US while the SEC 
Code is copied from the UK. Is it possible for Nigeria to 
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develop their regulatory standard that suits our culture of 
togetherness and inclusiveness and suits our environment 
and society? ...our people should not be subjected to 
copying; otherwise, they should expect conflicts in 
implementation and practice. This is why we as managers 
are confused as to what to do. Most times, we ignore the 
Codes but for record purposes, we tick the boxes as a 
signal for compliance to the Codes and for auditing 
purposes... we just do it to avoid pressures from the 
regulators’479 
The results of their survey confirmed that over 67% of respondents believed 
that there are discrepancies in the Code, a number which is of great concern 
to stakeholders.
480
 
Regulatory multiplicity is a very grave issue in Nigeria. It is important that 
this problem is addressed in order to prevent an avenue for future control 
frauds. In this regard, a good suggestion would be that regulators work 
together to co-ordinate their Codes in order to create a unified system of 
corporate governance in the country so that corporate participants are clear 
on the rules in place. This would also provide for a more feasible possibility 
of working together to promote efficiency within the system. 
In the sub-sections that follow, notable areas of conflict will be analysed to 
the extent that they create regulatory multiplicity and an environment that 
could foster control fraud. 
5.4.1 Board Size and Independence 
Board size and independence has remained an area of concern in Nigerian 
corporate governance. The issue of how many members should be on the 
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board, how many executive and non-executive directors and how many 
should be independent directors has been a subject of debate.
481
 It is 
important to state that the Codes to be compared below will be the post-
crisis Codes, that is the SEC Code of 2011 and the most recent CBN Code 
of 2014. This is to focus on whether or not the present corporate governance 
regulations can help prevent future control frauds in Nigerian banks.
482
 
To start with, both the CBN and SEC Codes have various provisions 
regarding board size and independence and every time a new Code comes 
out, it creates even more ambiguity on the issue. For example, where the 
Code provides for non-executive directors to be independent, it goes on to 
say that the number of independent directors should be at least one.
483
 
Furthermore, the SEC Code provides that the number of board size should 
be a minimum of 5.
484
 It fails to provide the maximum number of board. 
Also, the ratio of executive to non-executive directors is not provided for in 
the Code. What is seen in S. 4.3 is that the board should be comprised of a 
mixture of executive and non-executive directors and the ratio of non-
executive directors should be more than that of executive directors. The 
Code further provides that at least one of the non-executive directors should 
be an independent director.  
Furthermore, the Code fails to clarify the issue of independent directors. 
According to the Code, a public company should have at least one 
independent director.
485
 Section 4.3 provides that the board should comprise 
both executive and non-executive directors of which at least one of them 
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should be an independent director. Bearing in mind that an independent 
director is a non-executive director who is detached in the company and 
management so much so as to be independent in character and judgment and 
his main obligation is to promote the best interests of the company. The role 
of the independent director is therefore at the forefront of effective corporate 
governance and prevention of control fraud because he acts with the best 
interest of the company at heart and is therefore likely to be free and fair. 
It is important to mention that all independent directors are non-executive 
directors but not all non-executive directors are independent directors. It 
therefore follows that although a company may have a fair amount of non-
executive directors on its board, it may still be lacking in independent 
directors who will be fair in character and judgment. Best practice will 
therefore be for the majority of members of the board to be independent 
non-executive directors so as to ensure an unbiased corporate environment, 
which may open the door for control frauds to take place. For instance, in 
the UK, Section B.1.2 of the 2012 UK Code of Corporate Governance 
provides that: ‘Except for smaller companies, at least half the board, 
excluding the chairman, should comprise non-executive directors 
determined by the board to be independent.’ 486  There is therefore no 
gainsaying that the role of independent directors is very important and 
unless they are substantial in number as to have collective impact, most 
importantly in working together to prevent control fraud, their role may be 
undermined. The approach adopted in developed countries is that they 
constitute the majority of the board members.
487
 This is to ensure a situation 
where independent directors can influence board decisions. But in a 
situation where a public company only has a minimum of one independent 
director, the ability to influence decisions may be practically impossible.  
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Notably, the recent 2014 CBN Code addresses the issue of board size and 
composition when it provides that the size of the board shall be limited to a 
minimum of 5 and a maximum of 20.
488
 The maximum number provided 
for, which is 20, seems to clarify the issue here but will banks follow the 
CBN or SEC Code?  Perhaps the mandatory nature of the CBN Code would 
suggest that banks must comply with the recent CBN Code. However, the 
irregularity in board size and composition is further compounded by the 
number of independent directors. While the SEC Code provides (as 
explained above) for the number of independent directors to be at least one 
non-executive director, the CBN Code provides that the number of 
independent directors for banks should be at least two non-executive 
directors. It therefore becomes a concern as to whether or not these 
irregularities may pave the way for future control frauds. This is because 
prior to the crisis, the 2006 CBN Code stated that the number of 
independent directors should be at least two who should not represent any 
shareholder’s interest, or hold a special interest in the bank, and should be 
appointed by the bank on merit.
489
  
While there is no evidence to suggest how many independent non-executive 
directors there were for each of these banks, it is safe to say that they each 
had at least two independent non-executive directors and it remains to be 
seen whether they were indeed independent and appointed by merit as the 
Code prescribed. Clearly this was not enough to prevent the control fraud, 
hence, the need to at least improve the number of independent non-
executive directors as a positive step towards preventing future control 
frauds in Nigeria. It is therefore right to say that for Nigeria to tackle the 
institutional problem of fraud which has eaten deep into Nigerian banks, it is 
important to ensure that independent non-executive directors constitute the 
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majority of board members and this is more likely to help prevent future 
control fraud in banks.  
5.4.2 Chairman/CEO Appointment 
Although both the SEC and CBN Codes clearly separate the roles of the 
Chairman and CEO, irregularities occur in the form of appointment. The 
CBN Code expressly states in Section 2.3.3 that no two members of the 
same extended family should occupy the roles of chairman and CEO at any 
one time. It is important to state that the 2014 Code does not define the term 
‘Extended Family’. However this is defined in Section 5.2.3 of the 2006 
CBN Code and it refers to members of a nuclear family, comprising the 
husband, wife and their siblings including parents and brothers/sisters of 
both the husband and the wife.
490
 
It is pertinent to note that the SEC Code is simply silent on the matter. It 
makes no provision whatsoever regarding extended family members serving 
as chairman and CEO at the same time, which will therefore mean that 
although the Code separates the two roles, it gives room for family members 
to occupy both positions which will then mean that the so- called separation 
is only in words but not in practice. This obvious conflict will send various 
signals to managements and companies who get confused as to what to do; 
it becomes a problem if two deserving people for these positions turn out to 
be members of the same family. Do you employ them? A professional 
answer would be to interpret the Code using the old mischief rule
491
 to the 
effect that the history of the Code is understood in order to determine the 
reason why the Code came to being in the first place, to investigate what the 
Code was meant to correct; and by so doing it would only be fair not to 
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allow two members of the same family to occupy the positions at any one 
time. This is because a close look at the events surrounding the SEC Code, 
and most importantly the control frauds in banks, will lead one to the 
conclusion that the Code is meant to correct the demeanour of CEOs and 
bank managers.  
Would it then be of any use if the same Code was being interpreted to mean 
that family members could still occupy the positions of Chairman and CEO 
at any one time when the Code is intended to curb the excesses of CEOs and 
Chairmen themselves? In essence, how can control fraud be reduced in 
Nigerian banks if this was still the case? Looking at these questions, it 
seems that interpreting the Code in line with its intended remedy will help to 
achieve its purpose. Perhaps a lasting solution to the irregularity would be 
for the CBN and SEC to coordinate their Codes in order to avoid the 
conflicts that could pave the way for future control frauds. 
5.4.3 Audit Independence 
Another area where there is discrepancy lies in the issue of Audit 
committees. The SEC Code provides that every public company is to 
establish an audit committee in accordance with Section 359 (3) and (4) of 
CAMA. This is to the effect that the audit committee is to consist of an 
equal number of independent directors and representatives of the 
shareholders to a maximum of six. This is however contradictory to the 
CBN Code which provides that the Banks Audit Committee (BAC) should 
consist of at least three members, should be made up of only non-executive 
directors and should be chaired by an independent director.
492
  
The discrepancy regarding composition of the audit committee would create 
ambiguity in the selection process. Companies are torn between what calibre 
of people should be on the committee. If CAMA suggests that shareholder 
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representatives should be part of the audit committee, clearly, it is a way to 
promote adequate representation of stakeholders in the audit committee. 
However, the suggestion by the CBN that the committee should only be 
made up of non-executive directors would mean that shareholders or other 
stakeholders are excluded from having a say in the audit committee. How 
then can we promote adequate checks and balances when only non-
executive directors are on the audit committee? Also, the Code does not 
stipulate whether or not the non-executive directors should be independent 
directors, therefore, the issue of independence of the audit committee 
becomes a concern.  
Furthermore, there is the issue of external auditors and non-audit services. 
No doubt, while the CBN Code provides that non-audit services are 
prohibited due to conflict of interest and goes further to highlight the 
particular services that are prohibited,
493
 the SEC Code merely provides that 
where non-audit services are provided, the audit committee is to ensure that 
there is no conflict of interest. There is a presumption that non-audit 
services may be provided in as much as the audit committee are satisfied 
that there is no conflict of interest.
494
 This would then suggest that there 
may be some non-audit services that could be provided while still 
maintaining independence of the external auditor. The problem with the 
SEC Code here is that it fails to list such services for the purposes of clarity. 
This is a very important provision as non-audit services are very vital to 
external auditor independence and it would be worth taking time to 
enumerate the kind of services that may be permitted under the Code. 
Another way of interpreting this provision is to consider the fact that 
perhaps there are indeed non-audit services that are conflict-free hence the 
reason for not listing same. 
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As will be examined in the chapter on Auditors, the external auditors in 
Nigeria provided both audit and non-audit services. There is therefore no 
doubt in saying that auditor independence has been impaired. Perhaps a 
good suggestion would be for CAMA to specifically prohibit non-audit 
services as this term is not mentioned in both soft and hard laws in Nigeria. 
It is important to clearly state the term in both the laws and Codes so as to 
provide adequate clarity on the issue. 
5.5 Should Corporate Governance Regulation be rules-based or 
principles-based? 
The success of corporate governance can be said to be based on a totality of 
environmental factors within which firms operate.
495
 These include the legal 
environment which comprises laws and policies, the corporate environment 
which is made up of business ethics and corporate relationship and also the 
regulatory environment which is made up of enforcement bodies such as the 
judiciary and other regulatory bodies like CBN and SEC in Nigeria. The 
totality of these can be said to be corporate governance regulation. 
Since the global banking crisis of the last decade, considerable attention has 
been drawn to regulating corporate governance across the world. Nigeria is 
therefore not left behind in the need to promote good practices of corporate 
governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
As the most populated country in Africa, the country still remains largely 
underdeveloped and is therefore devoid of standardised economic and 
political development. The level of corruption in the country is also a 
hindrance to the corporate environment which impacts on international 
investment and financial performance in the country.  
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That notwithstanding, active debates have been made towards regulating 
corporate governance from scholars, writers, regulators, legislators and also 
professional bodies. The arguments are being proffered twofold. Firstly, 
there is the notion that corporate governance regulation should be rules-
based. To this effect, Proimos argues that good corporate governance is a 
measure of compliance to legal requirements followed by penalties for 
breach;
496
 it therefore becomes impossible to separate corporate governance 
from law. The measure of a country’s compliance to effective corporate 
governance is determined by the level of increase or decrease in the number 
of cases that have been punished for non-compliance. He further argues that 
the provision of general guidelines are not in themselves effective, but 
rather a legal framework that spells out the penalties for non-compliance 
and becomes the solution to the problem.
497
 His conclusion therefore is that 
only rules-based corporate governance whereby statutes and laws are in 
force is the only way to prevent future corporate crisis. The most obvious 
example of rules-based corporate governance is the USA where in the 
aftermath of Enron and other major corporate scandals, the enactment of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act was seen as a proactive measure to prevent future 
scandals.
498
  
Secondly, there is the premise that corporate governance should be 
principles-based. This is based on more soft-law remedies for good 
corporate behaviour. The United Kingdom is a good example of principles-
based corporate governance whereby the adherence to corporate governance 
principles is seen as a voluntary measure whereby firms are encouraged to 
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adhere to corporate governance practices with the introduction of the 
comply or explain principle. The problem then lies on getting the best 
approach to effective corporate governance.  
In the consideration of the US reaction to the corporate scandals of Enron, 
WorldCom and Tyco, Greenfield posits that the introduction of a rules-
based system might be a rush in an attempt to ‘fix’ the things that may not 
be the parts that are broken.
499
 According to him, two assumptions underlie 
the rules-based system. First is the failure of corporate governance systems, 
fall in financial markets and loss of investor confidence; second is the 
attempt to get rid of the ‘bad apples’500 in order to get on with business. 
Greenfield further argues that neither of these assumptions will solve the 
problem. Trevino and Brown also claim that the first reaction to ethical 
problems is to find and punish the culprit.
501
 This is to serve as a ‘scapegoat’ 
for others and to create decorum in the organisation. The problem however 
is that although the perpetrator has been found and punished, the damage 
done is left behind and leaves a complacent environment behind. 
 The idea that by getting rid of one or more of the bad apples in the 
organisation, all will be well, leads the authors to conclude that most people 
are the product of the corporate environment in which they find themselves 
and therefore one can say that most fraud is supported either directly or 
indirectly by the context within which it occurs. 
In terms of control fraud, where the CEO uses ‘yes men’ to perpetrate fraud, 
it is possible that getting rid of the CEO will not necessarily get rid of all the 
allies to the fraud, therefore it is possible that other people in the system 
may carry on locally in their own capacity. 
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The challenge therefore is to develop a corporate culture of trust, integrity 
and intellectual honesty while also promoting the common law duties of 
good faith, diligence, care and skill. Companies tend to rebel against a rigid 
set of rules but are more attracted to a wider system that embraces the socio-
economic needs of the company. 
Berenbeim
502
 considers that effective corporate governance is a question of 
recognising human and institutional limitations as well as vigilance. 
However, he goes further to state that all these factors become irrelevant 
when markets rise. He then makes four suggestions that can help promote 
corporate governance. Firstly is in the issue of independence. Rather than 
focusing on promoting independence, a good knowledge of the cultural 
environment in which the board operates is far more important than 
concentrating on separation of the roles of CEO and Chairman. It is 
important to know the cultural dynamics which affect the day-to-day 
activities of the board. Secondly, director independence should be 
encouraged through employing competent directors, allocation of adequate 
resources to the board and regular meetings of non-employee directors. 
Thirdly, the requirement that boards certify financial statements may be 
beyond boards’ competence and fourthly is the promotion of more 
involvement in company ethics and compliance.
503
 
It is important to mention that any form of corporate regulation should take 
into consideration both rules and principles in order to adequately regulate 
the corporate environment. According to Adegbite, in many countries, both 
propositions of corporate governance regulations are not mutually 
exclusive; self-regulation actually functions on a preceding legal platform 
for corporate regulation.
504
 Ranking countries according to rules or 
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principles-based corporate governance would therefore suggest that 
corporate governance is country specific. 
The next issue to consider is whether or not Nigerian banks will benefit 
from a rule- based or principle-based system. Although the present trend in 
the country seems to be the rules-based system owing to a number of 
corporate governance Codes that have been developed since the banking 
crisis of 2009, Nigeria’s corporate governance system is made up of a 
combination of both legal and policy regulation which also includes soft 
laws, the only difference is that in the rules-based system, compliance is 
mandatory as opposed to the voluntary nature of the principles-based 
system. Indeed the country has seen a transition from voluntary to 
mandatory over the last few years in the banking industry. It is therefore 
safe to suggest that given the institutional configurations of the country; 
perhaps a rules-based system where compliance is mandatory will go a long 
way in helping to reduce corruption and control fraud in the country. 
5.6 Overview of the proposed Financial Reporting Council (FRC) of 
Nigeria National (Draft) Code of Corporate Governance (NCCG), 
2015 
It is important to discuss the controversial FRC draft unified Code of 
corporate governance, 2015 and its implications for Nigerian banks. 
In 2013, the Minister for Trade and Investment set up a steering committee 
to unify all existing Codes of corporate governance in Nigeria; this is 
premised on the multiplicity of the Codes which have created confusion 
regarding compliance.
505
 The committee was charged mainly with the aim 
of developing a unified Code that will promote highest standards of 
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corporate governance, enhance public awareness to corporate governance 
standards, promote sound internal control systems and enhance adequate 
financial reporting and audit systems.
506
 
The Code was divided into three parts; public sector, private sector and non-
profit organisations. Notable aspects of the Code are summarised below. 
To start with, the Code provides an exhaustive list of the functions of the 
board, stressing that the board is central to corporate governance. Duties of 
the board include leadership, accountability, risk management, as well as 
appointment and removal of internal audit committee.
507
 
Furthermore, Section 5.6 provides that the minimum number of board 
directors should not be less than 8 and in the case of small companies, the 
regulator may prescribe the minimum number of independent non-executive 
directors in line with both minority and majority stakeholders’ interests.508 
However, the term ‘small company’ is not defined in the Code and the 
prescribed number of 8 may cost more in terms of remuneration and the 
number also contradicts the CBN and SEC Codes which provides for a 
minimum number of 5.
509
  
Also, the Code provides that the number of executive directors should not 
be more than one-third of the board and the non-executive directors should 
not be less than two-thirds of the board.
510
 The result of this, however would 
lead to increase in governance costs because existing companies will have to 
increase the number of their board members. For example, a company with 
6 executive directors will have to increase its non-executive directors to 12, 
making a total of 18, which will impact on remuneration and governance 
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costs on the company. The Code further provides that the number of 
independent non-executive directors should not be more than half of the 
non-executive directors.
511
 This can be said to be a good improvement as it 
will provide for greater transparency and accountability. 
As regards audit committee, the Code provides that the board audit 
committee should comprise at least three members, who must be non-
executive directors, and majority of which shall be independent non-
executive directors.
512
 The Code also provides that the internal audit 
committee as set out by the board must develop an internal control 
framework for the company and obtain annual assurance report on the 
effectiveness of the internal control framework.
513
 It further provides that 
the head of the internal audit committee must be a member of senior 
management.
514
 Placing this position in the hands of a senior management 
may not necessarily provide a fair process of accountability and checks and 
balances as the role of senior management role itself poses the risk of 
control fraud. The Code also provides for appointment of external auditors 
who are to work with the internal board audit committee on appointment 
and removal of external auditors.
515
 Furthermore, the Code provides that 
listed and public interest companies should employ joint auditors for their 
statutory audit, and it goes on to define public interest companies as those 
whose capital is not less than N1 billion and annual turnover not less than 
N10 billion.
516
 While mandatory joint audit may provide a second opinion 
on an audit, it is not a guarantee for better audit performance or a more 
scrutinized audit.  Furthermore, the use of financial constraints to define 
public interest companies may be problematic because companies can 
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experience fluctuations in turnover which will lead to inconsistent 
categorization. 
The Code also provides for mandatory audit firm rotation after five years 
and leaves a five year cooling off period after which a previously engaged 
audit firm could work for the same company.
517
 Although this seems to be a 
positive step, whether or not audit rotation will help improve corporate 
governance and prevent the likelihood of fraud remains to be seen. 
Furthermore, the Code makes provision for shareholder involvement, taking 
into account both majority and minority shareholders and encourages 
constant relationship between board members and shareholders.
518
 
It suffices to say that the new FRC Code will be mandatory when released. 
However, it should be mentioned that the Code is not yet  in force and has 
been highly contested mainly based on its ‘one cap fits all’ approach which 
have raised concerns. Furthermore, it can be said that the FRC Code is not 
sufficient to address the issues raised throughout the course of this research. 
It is important to stress that the role of each participants in corporate 
governance needs to be enhanced if control fraud is to be reduced in 
Nigerian banks.  
5.7 Summary and Conclusion  
This chapter aimed at investigating the evolution of corporate governance 
Codes in Nigeria. It was the focus of this chapter to analyse the various 
Codes of Corporate Governance that are in existence in Nigeria with a view 
to understanding whether or not adequate regulations are in place targeted 
towards preventing control fraud. It can be seen that Nigeria’s corporate 
environment consists of a combination of Company Law and Corporate 
Governance Codes.  
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A thorough examination of the Codes would reveal that the Codes in 
themselves are not sufficient. It must be mentioned that the existence of the 
above Codes did not prevent the Banking Crisis of 2009, notwithstanding 
the existence of various corporate governance Codes aimed at promoting 
effective corporate governance in place at the time. Also, the lack of 
shareholder education doesn’t seem to help. In a situation where 
shareholders are ignorant of their rights and powers and do not know how 
and when to ask questions, shareholders that are mainly concerned with 
dividends and financial performance of the company will find it difficult to 
pay attention to details or even attend meetings where relevant issues are 
discussed. Nigeria has only recently begun shareholder education and 
enlightenment following the banking crisis and it is hoped that shareholders 
will become more confident in the use of their powers and privileges. 
Perhaps with the introduction of the 2014 Code with recognition for the 
Shareholder Association Code, more may be expected from Shareholders.  
Furthermore, the CBN Code had a massive case of non-compliance, even 
though compliance was expressly stated to be mandatory. It was discovered 
that Banks were able to falsify their accounts so much so that the CBN 
failed to detect for a long time. It therefore follows that if even mandatory 
rules could be sidelined, what then can be said for persuasive/comply or 
explain rules in Nigeria? The answer obviously would be that they will be 
simply ignored with little or no explanations given.  
In conclusion, although the new 2014 Code seems promising with the 
provision of sanctions for non-compliance to corporate governance policies, 
it doesn’t seem to be the solution that Nigeria needs at present. In addition, 
the proposed unified Code of corporate governance for companies has been 
identified as a ‘one cap fits all’ approach, which does not seem to be the 
solution that banks need. It is important to reiterate that banks are a peculiar 
institution with unique governance mechanisms, therefore a peculiar Code is 
required that will take into consideration corporate governance as it applies 
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to banks alone. In this regard, regulatory bodies such as the CBN and SEC 
need to be aware of the need to work with other corporate participants to 
reinforce their enforcement mechanisms rather than providing new laws 
from time to time. This means that enforcement of existing Codes for banks 
rather than replacing them with new ones should be the focus. The failure of 
the 2006 CBN Code seen in the banking crisis of 2009 would lead one to 
believe that the problem of corporate governance in Nigeria remains an 
institutional one of enforcement and until the underlying causes of these 
problems are addressed, mere introduction of new Codes from time to time 
would only help to compound the problem, rather than solve it. It is the job 
of each corporate participant to understand that preventing future control 
fraud is a collective responsibility not for regulators or lawmakers alone. 
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Chapter 6 
The regulatory involvement of the Central Bank of Nigeria in 
the banking crisis 
6.1 Introduction  
The global financial crisis of 2007 reiterated the enormous influence of 
financial institutions on the economy and politics. In Nigeria, the financial 
crisis of 2009 showed the importance of the Central bank of the country, 
particularly in prudential regulation. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
Act of 2007 charges the CBN with the overall control and administration of 
monetary and financial sector policies of the Federal Government.
519
 
Saddled with the responsibility of administering the Banking and Other 
Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA) of 1991 (As amended), the sole aim of 
the bank is to ensure high standards of financial stability and ultimately, the 
promotion of an efficient money system.
520
 This role is carried out both 
directly and indirectly. On the one hand, the central bank is a lender of last 
resort and a guarantor of net payments systems whereby they are ultimately 
responsible for the resolution of potential bank crisis. On the other hand, 
they are indirectly responsible for regulatory functions through design of 
financial structures targeted toward economic stability.  
In this regard, it is the focus of this chapter to explore the activities of the 
Central Bank in the banking crisis of 2009. Using the five banks as case 
studies, the chapter seeks to investigate the ways in which the central bank 
performed its regulatory functions before, during and soon after the banking 
crisis. It is important to note that the activities of the Central Bank during 
the crisis, particularly in sacking the CEOs of the affected banks and 
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subsequently bailing out the banks have generated a lot of criticisms. The 
chapter will commence with an investigation of the legal and structural 
composition of the Central Bank followed by the operational role of the 
bank. There will then be an analysis of the activities of the Central Bank 
during the crisis in order to explore factors responsible for the CBN’s failure 
to detect the potential solvency problems of the banks as part of their 
supervisory and regulatory role. The chapter suggests that regulatory role of 
the CBN is crucial to corporate governance; therefore, the CBN should be 
structurally improved to provide a more susceptible atmosphere for the 
prevention of control fraud. 
6.2 Overview of the Central Bank of Nigeria 
The Central bank of Nigeria, also known as the CBN, is regarded as the 
apex bank in the country. The CBN is the top regulatory authority in the 
Nigerian financial system. Established by the CBN Act of 1958, it 
commenced full operation on 1 July 1959
521
 with the enactment of the 
Banking Act and with an initial capital of £17.0million. In 1969, the 
Banking Decree was also established which fully legalised banking 
businesses in the country. The establishment of the CBN ushered in the 
beginning of banking regulation in the country. The Bank is responsible for 
formulating and implementing monetary and financial policies to achieve 
and maintain economic stability. 
Following the repeal of the Banking Act of 1959 and the Banking Decree of 
1969, the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Decree (BOFID) was 
promulgated in 1991, which further empowered the CBN in its regulatory 
and supervisory function in the country. By virtue of the Decree, both banks 
and non-banking financial institutions were brought under the purview of 
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the CBN. The Decree therefore empowered the CBN as the Chief Regulator 
of banking activities in Nigeria.  
In 1994, the CBN therefore established the Financial Services Regulation 
Coordinating Committee (FRSCC) as part of a regulatory initiative directed 
towards effective oversight of the financial sector.
522
 Members of the 
committee included the CBN, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), Ministry of Finance and the 
Nigerian Insurance Commission.
523
  
Sadly, the CBN did not enjoy its autonomous structure for long as the 
enactment of the CBN Amendment Decree No.3 as well as the BOFI 
(Amended) Decree No. 4 in 1997 effectively gave the Federal Ministry of 
Finance control over bank supervision and regulation, therefore giving the 
CBN little or no power in relation to bank supervision and regulation. 
The autonomy was later restored, although to a limited level in 1998 where 
the 1997 Decrees were further repealed in by the CBN Amendment Decree 
No 37 as well as the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Decree No 38 of 
1998, therefore, the regulatory power of the CBN was restored, granting it 
power to carry out its functions, particularly with regards to revoking 
banking licences.  
Finally, in 2007, a further CBN Act was enacted which repealed the CBN 
Act of 1991. By virtue of the Act, the CBN became a full autonomous body 
with a broader scope of advising the federal government of economic 
affairs. Section 1(3) of the CBN Act provides that the CBN shall be an 
independent body in the discharge of its functions, performance of its 
objectives (which are set out below), and in the promotion of economic 
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stability. Section 1(2) of the CBN Act also provides the principal objects of 
the bank. These include: 
- Ensuring monetary and price stability 
- Issuance of legal tender currency in Nigeria 
- Maintaining the external reserves to safeguard the international 
value of the legal   tender currency 
- Promoting sound financial system in Nigeria 
- Acting as a banker and providing economic and financial advice to 
the Federal government.
524
 
The CBN Governor and deputy are to be appointed by the president upon 
approval by the Senate. Section 8(5) of the Act provides that the Governor 
is to keep the president informed of the affairs of the bank from time to 
time, and make formal reports on the activities within the bank and 
economic performance to relevant committees of the National Assembly. 
6.3 The Operational role of the CBN 
Goodhart
525
 identifies two main functions of the Central bank. This includes 
micro-economic and macro-economic functions. Macro-economic functions 
include issues of monetary, price and financial stability, while micro-
economic functions have to do with the regulation of the financial system. 
According to him, these two functions of financial stability and financial 
regulation are interrelated because irrespective of the Central Bank’s focus 
on price stability and monetary balance in any economy (the macro-
economic functions), the achievement of this rests mainly on the micro level 
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stability in the financial system and banking system, as well as the smooth 
operation of the financial system in a broader sense.
526
   
In this regard, the need for the Central Bank to be in substantial relationship 
with supervisory bodies remains paramount to its operational role of 
financial stability and regulation. This amour propre as identified by 
Goodhart could be detrimental to smooth flow of information and lack of 
independence, hence the need for supervisory bodies in charge of banking 
supervision and the arm of the Central Bank charged with financial stability 
to work hand-in-hand, irrespective of its operational role and organisational 
structure.
527
 
Following from the above, it can be said that the organisational structure of 
banking supervision and the Central bank varies according to jurisdictions 
and other institutional factors and could mean that preference is given to one 
over the other.
528
 For instance, where the organisational structure works 
hand in hand with the Central bank, one issue that may arise would be that 
the organisational structure may want to control the category of people that 
would be involved in banking supervision, and influence the culture of the 
organisation in which they work. However, inasmuch as the need for 
Central banks to work with bank supervisors continues to grow, the best 
scenario will be to keep banking supervision within the central bank. Such 
internalisation, as argued by Goodhart, will allow for the enhancement of 
information flows and facilitation of decision-making.
529
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Although, the interrelationship between both roles would ordinarily warrant 
that they should be performed by a single entity, it is pertinent to consider 
the arguments for separation and fusion of the operational role of the central 
bank in developed and developing countries consecutively. 
6.4 The Supervisory role of the CBN 
In furtherance of the powers and functions conferred on it by the CBN 
Act,
530
 the CBN has all the functions and powers, as well as the duties, 
granted to it under the BOFIA. The CBN’s role of banking supervision is 
further reiterated in Section 1 of the Banks and Other Financial Institutions 
Act (BOFIA) of 1991 (as amended).
531
 Also, the CBN may appoint an 
officer of the bank to perform any of its functions under the Act and in some 
cases, appoint an outsider to render such assistance as necessary in the 
performance of its functions on behalf of, and in the name of the bank.
532
 
Furthermore, in the performance of its principal objectives stated above, 
particularly in ensuring price and monetary stability, the role of banking 
supervision becomes paramount to the CBN. Section 42 of the CBN Act 
therefore provides that the bank shall cooperate with other banks in Nigeria 
to ensure high standards of conduct and management throughout the 
banking system.
533
 In order to supervise financial institutions, Section 43 
further establishes the Financial Services Regulation Supervision 
Committee.
534
 The objectives of the committee include supervision of 
financial institutions as well as the promotion of safe, sound and efficient 
practices by financial intermediaries.
535
 The Committee can be said to be the 
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supervisory arm of the CBN responsible for regulating banking activities 
within financial institutions.  
One of the duties of the CBN is also to regulate and check the books of 
banks to make sure they conform to standard practice of banks with a view 
to determine their financial status. As a result, BOFIA provides that: 
‘Every bank shall keep proper books of account with 
respect to all the transactions of the bank. For the purpose 
of subsection (1) of this section, proper books of account 
shall be deemed to be kept with respect to all transactions 
if such books as are necessary to explain such transactions 
and give a true and fair view of the state of affairs of a 
bank are kept by the bank and are in compliance with the 
accounting standard as may be prescribed for banks. The 
books of account shall be kept at the principal 
administrative office of a bank and at the branches of each 
bank in the English language or any other language 
approved by the Federal Government’.536 
The CBN therefore has the power to demand for the books of any bank to 
determine whether it is in good stead. 
In furtherance of the duty to keep proper books, banks are to submit to the 
CBN a statement showing their assets and liabilities at their head office and 
branches within and without Nigeria in the form specified by the CBN, from 
time to time.
537
 Also, banks are to submit any other information or 
documents necessary for the proper understanding of the statements.
538
 Such 
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books must not only be kept, as well as submitted to the CBN, it must be 
done within a specified time. 
Additionally, the Governor of the CBN shall appoint an officer of the CBN 
who shall be known as the Director of Banking Supervision or by such other 
title as the Governor may specify. The Director of Banking Supervision has 
the power to supervise banks, other financial institutions and specialised 
banks. He also has the power to examine the books and accounts of banks, 
with access at all times and can require necessary information and 
documentation from directors, officers and managers.
539
 
A major provision of the BOFIA, which becomes paramount for this 
chapter, is seen in Section 33 and 35 of the Act. Section 33 provides that the 
governor shall have the power to conduct special examination in a bank 
where it is necessary in situations where the bank is struggling to cover its 
liabilities, or where it is carrying out business in a manner detrimental to the 
interest of the depositors and creditors.
540
 Section 35 further provides for the 
powers of the governor to intervene in a failing bank. A failing bank is 
described in the Section as an insolvent bank which may be unable to meet 
its obligations, or a bank which, upon investigation by the CBN pursuant to 
Section 33 of the Act, is deemed to be in a grave situation.
541
 The Section 
further provides that the governor can, among other things, remove any 
manager or officer of the bank, notwithstanding any written law or any 
limitations contained in the Memorandum or Articles of Association of the 
bank.
542
 The implications of the provisions of Section 33 and 35 of BOFIA 
will be analysed subsequently in detail in the course of this chapter. 
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6.4.1 Arguments for a Unified supervisory role 
Llewellyn (2006)
543
 considers major issues associated with organising the 
institutional structure of financial supervision, including the role of central 
banks. According to him, unification of banking supervision is necessary 
due to information-related connections within the banking sector. There is 
the need for central bank to be directly involved in data and information 
required in formulation of macro-economic policy and the severance of 
these functions will not only be expensive but will also lead to duplication 
in sourcing for information.
544
  
Also, the European Central Bank (ECB)
545
 posits that central banks in their 
function of prudential regulation of banks have a mandate for systemic risk 
and also financial market risk as a whole and it becomes practical that the 
role of banking supervision and systemic stability be taken by the central 
bank. 
According to Bernanke (2007), because prudential regulation is closely 
linked to macro-economic policy, as data from the banking sector is very 
vital for macro-economic policies; both operations should therefore reside in 
a unified body.
546
 Furthermore, information regarding banks liquidity and 
solvency is very paramount for the central bank, particularly in the 
performance of its role as a Lender of Last Resort. Another argument in 
support of a unified regulatory system borders around ability to hire and 
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train skilled and experienced staff. 
547
 The central bank in its capacity is able 
to attract more staff in comparison with an agency with lesser status, 
especially in an environment where regulators may have to compete to 
employ qualified and skilled staff. 
Furthermore, the independence of the central bank is strengthened with the 
unification of bank supervision and systemic stability roles and this will also 
help avoid potential regulatory capture by supervised institutions. According 
to Davis and Obasi (2009), 
548
 the need for a single Financial Services 
Authority empowered with the responsibility of overseeing the activities of 
the different financial institutions has convinced policymakers 
worldwide.
549
 
Davis and Obasi further enumerate three main areas that determine the level 
of power needed by the central bank as a supervisory authority, and how 
this power may be limited or reversed if necessary.
550
 Firstly, they note that 
there is the need for supervisory authority to have corrective powers, which 
would enable it to take necessary actions where it observes a decline in bank 
solvency level restructure and reconstruct a bank in extreme cases and also 
declare a failed bank insolvent.
551
 
Secondly, the central bank, as a supervisory authority, should have the 
power to address issues relating to violations of regulations and legal 
requirements as well as unethical behaviour by banks. It should be able to 
do this using its discretion.
552
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Lastly, there should be no interference from the courts in the exercise of the 
central bank’s function as a supervisory body. The court should serve as a 
complement to the central bank and not undermine or overrule its actions 
unreasonably.
553
 Going by this, it is important that there exists a balance of 
power firstly between the central bank in its supervisory capacity and the 
institutions which they supervise, and secondly between the courts and the 
central bank. 
In contrast to the above, Quintyn and Taylor are of the view that such 
authority may become too powerful to the detriment of the financial system 
or suffer diseconomies of scale where multiple supervisory authorities 
supervise financial institutions.
554
 Furthermore, Quintyn and Taylor suggest 
the independence of bank supervisors from politicians, the banks they 
supervise and unreasonable termination of office.
555
 In effect, the level of 
their independence is related to the entire standards of governance and 
accountability in the country.
556
 
6.4.2 Arguments for Separation of Banking Supervision and Monetary 
Policy 
One of the main arguments in support of separation of banking supervision 
lies in the issue of conflict of interest. This is premised on the fact that 
supervisory concerns on the banking system may influence the central bank 
to be more accommodating in relation to monetary policy than necessary for 
maintaining price stability.
557
 This argument is also rooted in the risk of 
credibility and reputational loss that is associated with the sole 
responsibility of supervision. This, according to Goodhart, is because on the 
one hand, scholars of economic and monetary analysis stress the need to be 
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able to influence expectations while central bank practitioners stress the 
importance of credibility.
558
 The central bank may therefore accommodate 
bail-out pressures through the use of liquidity measures (in the form of 
Lender of Last Resort, Open Market Operations) in a bid to avoid 
reputational loss that may jeopardize the credibility of the Central Bank as a 
monetary authority.
559
   
Also, as a regulator, financial performance and economic stability of banks 
and the financial sector as a whole becomes paramount to the Central bank, 
and in performing this role, there is the tendency that their reputation be put 
to question because owing to the fact that economic stability is very vital to 
the Central bank, various monetary strategies could be put in place which 
may be quite flexible, therefore posing issues of credibility upon the bank. 
Due to the vital nature of credibility and reputation, especially in ensuring 
price stability in the economy, perhaps it is better that the Central bank stay 
clear of bank supervision. 
Furthermore, Goodhart views the role of supervision as a thankless task 
which may tarnish the image of the supervisor. Supervision is mainly 
premised on preventing undesirable events and financial distress and a 
supervisor is basically noticed when supervision fails or when he takes a 
restrictive action against the regulator.
560
 This is usually the case where 
problems of mismanagement and financial crisis take place. For instance in 
the case of the Nigerian banking crisis of 2009 (the subject matter of this 
research), it can be said that before 2009, the positive activities of the CBN 
to regulate the banking and financial sector in general were unnoticed by the 
general public; however, upon the actions of the CBN, sacking the five 
directors in 2009 owing to allegations of control fraud and financial 
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mismanagement, there was a public outcry on the inability of the CBN in 
the conduct of its supervisory role of regulating these banks. The public was 
quick to criticise the activities of the CBN both generally and around the 
time of the crisis. 
Going further on the need for separation of banking supervision, Jacome
561
 
is of the opinion that the unification of banking supervision to the Central 
bank will grant the bank the sole discretion of ‘monetising’ financial 
distress.
562
 This is a situation whereby the decision for financial bail-out 
becomes the responsibility of the bank; and in a situation where there is a 
potential risk of collapse of the entire financial system,
563
 the bank may be 
quick to fuel such risk in order to avoid the ultimate bail-out of the system 
that could ultimately lead to financial instability. 
Although in order that the Central bank exercise its powers appropriately in 
supervision of the financial system, it is important that it is independent 
from adverse influence. The problem, however, lies in identifying exactly 
how much power the Central bank has and how this is used. Eijffinger and 
Hann
564
 posit that it is difficult to measure the degree of independence that 
Central banks have, let alone the extent to which this independence is free 
from political influence. Actual independence as opposed to legal 
independence is restricted to individual countries and most research 
generally tends to focus on actual independence. In Nigeria, the 
independence and accountability of the CBN is not only dependent on the 
enabling Act or legislation, but a function of a collection of other 
unquantifiable factors such as the calibre of bank officials and key personnel 
of the bank, as well as informal political arrangements with the government. 
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The problem of excessive power in a system where accountability measures 
are weak may lead to abuse of power by the Central bank and this may pose 
potential risk where such powers are concentrated in the hands of un-elected 
officials. 
565
 
In summary that in a country with an under-developed economy such as 
Nigeria where corruption is also endemic, it is probable that the CBN cannot 
be truly independent. A good suggestion therefore will be to adopt the 
position of Goodhart and to separate both roles by means of legislation. 
6.5 CBN’s Lender of Last Resort policy 
In the last decade, the Central bank’s liquidity assistance to failing loans in 
banks has prompted issues on the topic of Lender of Last Resort (LOLR). 
According to Bordo
566
, the classical doctrine of LOLR arises from banking 
panic in a fractional reserve banking system. Bordo describes banking panic 
as ‘a widespread attempt by the public to convert deposits into currency; 
and in response, an attempt by commercial banks to raise their desired 
reserved-deposit ratios’.567 Banking panic occurs when a series of failures 
occur within a short while that could threaten the solvency of otherwise 
sound banks.
568
 It is pertinent to mention that bank failures can be 
necessitated by two factors – internal and external. Internal factors include 
both financial and non-financial factors, including control fraud and 
financial mismanagement. External factors refer to adverse changes in the 
overall prices of assets, which may have an adverse effect in the value of the 
bank’s portfolio, thereby rendering it insolvent.  Control fraud can therefore 
be said to be a notable example of failure that could impact on the future of 
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sound banks. It can therefore be said that ultimate aim of the CBN’s Lender 
of Last Resort role is to serve as a pacifier of the incipient panic to be 
created by control fraud through provision of high-powered money, either 
through Open Market Operations or through the discount window.
569
 
Furthermore, depositors may find it hard to distinguish a sound from an 
unsound bank, especially where there is a panic in the banking system. This 
may then lead to bank runs whereby depositors withdraw their deposits 
simultaneously due to concerns that the bank may be insolvent. Runs on 
insolvent banks can lead to runs on solvent banks due to panic. Sound banks 
are therefore made insolvent by the fall in the value of their assets owing to 
the struggles for liquidity as they have to engage in ‘fire sales’570 of assets to 
meet demand for cash; this in turn drives down asset prices, endangering 
other previously solvent banks. At a point where the liquidity of solvent 
banks is threatened, intervention by a Lender of Last Resort will serve to 
allay the panic. Scholars have argued for and against Central bank as a 
Lender of Last Resort. 
To start with, Goodhart examines Central bank as a Lender of Last Resort 
(LOLR) to insolvent banks. According to him, although the traditional trend 
of LOLR is to lend freely but at a penalty rate to illiquid but solvent banks, 
the difference between illiquidity and insolvency remains unclear. This is so 
because many banks that require LOLR due to illiquidity are already under 
suspicion with regards to solvency.
571
 Furthermore, at the time when the 
bank is faced with illiquidity, it may be difficult for the Central bank to 
evaluate the assets of the distressed bank within the space of time involved; 
it will therefore have to take an immediate decision to provide last resort 
facilities when it knows that there may be a solvency problem, but just 
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doesn’t know its full extent.572 He also argues that the valuable customer-
bank relationship between depositors and the bank becomes severed in the 
case of bank run on an insolvent bank. Goodhart therefore concludes that in 
order to avoid loss of this relationship and in a bid to protect borrowers, 
LOLR becomes necessary. 
Solow also argues that since the Central bank is responsible for the stability 
of the financial system, bank failures would have a large impact on the 
financial system of the economy, mainly in the loss of confidence (and lack 
of investment); it is therefore necessary that it provides financial assistance 
to insolvent banks and restores stability to the financial system. However, 
Bordo considers this to be a moral hazard due to higher risk-taking, with the 
public losing incentives to monitor them.
573
 
Writers against LOLR have argued that banking panic is a mere reaction to 
the legal restrictions on banking in each legal system, the absence of which 
would lead to a panic-proof free market and where depositors are adequately 
informed of the situation of their banks, simultaneous runs will not occur.
574
 
6.5.1 CBN Lender of Last Resort and the Discount Window 
The role of the CBN in granting loans through the discount window is 
pivotal to this research. This is because the use of the discount window has 
been revealed as a central means through which control fraud was 
perpetrated in the banks. It is therefore important to examine the role of the 
CBN regarding discount window operations in order to explore how internal 
regulatory weakness of the CBN might have facilitated control fraud. 
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 In Nigeria, the Central bank’s Lender of Last Resort role is provided in 
Section 42 (2) of the CBN Act to the effect that the bank may grant loans 
together with other accommodation facilities at set rates of interest and 
terms as determined to any bank which may be having liquidity problems. It 
is important to mention that the CBN Act fails to define the term ‘liquidity’. 
However, liquidity can be considered in three possible definitions.
575
 Firstly, 
in terms of financial instruments, liquidity refers to the ability with which 
they can be exchanged without loss of value. Secondly, market liquidity 
refers to the ability of the market to trade large quantities of assets and 
securities quickly at a low cost without necessarily affecting the price.
576
 
Monetary liquidity, which is the third possible definition for liquidity, 
reflects to the quantity of liquid assets circulating in the economy, measured 
by monetary aggregate or its GDP ratio.
577
 
As a bank of all banks, the LOLR role of the CBN is attached to the 
mandate of ensuring financial stability in the country. It is important to 
mention at this stage that the CBN Act does not explicitly provide the 
criteria for granting loans to banks and the ratio for calculation of the 
penalty rate of these loans. However, this is provided for in the CBN 
Guidelines on the Expanded Discount Window Operations of 2008.
578
 
Mention must be made that the Discount Window was expanded in 2008 
following the global financial crisis and also liberalization of the financial 
markets. The expansion in itself involves the admittance of non-federal 
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government instruments and the extension of the tenure of liquidity period 
to 360 days.
579
 
According to the Guidelines, Discount Window is defined as the medium 
through which the CBN grants credits to Deposit Money Banks (DMBs)
580
 
and Discount Houses (DHs) at the Discount Window (DW).
581
 
There are two types of credit facilities available to eligible borrowers. These 
are Standing Lending Facility and Fixed Tenure Repurchase agreement as 
provided for in S.26 of the Guidelines. Standing lending facility, also known 
as outright borrowing, is an overnight advance available to DMBs and DHs. 
The collateral for this facility is set at ten per cent for Federal Government 
backed Securities above the value of the amount applied for and in all other 
cases, the bank has the right to set the collateral margin. Section 27 further 
sets out the procedure for applying for Standing Lending Facility. 
Repurchase Agreement on the other hand is the immediate sale of securities 
for payment followed by a recommitment to buy same on a later date and at 
a fixed term (usually not exceeding 360 days).
582
 It therefore involves two 
simultaneous agreements in one contract.
583
 Section 30 further provides that 
a Repurchase Agreement could either be a buy-back (Repo) or a sell-back 
(Reverse) depending on the standpoint of the borrower or lender. However, 
the CBN will view a transaction as a Repo for the purposes of the Discount 
Window. A Repo is viewed as a loan and therefore the applicable rate is set 
by the market. Also the maximum amount borrowable under a Repo is 
usually within 70 per cent of the face value of the eligible security. Eligible 
instruments that can be used for collateral includes: Nigerian Treasury bills, 
Treasury Certificates, Federal Government Bonds, NDIC Accommodation 
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Bills, State Government Bonds, Guaranteed Commercial Papers or 
Promissory Notes, and any other instruments that may be approved by the 
bank from time to time.
584
 
Section 4 of the Guidelines states the conditions for the operation and 
function of the Discount Window. These are listed below: 
1. Lender of Last Resort Facility - Institutions seeking to utilize the DW 
must first fully exhaust all alternative market sources. The DW is to be 
approached on a Last resort basis only.   
2. Deposit Money Banks and Discount Houses shall access the DW only 
on a secured basis. Any credit must therefore be fully and adequately 
collateralized by eligible securities.  
3. Deposit Money Banks and Discount Houses may use the DW to obtain 
liquidity from the Bank via repo or collateralized loans against eligible 
instruments.  
4. Repo credit from the DW shall be for a period not exceeding one year.  
5. Collateralized loans shall be on an overnight basis through standing 
lending facilities.   
6. Credits at the DW must be with eligible instruments whose tenure shall 
not exceed one year. In other words, such instruments shall be those 
qualifying for secondary market operations with the Bank. 
7. Credits by way of an advance or outright borrowing must be fully 
secured by eligible instruments.   
8. The eligible instruments at the DW will be rated appropriately and in 
line with the prevailing economic conditions and the financial well-
being of the issuer of the security.  
9. Advances or outright borrowing at the DW, whilst adequately secured, 
shall be priced appropriately, and the applicable rate of interest will be 
governed by the prevailing economic and market conditions. In any 
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event, such advances shall attract a rate of interest at the Bank’s MPR 
plus a margin determined at the discretion of the Bank.  
All DMBs and DHs have direct access to the Discount Window. However, 
the CBN has the power in exercising its discretion on access to the window 
and this may be denied in the following circumstances:
585
 
- If the Bank observes an act of undue rate arbitrage in the operations 
of the institution’s dealings;  
- If an institution is found to have contravened the provisions of the 
Bank’s monetary and credit policy guidelines;  
- If the Bank discovers that the institution has been over-trading or 
engaged in undue mismatch of its assets and liabilities;  
- If there is contravention of the clearing houses rules;  
- If there is any contravention or non-observance of provisions of the 
prudential guidelines;  
- If a DMB/DH under a holding action fails to comply with the 
provisions of the holding action.  
From the above provisions, it can be said that the CBN is fully empowered 
to provide access to the Discount Window as a Lender of Last Resort and in 
allaying liquidity shortages and absorbing excess liquidity that could arise in 
the banking system. However, as Goodhart points out, the distinction 
between liquidity and insolvency is far from clear; an illiquid bank can 
become insolvent and vice versa.
586
 
 It is important to mention that in the case of the five banks, access to the 
discount window must have been provided based on collateralized loans 
against eligible instruments as provided for in the CBN guidelines discussed 
above. It is however unclear, what instruments were actually provided as 
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collateral for these loans. Perhaps the publishing of the list of non-
performing loans granted by these banks suggests that they might have been 
used as collaterals for the persistent access to the discount window; 
however, whether or not this was actually the case remains unclear and the 
CBN has remained silent on this. This calls for attention regarding 
accountability of the CBN.  
6.6 The role of the CBN during the Banking Crisis of 2009  
In 2004, the Central Bank launched a financial strategy of raising the 
minimum share capital of banks to N25billion ($167million), as a reform 
strategy to adhere to changing phases in international corporate 
governance.
587
 
The consolidation exercise seemed a perfect solution for the CBN at the 
time. However, on the 3
rd
 of June 2009, Lamido Sanusi was appointed by 
the president to replace Charles Soludo. However, within a few months of 
his assumption into office, precisely on the 14
th
 of August 2009, the new 
CBN governor, upon investigation of five of the registered banks which led 
to the discovery of financial distress owing to fraudulent practices and 
mismanagement of funds, fired the CEOs and Board of Directors of five 
banks in Nigeria in accordance with Sections 33 and 35 of BOFIA 2004, 
replacing them with CBN appointed CEOs and Board of Directors.
588
 The 
banks involved include: Afribank Plc, Intercontinental Bank Plc, Union 
Bank of Nigeria Plc, Oceanic Bank International Plc and Finbank Plc. 
According to Sanusi: 
‘Available results from the tests showed that the five 
banks had aggregate non-performing loan portfolios of 
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40.8% and accounted for a significant proportion of total 
bank exposure to the stock market and oil and gas sector. 
Again, the banks accounted for 39.93% of total sector 
loans, 29.99% of deposits and 31.47% of total assets as at 
the 31st of May 2009.’589 
Clearly, under Section 33 of BOFIA explained earlier, the CBN has the 
power to conduct special examination of the affairs of the bank where 
necessary. The CBN is also empowered to sack and replace the CEOs under 
Section 35 of the BOFIA. 
On October 2, 2009, barely 48 days later, the CBN governor sacked 
additional CEOs and board of directors of three further banks, replacing 
them with CBN appointed CEOs and boards. This increased the total 
number of affected banks from 5 to 8. The three banks involved were 
Platinum and Habib Bank (popularly known as Bank PHB), Spring Bank 
and Equatorial Trust Bank (ETB).
590
 The CBN then declared intervention in 
the distressed banks in order to prevent their collapse by injecting a total of 
N420billion ($2.8million) liquidity into the banking system in the form of 
unsecured and subordinated debt and also the provision of a guarantee of all 
interbank lending transactions, foreign credit lines and pension deposits. 
The CBN relied on the provisions of Section 33 and 35 of BOFIA for its 
action.
591
 
While the Section does not state that the Governor can expressly inject 
money into the banks, it provides that the Governor after an examination of 
these banks can make an order to prohibit any further credit facility to the 
banks (such as the EDW), and most importantly, the Governor can require 
the bank to take any steps in relation to its business as considered necessary. 
The CBN claimed it based its actions on the provisions of Sections 33 and 
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35 to the effect that it can remove and replace the directors after conducting 
its investigations and it can also take necessary steps as required in the 
banks. 
Furthermore, the governor in an address highlighted the following factors as 
its reason for intervention:
592
 
 The affected banks constituted a systemic threat to the financial 
sector in Nigeria due to their operational failure. 
 The affected banks lacked sound risk management processes. 
 The absence of corporate governance regimes and practices in the 
affected banks. 
 The prevalence of unethical practices by the management of the 
affected banks including huge amounts of non-performing loans. 
6.6.1 The regulatory involvement of CBN in Afribank 
In 2012, the House of Representatives, through a resolution, set up an ad 
hoc committee to investigate the near collapse of the Nigerian Capital 
Market through public hearing and explore the factors that led to the near 
collapse of the capital market in order to find possible solutions to the 
problem.
593
 In order to achieve its objectives, the ad hoc committee 
conducted inquiries into activities of regulators, operators, persons or 
institutions that were connected with the capital market from 1999 to date. 
It is important to mention that the committee specifically stated that while 
adequate cooperation was received from stakeholders, certain Government 
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agencies, namely CBN, SEC and AMCON, refused to cooperate with the 
committee and failed to divulge relevant documents considered very vital to 
the investigation.
594
 During the investigation by the Ad Hoc Committee of 
House of Representatives, Sebastine Adigwe, former Managing 
Director/Chief Executive Officer of Afribank Plc, stated that the collapse of 
the banking sector was as a result of CBN’s regulatory intervention which 
caused remaining international players to pull out their money. Again, CBN 
pressure on banks to recover loans, led to over N1 trillion of banks’ fund 
trapped in the capital market; CBN expropriation of investors shares by 
forceful takeover and change of business name in an arbitrary process 
thereby discouraging further interest of foreign and local investors; CBN as 
the regulator, was unable to propose and implement a timely and carefully 
planned bail-out option.
595
 
Further indictment on the CBN before the Committee was that in August 14, 
2009 the CBN sacked the executive directors of the bank, basing their 
decision on the fact that Afribank had a liquidity ratio of 24 per cent against 
CBN’s prescribed ration of 25 per cent; capital adequacy ratio of 8.49 
against CBN’s prescribed 10 and corporate governance violations such as 
mismanagement and weak internal controls. Prior to that, the CBN had 
earlier approved N70billion to be raised through bond issues but this was 
truncated following the intervention; subsequently, the CBN injected 
N50billion into the bank (through unsecured and subordinated debt and also 
the provision of a guarantee of all interbank lending transactions, foreign 
credit lines and pension deposits); an action that affected risk assets and 
compounded the crisis.
596
  
The Committee further revealed that one of the major causes of the capital 
market downturn is sudden change of policies, poorly thought-through 
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tightening of regulations and a scapegoat approach to a systemic problem by 
the new CBN administration.
597
 In the case of Afribank, it was revealed that 
the CBNs’ appointed managers in Afribank, classified all risk assets as lost, 
and therefore created a liquidity scenario during the sale of the bank in 
2010. The CBN initially shortlisted 2 bidders: Vine Capital Limited and 
Fidelity Bank PLC. Based on this, Afribank signed a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) with Vine capital, however, CBN in the exercise of 
its powers and policies rejected the bid. Subsequently, Afribank’s license 
was withdrawn and the assets and liabilities of the bank transferred to Asset 
Management Committee of Nigeria (AMCON) and the name changed to 
Mainstreet Bank Ltd, a private company.
598
 
In the memorandum provided to the AdHoc  committee, the CBN listed the 
causes of the banking crisis such as Macroeconomic instability; major 
failures in corporate governance risk management; lack of investor and 
consumer sophistication; poor disclosure and transparency; gaps in 
regulatory framework; weaknesses in business environment.
599
 However, it 
must be noted that till date, the CBN is yet to respond to the following 
issues raised during the investigation by the Ad Hoc Committee: 
 The Special Examination report with respect to the 10 banks, and the 8 
intervened banks, and all the accompanying approvals, Board 
Resolutions, and all other relevant explanatory details; 
 Bank-by-bank analysis of movements/trends in margin loans balances 
2006 to date; 
 schedule of Capital Verification Report following the banking sector 
consolidation of 2004/2005; 
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 a schedule showing the forbearances, waivers, or other financial 
accommodation granted to any bank or groups of bank on account of the 
banking sector consolidation of 2004/2005; 
 schedule of all liquidity injections into the banking system from the 
onset of the banking consolidation of 2004 up to the period to April 
31st, 2012; 
 details of the commercial banks’ exposure to the CBN discount and 
expanded discount window, on a bank-by-bank basis from the year 2004 
to the period to 31st April, 2012; 
 schedule showing CBN’S approval of bad loans assumed by AMCON 
from the period of AMCON’s inception to date; 
 CBN’s Analytical Balance Sheet for the period 2004 to 2008, then, 2009 
to the period to 31st April, 2012; Details of share exchange computation 
by AMCON representing the share values of shareholders in all the 
intervened banks; 
 Evidence that the CBN have received the sum of N620billion, claimed 
to have been repaid. 
 Status Report on Savanna Bank PLC, SGBN, showing details of all 
assets and liabilities due to investors and shareholders as accounted for 
by the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation.
600
 
It is important to reiterate that accountability of the CBN remains of major 
concern, particularly in its refusal to respond to the demands of the 
committee. It follows that this issue must be dealt with for future control 
frauds to be prevented in Nigerian banks. It is important that every actor 
plays its role in corporate governance regulation and failure to publish 
publicly relevant data is not quite encouraging in towards preventing future 
control frauds in Nigerian banks. 
The following conclusions were made by the committee:  
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Firstly, the circumstances and the processes surrounding the three 
nationalised banks of August 5th, 2011, in Nigeria, remain a major source of 
investors’ loss of confidence in the Nigerian capital market. By August 
2009, CBN intervened in 10 banks; however, it gave the intervened banks 
up to September 30th 2011, to recapitalise. But, between Friday 5th August 
2011 to Monday, 8
th
 August, 2011, without any further warning, the licenses 
of three banks, namely, Afrikbank PLC, Spring Bank PLC, and Bank PHB, 
were revoked by the CBN; and Nigerians and investors were informed that 
the names of these banks have been changed as follows: Afribank PLC, now 
to be known as Mainstreet Bank; Bank PHB, now to be known as Keystone 
Bank; and Spring Bank PLC, now to be known as Enterprise Bank.
601
  
Secondly, the CBN Governor withheld all material information, financial 
records, schedules, reports, and Minutes of all Board Meetings, and in all 
cases, particularly the CBN’s refusal to produce the Special Examination 
Report preceding its intervention in the 10 banks in August 2009. The CBN 
had stated that the Reports, among many others which the Committee 
requested, were purely confidential to it alone. The CBN, by this act, 
prevented the Ad Hoc Committee from independently verifying the 
rationale for the cash injections into the banking sector by the CBN. 
Furthermore, the Ad Hoc Committee was unable to reassure itself that the 
injected funds were not just a mere attempt for the money to find its way 
into the foreign exchange market, and/or, the capital market.
602
 
Furthermore, the Governor rebuffed all amicable letters sent to him to send 
the required documents that the Committee needed.  The Committee issued 
a 24 hours ultimatum to the CBN Governor, after the expiration of the 
enrolled Order, but the CBN replied that it has no reply as the entire Board 
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and the Governor had been in a Retreat in South Africa!
603
 The requested 
documents have not been produced to date.
604
  
Following from the above, the CBN may be said to be in breach of the 
provisions of the Section 12(2) Freedom of Information Act.
605
 The section 
provides that an application for the disclosure of information is not to be 
refused where the public interest in disclosing the information outweighs 
whatever injury that disclosure will cause.
606
 In confirming this position, the 
court, in the case of Mr. Boniface Okezie v The Central Bank of Nigeria,
607
 
stated that there exists strong and compelling public interest for the CBN to 
disclose the relevant information, as this will shed more light in its 
expenditure of public funds and and provide the tax-paying public with 
better view of the self-styled banking reform programme embarked upon by 
the CBN governor, and this interest outweighs the concerns of the 
Governor. From this case, the CBN through its Governor, failed to disclose 
to Mr. Okezie, which breaches the provisions of the FOI Act.  
6.6.2 The regulatory involvement of CBN in Union Bank 
The case of Union bank remains the only decided case in relation to the 
activities of the CBN during the crisis and therefore becomes vital. The case 
of Danson Izedomwen & Ors v. Union Bank Plc & Ors
608
 is premised upon 
the CBN’s investigation of the affairs of the activities of Union bank and 
subsequent removal of the executive directors and appointment of 
replacements pursuant to Section 33, 35 and 36 of BOFIA. Aggrieved by 
the situation, some shareholders of the bank instituted an action against the 
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CBN, arguing that upon proper construction of the Act, it would be seen that 
the governor had acted ultra vires as the law only conferred power on the 
Governor to:  
(a) Remove only one director at any given time,  
(b) Either remove, or appoint a director, but not both,  
(c) The Governor lacked powers to allocate specific functions to the 
directors he appoints, and  
(d) The actions of the Governor were in breach of the memorandum and 
articles of association of the Bank.
609
 
Reaffirming the governor’s powers, the court held that it is vital that a 
statute be construed according to its expressed intention and the words are 
to be understood by looking at the issue. The court also held that the 
governor is empowered to exercise one or more of the powers specified in 
Section 35 of the Act, and the use of the word ‘any’ means that the governor 
is not restricted to exercising only one of the powers specified in Section 
35(2) which allows for removal of directors, appointment of new ones, 
capital injection, etc; but could exercise some or all of the powers. Relying 
on the decision in Ndoma V Chukwuogor
610
, the court held that the word 
‘or’ in the Section 35(2) should be given a conjunctive meaning. The court 
also agreed that by Section 35(2)(d) of the Act, the powers of the governor 
are exercisable ‘notwithstanding any written law’ and by also referring to 
the decision of the Supreme court in NDIC V. Oken Enterprises Ltd
611
 the 
court also held that the word ‘Notwithstanding’ ‘exclude an impinging or 
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impending effect of any other provision of the statute or subordinate 
legislation so that the said section may fulfil itself.”612 
Finally the court held that he who has power to appoint has power to fire, 
even when the general rule is silent on the power to remove. Referring to 
Section 11(1) of the Interpretation Act, 2004 which provide that where a 
provision empowers a person the power to appoint, whether to an office or 
to exercise any functions, whether for a specified period or not, the power 
also includes the power to remove or suspend him. 
It becomes clear from the above judgment that the powers of the CBN and 
its actions in relation to the failing banks in 2009 have received judicial 
imprimatur. It remains to be seen if other cases involving the CBN and its 
activities during the crisis will be decided in the same line and what the 
reaction of the Appeal court will be. 
6.7 Factors responsible for the CBN’S role in the Banking crisis 
6.7.1 Institutional Factors 
In 2010, the CBN, in an address on the impact of the global financial crisis 
in Nigeria which was presented to the House Financial Services Committee 
of the US Congress Hearing on the global financial crisis, addressed major 
reasons attributed to the CBN in the periods leading to the crisis.
613
 One of 
the reasons stated by the CBN was the absence of co-ordination among 
regulatory institutions in the banking sector, including the CBN.
614
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According to the CBN, the lack of co-ordination prevented the CBN from 
having a comprehensive consolidated bank view of the activities of these 
banks. For instance, the Financial Services Regulatory Coordinating 
Committee (FSRCC), the body responsible for co-ordinating financial 
regulators, had not for two years during this period. Although excess capital 
is meant to increase lending, it was discovered that banks were also using 
the capital for a number of non-lending activities including stock market 
investments, which were mostly diverted to subsidiaries abroad, thereby, 
escaping the supervisory authority of the CBN.
615
  
Also, SEC produced no examination reports for subsidiaries, neither was 
there a mechanism for consolidated bank examination.
616
 Sanusi went on to 
state that lack of adequate corporate regime also contributed to the crisis, 
For instance, there was no legal and regulatory framework governing the 
margin lending activity. 
617
 
Another important contributory factor was uneven supervision and 
inadequate enforcement.
618
 Sanusi identified enforcement failure as the 
biggest problem of the crisis. According to Sanusi, regulators were 
ineffective in foreseeing, anticipating and supervising the changing phase in 
the industry or addressing the prevalent corporate governance failures such 
as granting of unsecured loans. For example, the Supervision Department 
within the CBN was not structured to supervise effectively and to enforce 
regulation; therefore, no one could be held accountable for failure to address 
issues such as risk management, corporate governance, fraud, cross-
regulatory co-ordination, money laundering, enforcement and the likes.
619
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Furthermore, while some examinations identified critical risk management 
issues, the examination failed to reveal many issues that caused the crisis, 
even though they were known in the industry. Time was also a contributory 
factor and many examinations took between 9 months to a year to complete.
 
620
 The CBN also identified the fact that financial penalties available at the 
time were not adequate measures of compliance. Because banks could get 
away simply with the payment of fines, they practically annulled relevant 
aspects of examination reports.
621
 
Also, records on compliance of banks were poor. There was inadequate 
discipline in committing banks to respond to examination reports and 
recommendations were frequently ignored, despite the gravity of issues 
specified.
622
 This is due to the fact that the penalty prescribed for non-
compliance was not enough to change their behaviour as directors faced no 
personal liabilities for non-compliance.
623
 
The policies of CBN have also impacted on the bank crisis in Nigeria. It is 
true that the banking consolidation was initiated during Joseph Sanusi’s era 
as CBN Governor, which was to be done in phases. But the Chukwuma 
Soludo-led board of the CBN decided to alter this approach, insisting on a 
one-time share capital increase to N25billion. Although the CBN did a 
verification exercise for the first round of capital-raising, the time-
consuming exercise was criticised by foreign investors, and it was later 
discontinued. This led to unintended consequences, which negatively 
affected the financial sector, and unfortunately the CBN turned around to 
accuse the banks of buying their own shares with depositors’ money and 
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that the resultant decrease in share price has led to a serious impairment on 
the banks’ shareholders fund.624  
6.7.2 Political Factors 
Furthermore, Nigerian banks have to some extent remained dependent on 
the government in two broad ways, to wit, as a client and as a provider of 
capital in times of distress. Nigerian banks tend to rely on the government as 
a client due to the fact that they are required to hold many of their assets in 
the form of liquid, low-risk assets, such as government securities.
625
 As seen 
in the previous chapter, most of the banks had as their majority 
shareholders, Nigeria’s social and political elites and retired military 
officers. Due to this, the CBN might have been handicapped because a lot of 
the control frauds are connected to the elites of society.
626
  
It is important to reiterate the position of Sanusi:  
‘...We were dealing with chief executives that in 2009 had 
become invincible. They were in the seat of power. They 
had economic power and they had bought political 
protection. They were into political parties, they had 
financed elections of officers and they believed that 
nobody could touch them. And every time I said it was 
time for us to take action, people said to me you can’t 
touch these people, you’ll be sacked. Or you can’t touch 
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these people they will kill you. Or you can’t touch these 
people, you can’t do that....’627 
That notwithstanding, the position of the CBN Governor is also one of a 
(political) appointment by the President; whereby nomination is passed to 
the National Assembly for confirmation. It is no news that owing to 
Nigeria’s multi-ethnicity, and in a so- called bid to ensure fair 
representation, political appointments are made on a Zonal basis,
628
 a 
prejudicial arrangement which is not in the best interest of the country, 
particularly where eligible candidates are overlooked based on political 
imperatives.   
Furthermore, there is the lack of independence in the proper functioning and 
administration of the CBN. Banking licences were given due to political 
connections. This also led to non-compliance to regulation in many 
instances because many of the top executives in the Nigerian financial 
sector have major ties and connections to political groups. Due to this, they 
depend on them for their livelihood and were quick to compromise based on 
this relationship.  
Prior to his appointment, the former CBN governor, Professor Charles 
Soludo, from Eastern Nigeria, was the Chief Economic Adviser to the then 
President of Nigeria, General Olusegun Obasanjo
629
, a Southerner. Professor 
Charles Soludo, an accomplished economist of international repute
630
 failed 
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to take adequate measures that could have prevented the financial meltdown 
in the country at the time.  
Perhaps the reason for lack of a more drastic approach is not farfetched and 
can be likened to political/regulatory forbearance leaving no apparent option 
than the continuous funding of these banks with the Expanded Discount 
Window. 
It must be stated that Mallam Sanusi L. Sanusi who succeeded Soludo was 
appointed no sooner than the late President Umaru Yar‟Adua, assumed 
power. It must be mentioned here that both of them were Northerners. The 
general belief in Nigeria is that Mallam Sanusi was on a mission to take 
over the banks from southerners and easterners because the northern elites 
did not have considerable representation in the banking sector. Therefore, as 
soon as Sanusi was at the helm of affairs in the CBN, he set out to remove 
the five Managing Directors of banks, all of which so happened to be 
Southerners and Easterners, with no Northerner amongst them! There is 
therefore a struggle between tribal elites in Nigeria; this is a prejudicial 
belief that has eaten deep into every sphere of the economy and may be 
difficult to eradicate. 
One credit that ought to be given to Sanusi, however, was the bold and 
unusual step taken to publish the names of the debtors of these banks and to 
reveal the relationship between top politicians and bank executives.
631
  
Mention must also be made that concerns were raised prior to the outbreak 
of the financial crisis by a minority of CBN workers and also the NDIC.  
Notably, Sanusi stated: 
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‘The sad story in all of this is we now have evidence that 
junior officers in the CBN did document their concerns to 
CBN top management at that time, but no action was 
taken. We also have evidence that the NDIC documented 
its concerns but its efforts to get the CBN leadership to act 
quickly were rebuffed.’632 
Perhaps a listening ear to the concerns raised might have gone a long way. 
However, in a situation where the government is in strong ties with the 
CBN, efforts to report ‘Peter to Paul’ cannot do much in the end. 
6.7.3 Judicial Factors 
It is important to also note the problem associated with the Judiciary and 
how Nigeria’s political environment has been used to influence the CBN’s 
intervention during the crisis. Although legal action was jointly taken by the 
CBN and the EFCC, to date, only one of the five cases has been decided in 
Nigeria, what is seen is the rest of the executives fleeing the country either 
on medical grounds or as the case may be. 
The table below is an extract from the EFCC showing the status of the top 
five cases of fraud involving the CEOs of the banks in question. 
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Table 4 
S/N Banks / CEOS Size of Non- 
performing 
Loan (N) 
Status of Case 
1. Oceanic Bank Plc 
Mrs Cecilia Ibru 
278.2 billion Sentenced for 6 
months and 
also forfeited 
assets worth 
N191.0bn 
2. Intercontinental Bank 
Plc 
Dr E. Akingbola 
210.9 billion On Bail, Assets 
frozen 
3. AfriBank Plc  
Mr Sebastian Adigwe 
141.9 billion On Bail, Assets 
Frozen 
4. Union Bank Plc  
Dr. E Ebong 
73.6 billion On Bail 
5. FinBank Plc 
 Mr Okey Nwosu 
42.5 billion On Bail 
Total  747.0 billion  
       Source: EFCC website 
As seen above, the only trial that has been concluded is that of Mrs Cecilia 
Ibru, other cases have been going in and out of court due to the delay tactics 
inherent in the Nigerian legal system. Thus, this constitutes another problem 
that regulators face in carrying out their duties. It is no news that the judicial 
process in Nigeria is very slow and constant adjournments through delay 
measures can sometimes make plea bargaining a very attractive option.  
The problem of the judiciary is further compounded by the duality of 
proceedings brought to court at the time. The notable case involving 
Afribank shareholders which discussed in the chapter six on shareholders 
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saw the judiciary turn a deaf ear to all the cries of the shareholders and 
ultimately carry out a grave miscarriage of justice when it was quick to 
strike out preliminary objections brought by the shareholders notifying the 
court of the duality of proceedings by the CBN. 
633
 Issues regarding judicial 
independence cannot be ruled out in Nigeria as power and manipulation 
become more evident on a daily basis. 
6.8 Conclusion 
Sanusi opined that the Nigeria banking sector has experienced several 
failures prior to the bank crisis; however, he described the banking sector 
incident of 2009 as a ‘monumental fraud’ because owners and managers of 
these financial institutions constantly devised means by which the banks 
were defrauded. The antecedent of the crisis purported financial institutions 
engaging in foreign exchange trading, direct importation of goods using 
hoax companies and purchasing government treasury bills, and banking 
licenses were easily obtained in order to trade in these non-core banking 
activities.
634
 
There was laxity on the part of the CBN to scrutinize the quality of banks’ 
accounts in order to ensure accurate reports. Thus, the CBN’s internal 
reporting system was unable to serve as an effective warning system for 
banks’ misconduct.635 Also, the integrity of CBN supervisory officials calls 
for concern. The banking examination department became the most sought 
department and officials compromised in issuing clean bills of health in 
their bank examination report. Incompetency is also another problem faced 
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by bank officials and it is believed that most of the examiners lacked 
requisite skills in the phase of changing technology.
636
  
From the foregoing, it must be said that the CBN statutorily has the power 
to regulate, monitor and supervise the activities of banks. Thus, the CBN 
has the power to contain the bank crisis of 2009. This includes the 
examination of the books of the banks, the removal and replacement of the 
banks MDs/CEOs, charging the affected MDs/CEOs to court, among others. 
It is important to state that prior to the banking crisis, the quality of 
corporate governance in the banking sector was very poor. Insider trading, 
fraudulent practices using the banks subsidiaries abound in the banking 
sector which triggered the bank collapse. The stupendous riches and assets 
of some of the indicted MDs/CEOs and other directors show that the rot in 
the banking system was overwhelming. In fact, some of the banks were used 
as conduits for money-laundering, which aggravated the deplorable 
condition in the banking sector.  
In conclusion, it can be said that the CBN failed in performing its duties, 
over-stepped its bounds, particularly in its refusal to provide the necessary 
documents and reports used throughout the banking crisis. This depicts an 
institution that purports to have more powers than the people’s 
representatives (Legislature). 
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Chapter 7 
An Assessment of the Role of Auditors in the Banking Crisis 
7.1 Introduction 
In financial markets, external auditing is seen as a necessary measure of 
trust in order to create a formalised and legible relationship subject to 
independent validation.
637
 The past decade witnessed financial crisis across 
the globe and revealed control frauds by Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) 
and the inability of auditors to prevent or expose these practices have 
become a major concern. In Nigeria, despite the fact that credible financial 
performance remains vital to the growth of the economy, the independence 
of auditors is a rather complex issue and doubts are raised as to whether 
auditors are indeed part of control fraud.  
The 2009 banking crisis has since raised unanswered questions as to how 
regulators and even external auditors could have prevented the crisis. This 
sense of doubt about the independence and credibility of the external 
auditors leads to conclusions as to whether it was a case of gross negligence 
or silence in conspiracy to the fraud. In this regard, it is the focus of this 
chapter to critically examine the involvement of auditors in Nigeria in the 
banking crisis using the big five banks as case studies. The chapter will first 
examine the ambiguity of auditing created by an ‘expectations gap’. This 
will then be followed by analysis of the law relating to auditors in Nigeria as 
well as guidelines with regards to Nigerian audit standards to analyse the 
purpose and function of auditors and the nature of audit reports. 
Examination of the evidence of audit failure in Nigeria would then follow. 
This is to determine the role played by auditors in the banking crisis, using 
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the five banks as case studies. The last part would investigate the reasons for 
audit failure in order to assess whether the auditors were indeed part of the 
control fraud and also whether their independence could have been 
compromised due to the nature of totality of services provided known as 
non-audit services.  
The chapter critically examines legal, regulatory and practical problems of 
auditing in Nigeria and why the audit reports had failed to reveal true 
financial situations of the banks as it would be later revealed that each of the 
top five banks succeeded in getting at least one clean opinion from a top-tier 
audit firm. The purpose of this chapter is to stimulate reflection on the 
limitations of financial auditing within the dynamics of independence and 
professionalism. It can be said apart from institutional corruption which has 
eaten deep across various spheres of the Nigerian economy, 
commercialisation of audits through non-audit services also accounts for 
non-independence of auditors and lack of audit quality; therefore, audit 
firms are no different from the many corporations that tend to engage in 
fraudulent and anti-social practices in the name of profit maximization, 
shareholder value and financial performance.  
An important problem, however, lies in the lack of documentary evidence 
regarding non-audit fees and in as much as it is clear from auditor-client 
relationships in Nigeria that non-audit services are being provided, the lack 
of documentary evidence for this remains an overwhelming concern. 
7.2 The Obscurity of Audit: An Expectations Gap 
Although it is logical to commence any discussion of the role of auditors 
with a definition of audit, it is however also important to clarify the 
contradiction regarding the actual and expected performance of auditors and 
indeed auditing, also known as the obscurity of audit. 
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In his book: ‘The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification’,638 Michael Power 
offers a systematic exploration of ‘audit’ as a principle of social 
organisation and control. He provides a critical investigation of the means, 
reasons and consequences of what he calls the ‘audit explosion’, and by 
raising critical questions on the effectiveness of audit processes, he posits 
that the consequences arising from these processes must be weighed and 
contrasted against theories and practices of trust.
639
 
He analyses the obscurity of audit and explains that the expectations and 
reality of audit are two different things. While audit may be aimed at 
detecting financial problems in an organisation, it is impossible for an audit 
to know for certain that there is no fraud. Power compares the difference 
between Audit explosion and Audit society. According to him, audit 
explosion refers to the set of attitudes and cultural commitments that are 
targeted at problem solving; audit society on the other hand, is made up of 
the totality of tendencies that are revealed by these commitments, which are 
different from an objectively identifiable state of affairs, and are drawn from 
longstanding practices of financial auditing.
640
 In other words, audit 
explosion is the way and manner audit is conducted while audit society s 
made up of the totality of possibilities revealed by audits. Power further 
considers the problematic relationship between auditing as a financial 
practice and the goal of fraud detection. According to him, there is an 
‘expectations gap’ whereby the trend of Regulations and Guidance on 
functions of auditors creates a responsibility of detection of fraud, 
compounding the process of producing a credible role for auditors in the 
midst of high and low expectations and where this aim of financial audit is 
not attained, as in detection of fraud, it is believed that audit has failed.
641
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Power believes that this problem creates a dilemma on the potential and 
operational capability of auditing. As further explained by Power: 
 ‘The knowledge base of financial audit process is 
fundamentally obscure. It is this obscurity which sustains 
the expectations gap. An obscurity which practitioners 
overcome by appealing in the end to the authority of their 
own judgment in determining what is reasonable practice. 
However, it must also be emphasized that to draw 
attention to this obscurity is not to regard auditing as a 
fiction or myth.’642  
In this regard, it can be said that the ambiguous nature of auditing is not a 
methodological problem but a substantive fact as to the expectations and 
reality of audit. Auditing as a concept is an embodiment of ideas of social 
norms and hopes. Auditors have really obfuscated the issue of what auditors 
really do and this obscurity of auditing coupled with the problem analysed 
above regarding difficulty in separating the success of auditing from the 
success of the company is indeed very crucial to the ‘Expectations Gap’. 
Furthermore, a ‘Clean’ opinion by an audit firm would not necessarily draw 
a conclusion of a true and fair financial state of affairs.
643
 This is because as 
mentioned above, auditors cannot state for certain that there is no fraud, but 
rather, they can only state that their samples did not reveal one.  
Grabosky identifies audit failure is a form of ‘Gatekeeper failure’ which 
stimulates chains of reaction ranging from litigation to inquiries at various 
levels.
644
 Furthermore, while corporate failure would generally give rise to 
the public questions regarding audit failure, corporate success does not 
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usually yield public praise for the role of audit. In view of this, the success 
of auditing must be disentangled from the success of the company audited, 
however difficult it may seem.
645
 
The issue of what audit can and cannot do is therefore one of concern. It is 
pertinent to note that the functions of auditors are in fact limited to the 
evidence before them which, depending on the management of the company 
could be biased without their knowledge, and it is quite possible that a 
‘good audit’ could have been given to a ‘bad company’ if it was conducted 
prior to the collapse of the company and defences relating to audits usually 
comes in this form.  
As considered by Keasey and Wright, although not all defences in relation 
to audits are successful, the idea of audit failure or success remains an 
elusive concept and audit failures may be impossible to judge because the 
activities of accounting and auditing are so vaguely defined.
646
  
Power also seconds this when he posits that one issue that remains dazzling 
is that auditing lacks clear output based criteria of performance.
647
 He goes 
further to say that there is a demand as to what audits actually produce and 
how to tell whether or not audits are indeed successful, however useful it 
might have been in defining practical goals, corporate compliance and 
organisational performance. This issue is fundamental to any type of audit. 
Likewise, definitions of auditing do not usually reflect economic constraints 
(such as limited sampling) of auditing as a whole and regardless of whether 
audit processes are very expensive, the truth remains that auditing and 
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indeed any other form of monitoring lack the almost infinite resources 
necessary for the performance of the task.
648
  
Auditing as a process is quite rigorous in itself, involving Time and Cost 
Input in order to produce assurance, thereby promoting credibility of the 
audited object (in this case, financial statement) and ultimately adding 
‘economic value’ to it. The output of audit, therefore, is the production of a 
report that the financial statements offer a ‘true’ and ‘fair’ view of the 
company.  
According to Power, the obscurity, however, lies in the series of questions 
that would then arise: 
- What is the nature of assurance given by audits?  
- Can it be observed?  
- Can it be measured other than in broad qualitative terms or in terms 
of a consensus among auditors themselves? 
- It may not really be possible to know what audits really produce but 
can one at least ascertain whether auditors come to similar 
conclusions in similar circumstances?  
- Is it simply the case that more staff will yield more assurance?649 
Going from this point of view, the assertion of Power that auditing has a 
weak knowledge base can be said to be true and although auditing generally 
tends to assert the value which it adds, however true it may seem, the fact 
remains that there is ‘no way of specifying the assurance production 
function’ independently of the auditors own qualitative opinion process 
leading to the conclusion that there may something fundamentally 
unspecifiable regarding its output.
650
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From the above, it can be said that the problem of auditing lies in the level 
of expectations gap that is put into it, particularly in the prevention of fraud. 
As identified by Power, the inability of audit in detecting fraud should not 
be construed to mean it has failed. It therefore suffices to conclude that the 
result of auditing is limited by the evidence placed before it, even in the 
absence of control fraud because auditors cannot check everything. 
However, in Nigeria, it is pertinent to note that going by virtue of Section 
360(1) of CAMA, auditors are allowed to carry out necessary investigations 
in order to make their report, particularly to verify whether the company’s 
accounting records matches its balance sheet. Also, in Section 360(3), 
auditors have a right to access the company’s books and accounts, and can 
request for any other documents needed for the performance of their duties. 
Also, Section 359(2) of the Act (as would be further explained in this 
chapter) provides that the auditor’s duty is ‘to provide an opinion whether, 
to the best of their information and according to the explanations given to 
them by the company, the said statements give a true and fair view of the 
financial status of the company’.651 However, depending on the motive of 
the management of the company, a control fraudster will go to extra lengths 
to conceal vital financial information from the auditors.
652
 Auditors may not 
be in a position to identify ongoing control fraud in the company. As 
previous chapters on control fraud explain, fraud is theft by deception and 
control fraudsters are financial super-predators,
653
 it is therefore possible 
that the real state of affairs of the company might have been deliberately 
concealed from the external auditor.  
It is quite plausible that vital information could be compromised without the 
auditor’s knowledge, therefore making it possible that a ‘good audit’ could 
have been given to a ‘bad company’ if it was conducted prior to the collapse 
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of the company and defences relating to audits usually come in this form. 
Notably, one member of a reputable accounting firm in Lagos was observed 
to have said the following in the defence of auditors: 
‘It is not the job of the accountants to go deep into the 
papers. The law places the onus of preparing the account 
on the directors of the company. What the auditors are 
doing is to ascertain that the account is well prepared and 
that all the necessary checks and balances are there and 
that all the regulations that should have been followed are 
followed. If they see anything that is not proper in the 
account, it is their duty to point it out. You cannot really 
blame the accountant because some management hide 
things from the auditors.’654 
Due to the above, it is right to say that auditors may indeed be vulnerable to 
the wave of control frauds in the company and this possible but fundamental 
constraint to external auditing remains a live concern. 
However, in the case of Nigeria, it remains to be seen whether or not the 
auditors were indeed ignorant of the ongoing wave of frauds in the banks. 
As will be later revealed in this chapter, the problem arises in the 
oligopolistic structure of market for audit and non-audit services. The 
impairment of auditor independence in an institutionalised society where 
corruption is endemic will only lead to the suggestion that auditors might 
have indeed been a part of the fraud. 
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7.3 The concept of Auditing 
 Following from the above, it can be said that any attempt to define auditing 
is basically an attempt to define what auditing could be.  
 According to Kiger and Scheiner, Audit or Auditing is:  
‘the systematic process whereby a competent, independent 
person objectively obtains and evaluates evidence 
regarding assertions about an entity or event, for the 
purpose of forming an opinion about and reporting the 
degree to which the assertions conforms to an identified 
set of standards.’655  
Tandon, Sudharasanam and Sundharabahu also consider audit as a thorough 
and intuitive examination of facts in order to provide an expert opinion in 
the form of a report, certificate or attestation.
656
 There is therefore a notion 
of professionalism on the part of the auditor which would indicate that the 
auditor must be a certified accountant. Beatline also examine the concept of 
audit to be an examination of a series of financial statements, including 
book-keeping, accounts and records by an independent expert (individual or 
firm), known as the auditor, leading to the provision of an opinion or 
report.
657
   
Another definition views audit as ‘a process of obtaining and evaluating 
evidence concerning assertions and economic actions as well as events in 
order to objectively ascertain the level of correspondence the assertions and 
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the established procedures which are then tendered in the form of a report to 
interested parties.’ 658  
Power considers auditing to be ‘an independent examination of, and 
expression of opinion on, the financial statements of an enterprise.’659  
He further identified four conceptual ingredients as the root of any audit 
practice: 
1. Independence from the matter being audited 
2. Technicalities of form of evidence gathering and the form of 
examination of documentation 
3. The expression of a view based on this evidence, usually contained 
in a formal audit report 
4. A clearly defined object of the audit process which, in most cases, 
are usually the financial statements.
660
 
Audit can also be seen as a risk-reduction exercise which becomes 
necessary when principals (such as shareholders) are being exposed to 
‘moral hazards’ by their agents (these include directors, managers or CEOs) 
and it is used to provide a true and fair situation of the company and to 
reduce the possibility of agents acting against the interest of their 
principals.
661
 Flint examines situations that would require the necessity of 
audits. First is the issue of accountability whereby one party (usually the 
agent) is required to give account of his actions to another party (usually the 
principal). Second has to do with the complexity of the accountability 
relationship whereby the principals are distant from the actions of the agents 
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and as such, a lacuna is left, making them unable to personally verify the 
actions of the agents.
662
  
Perhaps the most widely accepted definition of audits is that provided by the 
International Auditing Guidelines, which was issued by the International 
Federation of Accountants Committee (IFAC). The Guidelines defined 
Audit as: ‘an independent examination of, and the expression of an opinion 
on the financial statement of an enterprise, by an appointed auditor, in 
accordance with the terms of engagement and the observance of statutory 
regulations and professional requirements’.663  
Audit constitutes a vital part of accounting. The contemporary nature of 
audits requires verifying financial statements and records of a company or 
entity. However, as observed by Danjuma et al.,
664
 generally, in the 
financial world, the objective of audits is for the professional auditor to 
provide an expert opinion on the financial statements of the company he has 
been provided with. This expert opinion would mean giving reasonable 
assurance that the provided financial statement indeed reflects a ‘true and 
fair’ view of the financial situation of the company and has not simply been 
inflated, having been provided according to the applicable financial 
framework.
665
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Going by the above, an auditor can be said to be a person entrusted with the 
duty of scrutinizing books of accounts prepared by companies and vetting 
such books in order to pass a report to the shareholders which, in the 
opinion of the auditor would clearly indicate whether the prepared statement 
of accounts reflect a ‘true’ and ‘fair’ financial situation of the company. 
In Nigeria, the law relating to auditing is majorly contained in the 
Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) as well as the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN) Act.
666
 Auditing therefore 
becomes an important part of the administration of Nigerian companies due 
to the separation in ownership and control.
667
 The shareholders as owners of 
shares with various rights in relation to the company share a common goal 
of profit-making, although they are normally not part of the day-to-day 
management of the company, they have in place appointed management 
whom shareholders expect to use the company’s funds for profit 
maximization. The management can be said to be in ‘control’ of the 
company. Normally at the end of every financial year, managers are 
expected to prepare a quantitative analysis of how the company’s funds 
have been managed during that year, this would then be verified by the 
auditors following acceptable standards that would assure the shareholders 
as well as third parties or external users
668
 of the fairness of the financial 
statements or other subjects as the case may be.  
7.4     The Legal Roles and Obligations of Auditors 
Auditing plays an important role in Nigeria’s financial sector, particularly 
the banking world whereby auditors’ opinion in the form of reports is 
constantly relied upon for investment decisions.   
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It becomes imperative to consider the role and obligations of auditors under 
Nigerian Law. This is to reiterate the fact that adequate audit standards exist 
in Nigeria, yet this was unable to prevent the banking crisis. 
7.4.1 Companies and Allied Matters Act 2004 
To start with, the need for the preparation and examination of financial 
statements is provided for in Section 331 (1) of CAMA which requires that 
every company must maintain and keep accounting records which must be 
verified. In Nigeria, the desirability of auditing streams from a series of 
legal and policy documents mentioned above. Section 357-369 of CAMA 
provides for the requirement of companies to have their accounts audited so 
as to verify their financial statements in order to verify that they indeed 
reflect the ‘true’ and ‘fair’ view of the company.  
Section 357 (1) provides for the appointment of an auditor or auditors at 
each annual general meeting who will audit the company’s accounts and 
records for that financial year
669
 and where for any reason, no auditors are 
appointed or reappointed at an annual general meeting, the directors may 
appoint a person in the interim.
670
 The duration of the auditor(s) is normally 
for one financial year but can be reappointed at the next annual general 
meeting.
671
  Furthermore, company auditors are entitled to attend general 
meetings of the company as any member of the company and also to receive 
notices regarding meetings and are also entitled to be heard at meetings on 
matters which concern them as auditors.
672
  Remuneration and resignation is 
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provided for in Sections 361 and 365 respectively and remuneration of the 
auditor is determined by the company at the general meeting.  
Auditors’ duties, powers and responsibilities are provided for in Section 360 
and as mentioned earlier, these include carrying out investigations that is 
necessary in assisting them to make will enable them to make their report on 
the accounting records of the company and whether the company’s balance 
sheets are in accordance with its records. Subsection 5 of the Section allows 
for the auditor to state in their report any suspicions or doubts as to whether 
or not the information in the directors report for which the accounts are 
prepared is in agreement with those accounts. 
As mentioned earlier, Section 359(2) sets out the information that should be 
contained in the auditor’s report and these include the following: 
- Whether they have gathered all relevant information relevant for 
their audit; 
- Whether the company has kept proper books of accounts; 
- Whether the company’s profit and loss account and balance sheet are 
in agreement with its accounting records; 
- Whether, in their opinion, and to the best of their information and 
according to the explanations given to them, the said statements give 
a ‘true’ and ‘fair’ view of the financial status of the company.673  
7.4.2 Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) 100 
The Statement of Auditing Standards issued by ICAN provides general 
principles to govern audit of financial statements as well as summary of the 
role of auditors which states the following as requirements which should be 
considered by auditors in making their report. The auditor should: 
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- Conduct investigations so as to gather necessary and relevant 
evidence according to the audit standards and also to determine 
whether the financial statements are free of mis-statements. 
- Evaluate whether the overall financial statements have been 
prepared following relevant legislation and accounting standards, 
and; 
- Issue a report, which contains an expression of the auditor’s opinion 
on the financial statements.
674
 
7.4.3 National Standards on Auditing (NSA) 
Similarly, ICAN also issued the NSA which provides that the objective of 
the auditor is to gather sufficient necessary evidence in investigating 
whether: 
-  Accounting estimates, including fair value accounting estimates, in the 
financial statements, whether recognized or disclosed, are reasonable; and 
-    Related disclosures in the financial statements are adequate, in the 
context of the applicable financial reporting framework.
675
 
It is pertinent to note another important provision of the NSA 23 to the 
extent that it is the responsibility of the auditor to assess the entity’s ability 
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to carry on as a going concern.
676
 The going concern assumption views the 
entity as being able to continue in business for the foreseeable future.
677
 
This responsibility exists regardless of whether or not the financial reporting 
framework with which the entity used in preparing its financial statement 
has expressly mentioned the need for the entity to assess whether the entity 
was able to continue as a going concern.  
Paragraph 10 provides the objectives of the auditor in this regard and 
includes investigation of the appropriateness of managements use of the 
going concern assumption and to determine within the circumstances 
whether any material uncertainty or irregularity exists as to place a doubt on 
the company’s ability to continue as a going concern and the implications 
for this. It should also be mentioned that although absence of any reference 
to whether the company is a going concern should not be construed to mean 
a guarantee as to the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern due to 
the fact that auditors are unable to predict such future conditions or events. 
However, the provision of this clause should not undermine the overall 
going concern objective.
678
 
7.5 The Audit Report: A Quality Label 
Crucial to the auditor is the preparation of the audit report. The audit report 
is a statement attesting to the validity or otherwise of the financial 
statements, profit and loss accounts and records presented before the 
auditor, including all group financial statements examined by them.
679
 The 
report must be made in accordance with the auditing practices standards as 
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provided for in Section 25-26 of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) Act 
of Nigeria 2011.
680
  
In the preparation of the audit report and indeed in discharging his roles, the 
fiduciary duties of care, diligence and skill is important to the auditor to the 
extent that his duties are carried out independently and his report reflects a 
true and fair view of the financial situation of the company.
681
 In addition to 
this, in the case of public companies, the auditor shall also make an audit 
report to an audit committee which shall be established by the company. 
According to Section 368(3), the audit committee shall consist of an equal 
number of directors and representatives of the shareholders of the company 
and shall be subject to a maximum of six members who shall examine the 
auditors’ report and shall make recommendations as it may deem fit to the 
annual general meeting (Section 368 (4)). This is however subject to the fact 
that no member of the audit committee is to be provided with remuneration 
and shall be subject to annual re-election. 
It is important to note that CAMA makes no provision regarding the types 
of directors that should be consisted in the audit committee. However, the 
Code of Corporate Governance 2006 seems to make a clearer position on 
this when it provides in Section 8.1.4 that: 
‘Members of the Board Audit Committee should be non-
executive directors and ordinary shareholders appointed at 
AGM and some of them should be knowledgeable in 
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internal control processes. One of such appointed ordinary 
shareholders should serve as the Chairman of the 
Committee’. 
Section 368(2) of CAMA provides that the auditor shall be liable for 
negligence upon institution of an action for negligence by the directors 
where a company suffers damage owing to failure of the auditor to perform 
his fiduciary duties. The Section goes further to provide that where the 
directors fail to institute an action against the auditor, any member may do 
so, after giving 30 days notice of his intention to institute such action. Going 
by this provision, it can be said that an action by the shareholders of the 
company against the directors would subsequently mean an action against 
the auditors for negligence. Furthermore, it is an offence for any officer of 
the company to provide false, misleading or deceptive information to the 
auditor where this information is required by the auditor in the discharge of 
his duties, which includes preparation of the audit report.
682
 It is the 
responsibility of the directors of the company to provide the financial 
statements after which the auditors’ duty is to provide a professional opinion 
as to the validity or otherwise of the statements and the audit of financial 
statement do not relieve the directors of these duties.
683
  
As stated earlier, the provision of an auditor’s opinion in the form of an 
audit report should not be construed to mean a guarantee of the viability of 
the entity. In this regard, according to Principle 8 of SAS, the term 
‘reasonable assurance’ is central to the provision of an audit in accordance 
with the applicable financial framework and it is the duty of the auditor to 
verify that the provided financial statement is free from any material mis-
statement. This opinion is provided based on facts and judgement and the 
opinion provided by the auditor based on financial statements is to provide a 
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‘reasonable’ and not ‘absolute’ assurance and this would not include an 
assurance as to the efficiency with which the affairs of the entity are being 
managed or conducted.
684
  
In his view, Power provides a useful context on the level of assurance 
produced by audit reports by comparing auditing to inspection. The audit 
report in itself is seen as an attempt to communicate the fact that minimum 
standards required for corporate financial statements have or have not been 
achieved and as discussed above, in the case of Nigeria, these standards are 
detailed in the NSA. While some forms of inspections issue certificates in 
the form of ‘license for practice’ which could mean ‘fit for purpose’, an 
audit report on the other hand is different from a license. Although it is a 
legal requirement for companies to have audit reports, companies are not 
automatically prevented from trading or being listed on the stock exchange 
merely because accounts are ‘qualified’, that is, if the auditor issues a 
negative report. It therefore follows that the qualified audit reports are not 
directly linked to regulatory machinery.  
However, the pressure has always been on financial audit to say more in its 
report, and whether audit reports indeed fall nothing short of professional 
opinion; that is: ‘is audit report a quality label or does it help provide deeper 
understanding of the process undertaken?’685  
Furthermore, the trend of describing what audit is not has led to loss of 
confidence in audit report. Stressing issues that are not covered by audit 
(such as product quality, safety and the like) has contributed to uncertainty 
as to what is actually contained in the audit opinion.
686
 It is important to 
therefore distinguish the audit report from other forms of inspections such as 
product quality, safety and the like. Generally, these forms of inspections 
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lead to issuing of certificates produced in the form of licences with clear 
messages that the facility, organisation or individual has met the required 
standards of operation and is ‘fit’ for a defined purpose.687 Issuance of the 
license would lead the public into believing that the organisation is 
operating according to legal standards, just as revocation of the license 
would suggest otherwise. These certificates are not designed to engage in 
communication but rather, they provide a ‘one-way signal which is ‘fit’ or 
‘not fit’ for purpose. The irony is that in the financial world audit actually 
functions as a ‘quality label’ which will be unambiguous in an environment 
where there is a notion of what quality actually is and significant level of 
trust is placed in the professionalism of auditors producing the quality label 
as a ‘Fit for Purpose signal’.688  
As Power suggests, at first glance, it may seem that audit works this way as 
audits generally say little about the company itself.
689
 The audit report is 
seen as an attempt to communicate whether or not financial statements have 
complied with minimum standards of the applicable legal framework and 
very little is said about the company itself. The problem here, however, is 
that the audit report is not quite a license in itself as in the above 
explanation. While it is important for all public companies to have such a 
report, however, a negative report or a ‘qualified’ report would not prevent 
them from trading or being listed on the Stock Exchange. Furthermore, as 
noted by Ayres and Braithwaite, the qualified report is simply a professional 
opinion and is not directly connected to a regulatory machinery of 
escalation.
690
 
It therefore follows again that the implications of ‘quality label’ or ‘fitness 
for purpose’ would be creation of expectations gap between those who read 
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and those who produce them. The actual meaning of ‘true’ and ‘fair’ view in 
an auditor’s report becomes an issue. Power further delves into the 
fundamental issue posed by this difficulty, which is contrasting quality label 
style of auditing with the longer form of narrative reporting as seen in Value 
for Money audits
691
. He posits that quality label audits largely exist to 
communicate comfort rather than discomfort, that is, certification rather 
than non-certification is usually the case. In such a situation, if the auditor is 
dissatisfied, the only option is to exercise ‘exit’ rather than ‘voice’, that is, 
to refuse to provide an opinion, and this is usually a last resort. The pressure 
to produce comfort is based on the fact that too much critique may lead to 
sacking of the auditor.
692
  
It can therefore be said that going from the above, while the adversarial 
nature of auditing may lead to conflict within the audited company or entity 
while also creating potential problems for regulatory bodies, the production 
of comfort, on the other hand, would mean lack of success of auditing in 
revealing problems; therefore auditing as a quality label and its implications 
of comforting or criticizing remains a subject of debate.
693
 
7.6 The impact of Non-Audit Services (NAS) on auditor independence 
It is important to start by saying the word ‘non-audit services’ is not used in 
the CAMA. This is important to the effect that CAMA did not specifically 
prohibit NAS. Also, the two major bodies that regulate auditors in Nigeria
694
 
have failed to have a detailed regulation regarding the provision of NAS. In 
order to discuss this, it is first important to examine NAS. 
                                                          
691
  Value for Money audit is an independent, evidence-based investigation that investigates 
whether economy, effectiveness and efficiency have been achieved through the use of 
public funds.  
http://www.niauditoffice.gov.uk/index/aboutniao/value_for_money_audit.htmValue_for_M
oney_Central_Government accessed 02.09.13 
692
 Power (n.637) 124.  
693
 Ibid, 125 
694
 These are the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN) and the Association 
of National Accountants of Nigeria (ANAN) 
 232 
 
Non-audit services include all services provided by an auditor that are not 
considered as an audit.
695
 These may be Management Advisory Services 
(MAS) or Compliance related services (Tax, accounting or financial 
services). Over time, writers have argued for and against whether auditors 
should be allowed to provide NAS. Kimney et al. argue that provision of 
non-audit services could lead to better audit. In their opinion, when auditors 
are being saddled with the responsibility of auditing a company, it is 
important that they have a comprehensive knowledge of their client, and the 
totality of this knowledge coupled with their professional skills and 
knowledge would help gain more familiarity with the client, which will then 
help to improve quality and accuracy of the audit report.
696
   
While a number of writers have noted that provision of non-audit services to 
a client should indeed enhance the auditors’ knowledge of their client and 
should serve to promote objectivity and independence of the auditors,
697
 
others have further opined that the question of whether provision of non-
audit services impairs audit independence remains yet unproven.
698
 
On the other hand, Ye, Carson and Simnett examine the relationship 
between non-audit services, audit tenure, audit clients, alumni affiliation and 
their impact on audit independence and posit that auditors’ dependence on 
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non-audit services; prolonged audit tenure and personal relationships 
developed through alumni relationships would indicate biased auditor 
independence.
699
 This is further corroborated by Hayes et al who suggested 
that the provision of non-audit services could impair auditor 
independence.
700
 
Firth also examines provision of non-audit services and auditor 
independence. According to him, there is a risk that increased income 
arising from the provision of both audit and non- audit services can lead to 
the auditors’ dependence on the client, and this could lead to lack of auditor 
independence but also the quality of the audit.
701
 
Prohibition of non-audit services is generally premised on three factors: 
1. An auditor cannot function in the role of management; 
2. An auditor cannot audit his or her own work; 
3. An auditor cannot serve in an advocacy role for his or her client.702 
Furthermore, in the process of providing non-audit services, auditors tend to 
gain a close relationship with the management and this could lead to a 
situation of bias whereby auditors will take sides as opposed to abiding by 
laid-down regulations. 
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De Angelo considers auditor independence and suggests that auditors would 
trade their independence against the potential loss of reputation and costs 
that could arise from such compromise.
703
 In view of this, it can be said that 
the biggest threat to auditor independence arises from the risk of losing a 
client. According to Beatie et al, the most frequent factors that undermine 
auditors’ independence lies in the income generated from retention of a 
specific client particularly where more than 10 per cent of a firms’ revenue 
comes from the provision of non-audit services.
704
 
In contrast to its silence on NAS, it is necessary to state that CAMA 
disqualifies certain persons from serving as auditors.  
Section 358 of CAMA reinforces the provisions of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN) Act, Cap I 11 LFN 2011, which disqualifies 
certain categories of people as auditors. The Section goes further to 
disqualify the following: 
- An officer or servant of a company; 
- A partner or employee of an officer or servant of a company; 
- A body corporate 
- Persons or firms employed by the company or connected with it in 
any form.
705
 
Clearly the Section 358 prohibits ‘firms’ that have been in ‘employment’ or 
‘connected’ to the company in any way from serving as auditors in the 
company. Nigerian writers have construed this to mean prohibition of non-
audit services by an audit firm having connections or in employment with 
the company in any way either before or during the period of audit (Section 
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358(2)). It is believed that this is to prevent conflict of interest and promote 
auditor independence.  
Adeyemi and Olowookere consider NAS and auditor independence in 
Nigeria. According to them, an interpretation of Section 358(2) would mean 
firms that provide professional advice in the form of consultancy such as 
secretarial services, tax or financial management are prohibited from being 
auditors of the company.
706
 Provision of NAS could lead to conflict of 
interest and impair on the independence of the auditor.
707
 The Local 
Authorities Pension Fund Forum (LAPFF), in 2010, considered that the 
prohibition of NAS is necessary primarily for the prevention of conflict of 
interest and also to promote independence of auditors.
708
 
Furthermore, in the case of Nigerian banks, the BOFIA also reinforces the 
above provision in Section 29(3) where it prohibits the following people 
from serving as auditors of a company: 
(a) Having any interest in a bank otherwise than as a depositor; or  
(b) Who is a director, officer or agent of a bank; or  
(c) Which is a firm in which a director of a bank has any interest as partner 
or director; or 
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(d) Who is indebted to a bank?
709
 
Perhaps the most explicit prohibition of external auditors from providing 
non-audit services is contained in the Code of Corporate Governance for 
Nigerian Banks (Post-Consolidation) 2006. The code, to which compliance 
is mandatory for all banks, provides in Section 8.2.4 that a bank’s external 
auditors should not provide the following services to their clients: 
-   Bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting records or 
financial statements of the audit client; 
-   Appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinion or contribution-in-kind 
reports; 
-   Actuarial services; 
-    Internal audit outsourcing services; 
-   Management or human resource functions including broker or dealer, 
investment banking services and legal or expert services unrelated to the 
audit contract. 
Going from the provision of the Corporate Governance Code above, it can 
be rightly said that auditors are prohibited from providing non audit services 
in Nigeria.   
In Nigeria, the oligopolistic nature of audit has led firms to be more drawn 
to mechanical compliance with professional auditing standards rather than 
audit quality and independence, and lot of effort is put in hiding loopholes 
and irregularities. Despite the fact that regulatory provisions exists to 
prohibit non-audit services as examined above, these provisions are hardly 
complied with or enforced in Nigeria.  
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As noted by Anichebe: 
‘In Nigeria, Auditors accept all services (except those to 
which they have no competence of) as long as there are 
separate engagement letters. The existing independent 
rules are thus clearly breached. The same auditor is 
allowed to prepare and audit financial statements due to 
lack of qualified accountants.’ 710  
It is important to also mention a disturbing issue at this point which is the 
lack of documentary evidence for actual non-audit fees, and as will be seen 
in the course of this chapter, the fees paid for audit also include non-audit 
fees but this is not expressly distinguished to state actual type of services 
provided and the amount paid for each. Perhaps the non-disclosure of NAS 
fees is a means to conceal this breach. Although it is clear from the 
relationships of audit firms and their clients that a lot of accounting and 
consulting services apart from auditing are being provided, documentation 
expressly stating this may be limited. 
According to Ebimobowei, the two main important non-audit services 
provided by Nigerian auditors are Tax management and Consultancy 
services.
711
 These fall under legal or expert services as prohibited under the 
2006 Code enumerated above. Provision of these services clearly would 
jeopardize the independence of auditors, placing them in a conflicting 
position. 
In a country like Nigeria, it is suggested that NAS should be clearly catered 
for in the regulation, this is to prevent a situation where corruption is sort of 
encouraged. It is important to also state that the fact that there are a few 
auditors in Nigeria should not mean that NAS should be allowed. It is 
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necessary to mention that while there are few auditing firms, accounting 
firms are however many; it is therefore suggested that NAS should be 
provided by accountants in order to protect the independence of auditors in 
Nigeria. 
7.7 Evidence of Audit Failure: The Big Five V. The Big Two 
There are four big accounting firms in Nigeria and these are KPMG, Ernst 
and Young, Price PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) and Akintola Williams 
Deloitte (AWD), all of which are international audit firms. However, this 
chapter shall focus on the activities of two of these firms that were charged 
with the responsibility of auditing the big five companies and these include 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and Akintola Williams Deloitte. Although, 
mention must be made that two other firms were involved in the audits of 
the five banks. AWD worked with Baker Tilly Nigeria (BTN) in the audit of 
Union Bank and the same goes for Finbank. However, only AWD and PwC 
have been implicated in the banking scandals involving the five banks they 
were engaged to audit and have been accused of acts of professional 
misconduct and financial misstatements. 
Various studies have been conducted to investigate the role of auditors in 
unethical practices in the Nigerian corporate sector.
712
 According to Bakre, 
cases of Nigerian accountants and external auditors collaborating with 
management to falsify and knowingly overstate financial statements of the 
company have become overwhelming in the last decade. Personal gain 
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owing to professional misconduct has clearly preceded the need to act in 
public interest.
713
   
Notwithstanding the limitation of audit firms in Nigeria, auditing firms are 
known to provide a combination of audit and non- audit services which is a 
clear breach. However, while it is as would be later revealed, Akintola 
Williams Deloitte were auditors for three of the big five, namely Finbank, 
Afribank and Union Bank, while PricewaterhouseCoopers audited Oceanic 
Bank and Intercontinental Bank.  
It should be mentioned here that after the post-consolidation exercise, only 
these four audit firms were responsible for auditing all the five banks and as 
such there is oligopoly. In the case of the two audit firms responsible for 
conducting audit of the five banks, they actually had the responsibility of 
auditing a total of eighteen banks between them having been engaged by 
these banks and this would mean intense competition among them. Not only 
has audit oligopoly in Nigeria created income stability, but it has also 
opened the door for provision of other non-audit services because it is 
almost considered normal for the same firm to provide both audit and non-
audit services, despite the fact that the 2006 Code which in effect, prohibits 
the provision of NAS. With income running as much as millions of Naira, 
stakeholders are therefore left with no clue as to checking the quality and 
standard of these audits.  
As noted by Cousins et al: 
‘In the absence of a ‘duty of care’ to individual 
stakeholders and public accountability, the auditing 
industry does not have strong economic incentive to 
improve the quality of audits. If by hook or by crook a 
company survives, no external party knows that audits 
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were botched. Anyone hiring a solicitor has full access to 
that solicitor’s working papers, but there are no equivalent 
rights for anyone hiring an auditor. The auditing industry 
is pre-occupied with fees and client appeasement... The 
auditing firms blame others for being the targets of 
lawsuits but show no signs of looking at how their own 
values and working practices contribute to poor audits.’714  
The authors further argued that in the wake of audit commercialisation, 
auditing firms are more drawn to mechanical compliance with professional 
auditing standards rather than audit quality and independence, and lot of 
effort is put into hiding loopholes and irregularities. 
The table below shows the auditors of the top five banks to illustrate the 
particulars of their audit. 
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Table 5 
Bank Year end Auditor Date of 
last 
Audit 
report 
Audit Opinion Auditor’s 
Remuneration 
(N millions) 
2008    2007 
Intercontinental 29/02/2008 PwC May 
2008 
Unqualified 208 112 
Oceanic Bank 31/12/2008 PwC May 
2009 
Unqualified 168 100 
Union Bank 31/03/2009 AWD, 
BTN 
Oct. 
2009 
Unqualified 118 113 
FinBank 31/04/2008 AWD, 
AI 
Dec. 
2008 
Unqualified 67 63 
Afribank 31/03/2008 AWD Mar. 
2008 
Unqualified N/A N/A 
Source: Adesanya and Lauwo
715
 
Although Adesanya and Lauwo do not explicitly state in the table whether 
the auditors’ remunerations were for provision of both audit and non-audit 
services, it is implied that this was the case because as will be seen by 
Union Bank later, their remuneration included both audit and non-audit 
services which they stated in their report.  
As illustrated from the table above, each of the banks had unqualified audit 
reports immediately prior to their financial distress which was discovered by 
the CBN. The ridiculous amount of their fees suggests that the auditors and 
the banks are too close for comfort. In 2007, the Nigerian Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (NDIC) annual report had shown signs of insolvency among 
Nigerian banks whereby out of the 24 banks that existed in the country at 
the time, only four were sound, yet audit reports of the banks showed that 
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the majority of the banks were sound when in actual fact 17 banks were fair, 
two were marginal and one was unsound.
716
 
As earlier examined in this chapter, it is a legal requirement that auditors 
must provide a written report stating whether the financial statements of the 
company reflect a true and fair view of the company’s financial status and 
their profit and loss accounts and balance sheets have been prepared up to 
standard. However, upon investigations in 2009, it was discovered that the 
banks had received unqualified reports from their auditors. The auditors had 
expressed no opinion as to the value of non-performing loans or any 
irregularities that could have revealed signs of distress in these banks. 
Shortly after, the CBN announced that these banks had financial distress.  
Accounting Standards require auditors to consider the ability of an entity to 
continue in operational existence as a going concern for the foreseeable 
future and this would ordinarily mean that the auditor makes an opinion on 
both present and future circumstances in which the entity operates.
717
 Surely 
it can be argued on the one hand that the auditors are not saddled with the 
responsibility of anticipating crisis in these banks; it can also be said that 
having been forewarned by the NDIC on the activities of these banks, 
perhaps a more in- depth investigation of their accounts by the auditors may 
have revealed this distress or, in a situation where control fraud prevents the 
auditor from conducting appropriate and necessary further investigations, 
and in a situation where all efforts to access documents that could lead to 
further investigations was jeopardised, perhaps a statement pointing this out 
and expressing dissatisfaction in the accounts in the audit report could have 
relieved them of any potential public doubt. 
Furthermore, while it may be practically impossible for auditors to 
anticipate the problems in these banks, such as the continuous use of the 
                                                          
716
 NDIC Report, 2007. http://ndic.org.ng/files/2007_annual_report.pdf accessed 1 August, 
2013 
717
 NSA 23(n.676) Para. 6-10 on Going Concern 
 243 
 
discount window, it is important that they pick on the persistent use of the 
discount window in the financial statements of the banks and should raise 
concern for this in their report. Perhaps if concerns were raised, it might 
have relieved them of any doubts that later came to the mind of the people, 
particularly the CBN on their credibility. It is also important to state that it 
may be impossible to know for certain the actual documents provided for 
the auditors to which their opinions were based. This is due to the problem 
of poor record-keeping in Nigeria. Efforts to gather information on the 
documents presented to the auditors upon which their reports were based 
proved abortive, with most of the banks now merged and records are either 
lost or withheld for whatever reason.  
In the case of Oceanic bank Plc, the auditors were reported to have asserted 
that: 
‘We have audited the accompanying consolidated 
financial statements of Oceanic Bank International Plc 
(“the Bank”) and its subsidiaries (together, “the Group”) 
which comprise the consolidated balance sheets as of 31 
December 2008, consolidated profit and loss accounts and 
consolidated statements of cash flow for the year then 
ended and a summary of significant accounting policies 
and other explanatory notes.... In our opinion, the 
consolidated financial statements give a true and fair view 
of the state of financial affairs of the Bank and Group as of 
31 December 2008, and of their losses and cash flows for 
the period then ended in accordance with Nigerian 
Statements of Accounting Standards, the Companies and 
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Allied Matters Act and the Banks and Other Financial 
Institutions Act.’718 
Investigations of the CBN on Oceanic Bank suggested a contrary view on 
the quality of the audit report and also the credibility of the auditors 
particularly on the issue of failure to disclose the level of non-performing 
loans of the bank. Oceanic banks annual report for 2008 shows it had N36 
billion ($288million) non-performing loans. However, in 2009, the CBN 
declared that the bank had a total of N278.2billion ($2.2billion) non-
performing loans which represents about 37 per cent of the total non-
performing loans of the five distressed banks which was put at N747billion 
($5.98billion).
719
 
Similarly, in the case of Intercontinental Bank, the audit report also 
conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers had shown non-performing loans of 
N16.6billion ($132.8million) where the CBN had revealed a total of 
N210.9billion ($1.69billion) of non-performing loans which accounted for 
about 28% per cent of the total non-performing loans.
720
  
The other three banks, namely Afribank, Union Bank and Finbank, Akintola 
Williams Deloitte (AWD) had served as auditors for them.
721
 Union bank 
had reported in its annual report in 2009 that the joint auditors, AWD and 
BTN had received N146million ($1.17million) for audit and accountancy 
(non-audit) services.
722
 The disclosure of Union Bank in their annual report 
to indicate how much they got for non-audit services will suggest that they 
provided NAS for the other two banks that they audited which are FinBank 
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and AfriBank, and may also lead to suspicions that PwC must have done the 
same for the remaining two banks, that is, Oceanic and Intercontinental 
banks. The result, no doubt had been good value for money where the audit 
report had stated that the bank was financially sound. However, in the same 
year, the bank was declared distressed by the CBN.
723
 
Perhaps one case, which is not surprising after all, is that of Afribank. This 
is so because in 2006, AWD had been indicted for facilitating the 
falsification of the 2006 accounts of Afribank Plc having been exposed by 
the former Managing Director, Mr. Patrick Olayele Akinkuotu. It was 
alleged that both the audit committee of the bank and AWD had colluded to 
manipulate the company’s accounts to reveal a pre-tax profit of 
N3.69billion, total assets of N131.2billion and shareholders fund of 
N27.06billion.
724
  
Investigations by the management discovered a loss of N6.9billion after tax, 
total assets of N127.5billion and shareholder fund of N17.85billion 
compared to the 2005 amount of N21.4billion.
725
 It was also discovered that 
one of the reasons for the difference in the management figures and the 
audited figures was as a result of huge non-performance risk assets which 
had been intentionally brought forward from the previous year as 
performance risk assets. The controversy became aggravated when it was 
discovered that the CBN had indeed certified the audit as being satisfactory 
and had given it a clean bill of health. The CBN, upon public demand 
commenced re-investigation of the bank accounts while the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange as well as the House of Representatives Committee on Capital 
Market also launched a separate investigation.  
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AWD however, denied their involvement in any unethical auditing practices 
and was observed to have noted: 
‘In our thirty years of experience, this is the first time 
someone would accuse us of modifying our report. We 
apply the rule 100 per cent, we do not bend the rules at all. 
Our firm has a world renowned in-house audit approach 
called Deloitte audit and accounting standards both local 
and international.’726 
However, while the investigations were still ongoing, AWD was implicated 
on another financial falsification involving Cadbury Nigeria Plc, a 
subsidiary of Schweppes Overseas Limited. It was alleged that the financial 
falsification was a collaborative act by AWD and the MD/CEO, Bunmi Oni 
and the Finance Director, Ayo Akadiri, who was a chartered Accountant and 
member of ICAN. Cadbury Nigeria Plc was quick to refute these allegations 
and employed another audit firm, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to 
conduct an independent audit of the firm. This then necessitated the 
involvement of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) which 
launched its own investigations and the issues for determination included 
inadequate disclosure and non-compliance with Corporate Governance 
Codes, deteriorating cash flows, declining profitability, worsening leverage 
flow and obtaining loans for the payment of dividends to shareholders.
727
  
Consequently, the directors and management were invited for questioning 
regarding violations of the provisions of the Investments and Securities Act, 
1999, the SEC Rules and Regulations 2000 (as amended), the Code of 
Conduct for Capital Market Operations and their employees as well as the 
Code of Corporate Governance of Nigeria. The Commissions 
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Administrative Proceedings Committee (APC) was particularly interested in 
AWD as external auditors involved in two ongoing scandals at the time.  
The investigation, which was concluded in March 2008, revealed a number 
of findings, especially on the involvement of AWD in the companies 
involved. Specifically, APC found that: 
‘Professional scepticism generally requires that an auditor 
should not believe documents presented by a client till it 
sees evidence that they are genuine. In the company’s 
case, AWD did not probe any further or doubt documents 
presented by the company in spite of the internal control 
lapses detected and revealed in the management letters. 
AWD and in particular the partners that handled the 
company’s  account, did not carry out their assignment 
with high level of professionalism and diligence expected 
of a reputable accounting firm of its calibre.
728
 
It was also found by the commission that the companies had filed annual 
report and accounts which contained mis-statements, that the completed 
audit report of PWC which was submitted to SEC revealed a mis-statement 
of approximately N13billion for the companies as at September 2006 and 
both the company directors, auditors and persons in charge of and 
responsible for the financial documents were liable. Consequently, the 
Managing Director, Bunmi Oni and the Finance Director, Ayo Akadiri were 
banned from operating in the Nigerian Capital Market and holding 
directorship positions in any public company in Nigeria, and their names 
were passed to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). 
AWD was also ordered to pay a fine of N20 million.
729
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The problem with Afribank plc would lead to a lot of suspicions, not only 
on AWD but on the other auditors responsible for the five banks. Is the fine 
enough? Although AWD was reprimanded and ordered to pay a fine, 
banning the said directors from operating in the Nigerian Stock Market and 
being Directors of any public company in Nigeria seems fair, but is it 
adequate enough to prevent others from doing same? It is summated that the 
fine is not proportional to the level of damage caused which was merely 
labelled as negligence and unprofessionalism. 
Perhaps the fact that they could get away with it was why they did it again 
during the periods that led to the crisis. Although the auditors could always 
claim that they were ignorant of the activities of the CEOs and merely did 
their job based on documents provided to them, but it has been established 
earlier that they must have been aware of the financial problems in the 
banks, at least due to previous concerns raised by the NDIC. 
Furthermore, in a society like Nigeria where corruption is endemic, it is 
impossible to say for certain that auditors are actually independent. The 
average business activity in Nigeria is potentially suspicious. According to 
Okike, in Nigeria, lack of checks and balances, coupled with poor national 
integrity is almost institutionalised, therefore creating doubt as to the 
independence of auditors.
730
 According to Otusanya, AWD was seen as 
auditor, stock market consultant and tax manager.
731
 This increased 
commercialisation of auditors may have resulted in auditors being sold as 
‘lost leaders’ in the bid to sell more profitable services; this money driven 
motive sees audit services as a means to an end; that is, access to senior 
management positions, thereby creating room for more consultancy 
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services.
732
 In this regard, Nigerian Auditors are considered by Otusanya as 
‘the private police force of capitalism’.733 
7.8 Audit Failure in Nigeria: An institutional Problem? 
7.8.1 Control Fraud 
The concept of control fraud has been examined in detail in chapter three on 
CEOs. However, having uncovered the involvement of auditors in the 
banking crisis, it is important to determine their role in control fraud, as it is 
an important question central to this thesis.  
As financial super-predators, control frauds are skilful in identifying both 
human and regulatory weakness. In the case of the top five banks in Nigeria, 
it can be seen that at least one clean external audit opinion was obtained by 
each of these banks. It therefore follows that auditors, both internal and 
external, may be valuable accessories to control frauds. Although what 
remains unclear is how to determine the actual involvement of auditors in 
control frauds, in the case of Afribank above, the auditors were found guilty 
and liable for fraud, AWD was found to be complicit in the fraud but yet, 
allowed to get away with it the first time by ‘strongly reprimanding’ them 
and this explains why they could do it again.  
On the one hand, for external auditors whose responsibility it is to make a 
report as to whether the statements presented before them actually reveal the 
‘true’ and ‘fair’ state of affairs of the company, it becomes difficult to prove 
that they may have indeed been helpful in manipulating the accounts as he 
can then bring up the defence of ignorance, however untrue, claiming that 
all information and investigations were verified and appeared correct at the 
time. On the other hand, the internal audit committee whose job it is to 
prepare these statements in the first place may contribute to control fraud 
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whereby the CEO, as the person ultimately in ‘charge’ of the company, 
could influence and turn them into accessories. Therefore, a carefully 
manipulated account could be presented to an independent external auditor, 
who is then misled to provide a ‘clean bill of health’ for the bank, thereby 
causing shareholders and the investing public to believe in the viability of 
the bank whereas the reverse is the case. The point here is that auditors can 
be used as a contributory tool for control fraud because their opinion as 
provided in the audit report is very important to the financial status of the 
company. It can therefore be said that auditors can contribute to control 
fraud. 
Furthermore, Black examines opportunistic control fraud. This type of 
control fraud examines a wave of frauds whereby opportunists seek out the 
best field for fraud. To this end, four factors are crucial: ease of obtaining 
weak control, weak regulations, ample accounting abuses and the ability to 
grow rapidly.
734
 He explains this further by positing that companies with 
weak rules against fraud are likely to invite abusive accounting practices. 
These companies with abusive accounting practices have higher 
opportunities for growth due to their constant production of fictitious 
profits, misleading investors and creditors to invest in the control fraud. 
Opportunistic control fraud makes regulatory and business environments 
ideal for fraud. In the case of AWD, they saw the opportunity to utilise the 
totality of weakness in the system to continue with these frauds, and of 
course, mention must be made that this was done in collaboration with the 
CEOs, leading to a web of frauds. Furthermore, little or nothing was done 
by ICAN to bring the auditors to book by prosecuting them in the first place, 
leaving a possibility that they could get away with it a second time, which 
frankly speaking is the case, as the auditors still work and live as free 
persons to date. 
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In view of the above, it can be said that control fraud was a major 
contributor to audit failure in Nigeria because the corporate environment 
and indeed all spheres of the economy were the best in the country for 
opportunistic fraud at the time, and it is no wonder that the control frauds 
caused so much damage at the time. 
7.8.2 Regulatory Failure  
In Nigeria, what should have been audit quality has been overshadowed by 
politics, power and social connections. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
need for audit quality and objectivity is being stressed by regulatory bodies 
and contained in various auditing standards, as in any other company, 
auditors are individuals under the pressure of financial performance, which 
would mean appraisals, promotion and fat packages.  
Furthermore, it goes without saying that professional regulators have erred 
in the sanctioning of their members and exercise of their statutory 
obligations. Former National President of the Association of National 
Accountants of Nigeria (ANAN), Samuel Nzekwe, has argued that the 
banking crisis had exposed ICAN as its members were involved in 
accounting mis-statements and although ICAN had claimed through the 
Vice President at the time that it did all it could to discipline its members, 
details of what was done remains unknown and certainly this is misleading 
as there is no record of any proceedings against them.
735
 Going further, he 
posited that the problem does not lie in provision of new rules dealing with 
erring bank officials or auditors, the problem however lies in appropriate 
bodies enforcing the rules in place as none of the auditors who were 
implicated were actually prosecuted by their own regulatory bodies.
736
 
While it is agreed that Nzekwe is right in identifying the problem as that of 
enforcement, it is however important to state that it is not only the job of 
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regulators to implement enforcement. As will be stressed throughout the 
course of this thesis, enforcement is most likely to work if all participating 
bodies in corporate governance work together to promote effective 
corporate governance. 
As noted by Bakre, the fact that the auditors were implicated in the fraud 
should call for concern from their regulatory bodies, they should have 
conducted investigations within their power to probe the auditors; however, 
the accounting regulators have used their power and privileges to shield 
their members from being held accountable.
737
 
Also, the then Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC), Farida Waziri, was noted to have stated: 
‘During our investigations, we found that all the erring 
bank chief executives were given a clean bill to operate by 
both the external and the internal auditors who are paid to 
do so. It was gathered that these auditors connived with 
the chief executives to cook the books and cover the tracks 
while the frauds were being perpetrated.’738 
It is important to state that the EFCC is a criminal organisation aimed at 
prosecuting members of the public or companies alleged with financial 
misconduct. It is interesting to see that having made the above statement; 
the EFCC has failed to prosecute any of the auditing firms alleged to have 
been involved in the fraud. It is therefore absurd that only the CEOs were 
further indicted and actually charged with fraud when it is clear from the 
statement of the EFCC that their investigations revealed that the auditors 
were ‘paid’ by the CEOs to give their financial statements a ‘clean bill’.  
                                                          
737
 Bakre, O.M. (n.712)  
738
 Otusanya and Lauwo (n.654) 189 
 253 
 
Clearly, as explained earlier in the chapter, the limitations of audit as a task 
itself would suggest obscurity as to what is expected of an audit and what 
audit actually produces, it could also be the case that auditors might be 
victims of control fraud, having absolutely no knowledge of what goes on 
behind closed doors; however, this is not the case of the auditors of these 
banks, as the EFCC had actually confirmed collaboration and conspiracy 
between these auditors and the CEOs but sadly none of these auditors have 
been indicted. It can be said that the auditors were actually complicit in the 
fraud as will be discussed shortly. The public was led to believe that drastic 
steps were being taken to bring the culprits to book. However, while this can 
be said of the CEOs and members of management staff and internal audit 
committee that were involved, very little can be said of the prosecution of 
the external auditors involved in the crisis. What the Regulators and EFCC 
have done is to invite the indicted auditing firm from time to time for a 
hearing without any further prosecution.  
It is evident that the activities of the auditors would require statutory 
obligations from the professional bodies to conduct an investigation and 
provide appropriate sanction for its members. It is important to state here 
that the disciplinary tribunal of ICAN has the status of a federal high 
court.
739
 However, to date, the involvements of audit firms in the banking 
crisis have not been investigated by their ICAN, neither has it indicted any 
of its members. However, what we see is a situation where power and 
privileges of self-regulatory status of ICAN have been utilised to shield 
these auditors from public accountability. The issue that comes to mind at 
this stage is whether the capitalist nature of these accountants creates a 
pressure to make profits and therefore an avenue for auditors to engage in 
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unethical practices. Perhaps the reason for this is not farfetched as will be 
explained below: 
In Nigeria, whereas directors and bank executives were held accountable for 
fraudulent and corrupt practices, the position is massively different for 
auditors where auditors cannot be held personally liable for fraudulent 
practices. Auditors have therefore remained questionably silent in 
commenting on the activities that led to the crisis. Therefore, in arraigning 
the bank executives, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC) had merely invited the audit firms for hearings without penalising 
them for their unethical practices and their contributory role in financial 
misappropriation. The lack of power to personally prosecute the auditors 
involved calls for concern. Perhaps a reform is necessary in this area of 
corporate governance, that auditors should be held personally liable for 
fraud. 
7.8.3 Audit Oligopoly: Too close for comfort?  
Issues of corporate governance failure due to unethical practices, 
professional pressure, politics and power undermine the objective of 
auditing and this should be a major concern for regulators. It can be rightly 
said that carrying out investigations and extra audits only when issues of 
financial distress due to misappropriation spring up suggests that the 
auditors’ role have been compromised and questions the quality and 
independence of auditors.  
From the case studies above, it can be seen that the five banks were audited 
by two main audit companies. The oligopoly of audits in Nigeria would lead 
to a lot of concerns especially on the issue of independence. It should be 
noted that at the time of the crisis, although there were more than four 
accounting bodies in Nigeria, banks were attracted to the leading ones; 
perhaps, due to their international affiliations. In Nigeria, notwithstanding 
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the fact that nomination and appointment of audit firms is determined at 
annual general meetings, auditors are actually dependent on directors for 
their appointment and remuneration as provided in CAMA and as such, they 
would want to keep them on their side so as to secure further appointments.  
The variety of services provided to the client, an auditor-client relationship 
is developed which would mean a compromise of professional 
independence and audit quality. In Nigeria, the provision of CAMA 
regarding Auditor Tenure policy is an open-ended one which would mean 
that Auditors can be re-appointed as many times as possible inasmuch as 
they are approved by the General meeting. In order to constantly gain re-
election as Auditors, it would follow that Auditors would be willing to 
establish sound relationships that would not put their job in jeopardy. 
In Nigeria, concerns regarding corporate governance standards for auditors, 
particularly audit quality and independence have raised a lot of attention. As 
earlier stated, in the wake of the banking crisis, shareholders have blamed 
both auditors and the audit committee for misguiding them as to the 
financial situation of the banks. Auditor-client relationship includes 
emotional, financial and personal interests; auditors may therefore favour 
their self-interest in the performance of their duty. Freedom from bias and 
prejudice is crucial to auditor independence, to the extent that auditors must 
have no personal interest in the company; neither should they be susceptible 
to any form of bias or influence.
740
 Questions have been asked as to the 
negligence and compromising nature of the auditors in the discharge of their 
duties. Perhaps the development of personal relationship between auditors 
and their clients has put the auditors in a tight situation where they would 
not want to ‘bite the finger that feeds them’.  Audit oligopoly is a recurring 
issue of audit quality in Nigeria owing to longstanding relationships. 
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Perhaps a good suggestion on promoting auditor independence would be 
rotation of auditors, practiced in western economies.
741
  
7.9 Conclusion  
This chapter examined the role of auditors in the banking crisis, taking into 
account the big five banks. The chapter aimed at investigating contemporary 
auditing in Nigeria and its adequacy or otherwise in preventing the soon 
revealed cases of control frauds.  
Although audit is a risk reduction exercise and the label ‘audit’ plays an 
important role in different organisations including banks, audit can be said 
to be a rigorous exercise on its own, a responsibility with too much 
expectations, at the expense of the auditor. It can be said that the 
responsibility of producing audit assurance in a society where control fraud 
is apparent is limited by the obscurity of audit actually is, what audits can 
and cannot do, and more often than not, the question of failure is highly 
contested. 
Notwithstanding the above limitations, it can be said that the lack of 
independence for auditors in Nigeria is guided by a deeper problem of 
corporate governance failure and also institutionalised corruption, which has 
become endemic in Nigeria. 
Freedom from bias and prejudice is crucial to auditor independence, to the 
extent that auditors must have no personal interest in the company; neither 
should they be susceptible to any form of bias or influence.
742
 Questions 
have been asked as to the negligence and compromising nature of the 
auditors in the discharge of their duties. Perhaps the development of 
personal relationship between auditors and their clients have put the auditors 
in a tight situation where they would not want to ‘bite the hand that feeds 
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them’.  Audit oligopoly is a recurring issue of audit quality in Nigeria owing 
to longstanding relationships.  
In Nigeria, the provision of CAMA regarding Auditor tenure policy is an 
open-ended one and by Section 357, auditors can be re-appointed as many 
times as possible inasmuch as they are approved by the General meeting. In 
order to constantly gain re-election as Auditors, it would follow that 
Auditors would be willing to establish sound relationships that would not 
put their job in jeopardy. 
According to Patrick Gaye: 
‘There is no way the auditors especially the external 
auditors could have done what is expected of them 
because, the external auditors in particular, are just like 
contractors who dance to the tune of their hirers. Auditors 
are on a retainership and for the banks to retain them on 
the job; they would not want to rock the boat through 
exposing the banks’ shortcomings to the regulators’.743 
Furthermore, prior the banking crisis, various provisions have now been 
made to limit the tenure of auditors. According to Section 8.2.3 of the Code 
of Corporate Governance 2006, the tenure of external auditors shall be for a 
maximum number of ten years after which the audit firm shall not be 
permitted to be reappointed by the bank until a further period of ten years. 
Likewise, the ICAN Code of Conduct and Guide for Members (2009) also 
noted that constant re-election may lead to an auditor being too over-
influenced by the directors and management of the company to the point of 
being too sympathetic to his detriment.
744
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However, while the Code of Corporate Governance sets a ten year limit of 
audit tenure, the ICAN Code of Conduct prescribes a five year limit 
according to Section 16.3.0, after which the auditor must cease to be 
engaged for another period of five years before he can then commence to 
work for the firm.
745
 However, a controversial clause is further provided in 
the Section, which provides that the auditor is not precluded from engaging 
in ‘other forms of involvement’ with the client. Clearly, if after serving as 
auditor for five years, the same auditor is still involved in other forms of 
involvement with the bank during the five year cooling off period, the whole 
point of auditor rotation is jeopardised. Furthermore, there is no indication 
regarding the sort of involvements that were allowed in these sections and 
whether provision of non-audit services could be construed here; to which 
case, the provisions of CAMA and BOFIA discussed above would preclude 
an auditor who had been involved in any other engagement with the client 
from serving as auditor, therefore the auditors would be disqualified from 
any possible future engagement after the five years. Perhaps, this clause has 
been constructed by ICAN for the benefit of its members and ultimately 
itself. 
The problem here does not lie on lack of adequate corporate governance 
regulation as it would be gathered from the above discussion that there 
exists adequate legal responses to financial auditing in Nigeria with 
provisions to cover audit quality and independence, audit tenure as well as 
provision of non-audit services. In fact the new provisions following the 
crisis as seen above would merely create more controversy as to what 
auditors should and should not do. The problem however, lies in 
enforcement. Clearly the 2006 Code lists the type of services prohibited 
from auditors and these are clearly breached. It therefore becomes important 
to ensure that the rules in place are adequately enforced. This will lead to 
the suggestion that non-audit services should be more clearly catered for. 
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Furthermore, another feasible suggestion would also be to strengthen 
enforcement mechanisms by placing both auditors and directors on the same 
platform with regard to prosecution for fraudulent financial activities. The 
implementation of legal sanctions against auditors found guilty of financial 
mis-statements would serve as a deterrent for others to learn from.  Again, it 
should be mentioned that the problem of control fraud in Nigeria clearly 
goes beyond strengthening enforcement mechanisms for auditors alone, but 
a targeted effort to reduce fraud in Nigeria should be the responsibility of all 
corporate participants. This suggestion on enforcement is vital to this 
research as a whole and would be further developed in the course of this 
thesis.  
That notwithstanding, another issue that remains frustrating is the fact that 
to date, the CBN fails to produce details of its ‘Special Investigation’ of 
these banks, despite repeated demands by the public, shareholders and the 
House of Representatives. What is seen instead, are references made to 
these reports, publications and statements in newspapers revealing that the 
results of their special investigations reveal evidence of fraud and accusing 
the CEOs and auditors of financial mis-statements. 
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Chapter 8 
An Investigation of the role of Shareholders in Control 
Fraud: Evidence from the banking crisis* 
8.1 Introduction 
The chapter critically investigates the role of the shareholders in control 
fraud. In view of the provisions of the laws and the codes of corporate 
governance, the chapter will determine whether issues of negligence, 
complicity or collusion can be said to have encouraged the fraud. Of 
particular importance is the active involvement of majority shareholders in 
contributing to the bank fraud, or the effect of executive directors of these 
banks also who owned shares in the banks and could therefore take 
advantage of their shareholding power to manipulate the bank to their 
advantage due to their power and status. The impact of political patronage 
through government shareholding would also be considered. More so, 
shareholder activism in Nigeria, through the existence of shareholder 
association, will be examined and analysed to determine whether during the 
banking crisis of 2009, there was enough shareholder activism in the 
country. Particularly, in helping to prevent the crisis or protect the rights of 
shareholders after the crisis. Mention must be made that efforts to collect 
data on the shareholding composition of each of these banks have proved 
abortive. This is due to the lack of adequate record-keeping in Nigeria, 
coupled with the fact that many of these banks have been merged and 
therefore relevant documents are no longer available to the public. Perhaps 
the lack of available documents is also due to the circumstances surrounding 
their mergers. 
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8.2 Separation of Ownership and Control 
Jensen and Meckling define agency relationship as a contract whereby one 
or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some 
decision-making authority to the agent.
746
 The principals are identified as 
Shareholders while the Directors are Agents. If both parties to the 
relationship are utility maximisers, there is good reason to believe that the 
agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal.
747
 They 
further examined the ownership structure of a corporation, taking into 
account how equity ownership by managers can be said to combine their 
interests with that of the shareholders.
748
 
According to them, the principal is able to limit divergences from his 
interest through monitoring costs and the creation of various incentives 
aimed at limiting future deviant activities of the agent.
749
 Monitoring costs 
are usually undertaken by shareholders up to the point that these do not 
exceed agency costs they are aiming to control. For example, providing 
bonding costs (such as advertising costs that results in attracting more 
external scrutiny to the firm thus reducing agency costs) for the agent to 
guarantee that he will not harm the principal, and where this happens, 
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ensuring that the principal is compensated. However, more often than not, 
there will be a discrepancy between the agents’ decisions and decisions that 
would serve to optimize the interest of the principal. This is because it is 
generally not feasible for either the principal or agent to ensure that the 
agent will make vital decisions in the interest of the principal at no cost; 
generally, monitoring and bonding costs are usually incurred.
750
  
Agency costs are defined by Jensen and Meckling to include monitoring 
expenditures incurred by the principal, bonding expenditures incurred by the 
agent, as well as residual loss.
751
 
Going back to Fama and Jensen, organisations that tend to separate residual 
risk bearing from decision management are generally complex in nature 
because valuable information is then diffused among many agents of the 
organisation, therefore what we have in most complex organisations are 
diffuse decision control systems of formal decision levels where the 
decision of lower agents (such as managers) are submitted to higher level 
agents (such as the board of directors), initially for ratification and later for 
monitoring.
752
 This is because where there are many residual claimants, 
decision control becomes a costly exercise; hence, the need to separate 
residual risk from decision control. This would then create problems of 
agency relationship between residual claimants and decision agents. The 
separation of decision management and control at all stages in the 
organisation, the incurring of monitoring costs by the residual risk claimers 
and the bonding costs incurred by the agents would collectively help to 
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reduce possible agency problems by limiting the power of agents to 
appropriate the interests of residual claimants.
753
  
The need to separate decision control and management would be effective in 
complex organisations as they would both allow relevant applicable 
knowledge to be utilised as and when due because they help to control the 
agency problems that are posed by diffuse residual claims. Furthermore, in 
decision control systems where multiple-member board of directors tend to 
ratify and monitor important decisions as well as choosing, rewarding and 
dismissing important decisions that bear little or no share of the cost effects 
of their decisions, make it difficult for any form of collusion between 
decision management at the top and control agents.
754
 This ultimately 
facilitates the separation of the management and control of organisations’ 
most crucial decisions.  
8.3 Nature of Shareholding in Nigeria 
The Federal Republic of Nigeria is a former colony of Britain. The first 
companies to operate in Nigeria were therefore British companies chartered 
in England. Foreign companies had foreign ownership status that granted 
them absolute rights and privileges associated with it. Legal activities began 
in 1876 when Lagos, the then Federal Capital Territory, was ceded to the 
British Crown. Following the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern 
protectorates in 1914 and the establishment of a Supreme Court for the 
whole country, an Ordinance was also promulgated for the whole country. 
Section 14 of the new Ordinance provided that: ‘subject to the terms of this 
or any other Ordinance, the Common Law, the Doctrines of Equity and the 
Statutes of General Application, which were in force in England on the 1
st
 
of January 1900, shall be in force within the jurisdiction of the court.’ 
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The above provision laid the foundation of Company Law in Nigeria as the 
English Common Law and Doctrines of Equity became applicable to 
Nigeria. The Companies Ordinance of 1912 was the first Company law in 
Nigeria, based on the English Companies (Consolidation) Act of 1908. 
As the most populated country in West Africa with natural resources 
ranging from crude oil to agriculture,
755
 the independence of Nigeria in 
1960 necessitated the need for local control of public infrastructure. In this 
regard, the government effected a major change in ownership and control 
structure of Nigerian corporations prohibiting absolute ownership by foreign 
investors.
756
 The activities of the government in the encouragement of local 
participation in economic activities led to the enactments of various Acts 
from 1962 to 1977. Two major legislations passed to this effect were the 
Foreign Exchange Act of 1962 known as the FX Act and the Nigerian 
Enterprises Promotion Decree (NEPD) No. 4 of 1972, also known as the 
Indigenisation Decree. The purpose of these Acts was to reserve for 
Nigerians those areas where they had the experience and capital to run. The 
FX Act prohibited the transfer of security or interest of security outside 
Nigeria without the permission of the Minister of Finance. The NEPD on 
the other hand, in a bid to restrict foreign ownership, created three types of 
enterprises.
757
 
First, there were enterprises exclusively reserved for Nigerians, which 
basically was a reflection of the Nation’s economic, financial and corporate 
needs at the time. There were also enterprises in which Nigerians were not 
allowed to own more than 40% of shares, in which case foreign companies 
had the opportunity to invest in the country, generating foreign capital and 
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managerial expertise for Nigeria. The third sector was enterprises in which 
foreigners were not allowed to own more than 60% of shares and these 
included capital-intensive enterprises.
758
 
The ownership structure of the country, prohibiting 100% of foreign 
ownership, made a lot of foreign corporations to divest their shares. 
However, due to lack of local investment funds at the time, government 
became the major shareholder of the divested shares, although few local 
investors bought a small percentage of the shares.
759
 Subsequently, the 
government became actively involved in the production sector of the 
country, either solely or as joint ventures with the foreign or local investors. 
In reality, the government policy on prohibition of absolute foreign 
investment in the country only operated to empower foreign investors as 
major partners with the government, leaving local investors as the minority. 
This, no doubt created abuse of minority rights as majority shareholders had 
control. Conflict between majority and minority shareholders remains a 
dominant problem of most developing countries with concentrated 
ownership structure.
760
  
Following the independence of the country in 1960, there was the need to 
provide a wider framework for indigenous companies. A Law Reform 
Commission was therefore set up to make recommendations on the future of 
the country’s corporate sector while protecting the interest of investors and 
the nation. The recommendations of the Law Reform Commission led to the 
introduction of the Companies and Allied Matters Decree (now Act) 
1990.
761
 Part 1 and 2 of the Act provides that it shall apply to all companies 
                                                          
758
 Orojo, J. O. (1992) Company Law and Practice in Nigeria Lagos:  Mbeyi and Ass. 
Lagos. 
759
 Akinsanya, A. A. (1983) State Strategies towards Nigerian and Foreign Businesses (in 
L W. Zartman (ed.). The Political Economy of Nigeria New York: Preager, p. 169.) 
760
 La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes. and A. Shleifer:1996, 'Law and Finance' (National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.) Working Paper 5661. 
761
 It can also be rightly said that CAMA is largely based on the UK Companies Act of 
1948. 
 266 
 
registered under it, all existing companies, all companies formed or 
incorporated under other enactments and also all unregistered companies.
762
 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Nigeria is the apex 
regulatory institution of the Nigerian capital market.
 763
 SEC has evolved 
over time from its first establishment as an arm of the CBN in 1962. As an 
arm of the CBN, it was originally an ad-hoc committee and later became 
SEC in 1979.
764
 One of the key duties of SEC Nigeria is to review the 
financial health of publicly quoted companies in order to protect 
shareholders, and ensure compliance with the code of corporate governance 
and other relevant guidelines. 
765
 
The Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) is licensed under the Investments and 
Securities Act (ISA) and is regulated by SEC Nigeria. The NSE is one of the 
largest Stock Exchange Markets in Africa that provides listing and trading 
services. The NSE also offers market data dissemination services, market 
indices and much more.
766
 The NSE recognises shareholders as valuable co-
owners of their respective companies, with rights and privileges as 
stipulated by law. The NSE serves the purpose of providing professional 
advice on selection and management of investments. As a portfolio and 
issuing house, the NSE also assists sponsors of projects to raise funds on the 
floor of the stock market, trading in shares and stocks for capital market 
dealers. 
The NSE started operations in 1961 where it listed 19 securities for trading. 
The requirement for shares to be quoted on the market initially received a 
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slow response and as at 1970, only 20 companies had their shares quoted on 
the market, even though there were about 2000 foreign- owned enterprises 
in Nigeria at the time.
767
 However, today there are 260 Securities listed on 
the Exchange, made up of 10 Government Stocks, 55 Industrial Loan 
(Debenture/Preference) Stocks and 195 Equity / Ordinary Shares of 
Companies. The total market capitalization amounts to N875.2 billion.
768
 
Most of the listed Companies in Nigeria have foreign affiliations that are 
dispersed across various sections of the economy ranging from Agriculture 
to manufacturing and services. The largest Plc listed on the exchange, 
Dangote Cement, has an asset value of $2.1billion and a Market value of 
$12.5billion. Being the most valuable company in Nigeria, it ranks 1,434
th
 
position in the list of the World’s Biggest Public Companies.769 In Nigeria, 
it can be said that concentration of ownership in Nigerian banks is presently 
with majority shareholders.     
8.4 Shareholders’ Rights and Responsibilities under Nigerian Law 
Shareholders rights and responsibilities are provided for in a number of 
legal and Regulatory documents in Nigeria. These include the Companies 
and Allied Matters Act 2004, the Banks and Other Financial Institutions 
Acts, 1991, the CBN Code of Corporate Governance and the SEC 
Shareholders’ Rights and Responsibilities 2007. 
To start with, CAMA describes members of a company as subscribers of the 
memorandum of a company. Each member of a company with a share 
capital is deemed to be a shareholder of the company.
770
 Under Section 80 
of CAMA, to be eligible to be a shareholder of a company, a person must 
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own at least one share.
771
 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
defines a shareholder as a person who owns shares in a company, making 
him a part owner of the company.
772
 As a result of these shares, he is 
entitled to take part in making decisions for the company, as well as have 
access to management for all transactions of the company and to all 
information relating to the performance or otherwise of the company. 
Companies perform through their shareholders in meetings, board of 
directors, or through appointed agents or officers. Shareholders’ meetings 
are classed as ‘General Meetings’ to which all shareholders have the right to 
attend and vote.
773
 This meeting is not limited to shareholders alone, but 
also includes other authorised persons that are entitled to attend, such as 
auditors, debenture holders, and directors. CAMA identifies three types of 
meetings, which are: the Annual General Meetings (AGM)
774
, the 
Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM)
775
 and the Class Meeting (CM).
776
 
The powers expressly conferred on shareholders under CAMA are exercised 
during the appropriate meeting. The shareholders in general meetings can 
take some decisions to control the management of the company, and in 
furtherance of their duties use the general meeting to ratify the acts of the 
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directors which are ultra vires the Board of Directors. CAMA specifies the 
basic rights of shareholders that range from their voting rights during 
meetings on important decisions on the activities of the company to their 
rights to sue for dividend payments and bonus shares from their companies. 
These include: right to attend company meeting and vote in the meeting; 
entitlement to notice of meeting; right to transfer shares as a personal 
property; right to receive dividend once it is declared by the board of 
directors.
777
 Other rights include the appointment of members of the audit 
committee,
778
 fixing the remuneration of the auditors,
779
 election of 
directors
780
 and presentation of the report of the financial statements by the 
directors and auditors.
781
  
One way through which shareholders can exercise their oversight function is 
resolutions. CAMA
782
 states that a resolution shall be an ordinary resolution 
when it has been passed by a simple majority of votes cast by members of a 
company, who are entitled to do so, voting in person or by proxy at a 
general meeting. A resolution shall be a special resolution when it has been 
passed by not less than three-quarter of the voting cast by such members of 
the company. Also, voting can be made in person or by proxy at a general 
meeting of which 21days notice has been given, specifying the intention to 
propose the resolution as a special resolution.
783
 
Apart from the CAMA, the Bank and Other Financial Institutions Act 
(BOFIA) oversees all banks and other financial institutions in Nigeria. It 
must be pointed out that unlike CAMA and the Corporate Governance 
Codes (which will be examined shortly), BOFIA does not provide much 
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insight on Shareholders’ rights and responsibilities. While some of the 
provisions of the Act complement that of CAMA, on issues such as voting 
rights and accountability of financial reports, the Act fails to provide any 
specific responsibilities to shareholders, but rather empowers the CBN with 
sole monitoring, supervision and regulatory powers of banks.
784
  
Mention must also be made of the CBN Code of Corporate Governance, 
2006. The Code stems from the consolidation exercise of the CBN as well 
as the need to encourage good corporate governance practices in the country 
considering the financial scandals around the world at the time.
785
 It is 
important to state that compliance to the Code is mandatory. The CBN 
recognises a number of factors responsible for bad corporate governance in 
the country. These include: fraudulent and self-serving practices among 
members of the board, management and staff, passive shareholders, 
ineffective board oversight functions, overbearing influence of 
Chairman/CEO, especially in family controlled banks, and also succumbing 
to pressure from other stakeholders, particularly shareholders’ appetite for 
high dividends.
786
 
To curb the powers of majority shareholders who may also be directors, the 
Code recognises that non-restrictive (that is, transferrable) equity-holding 
has been abused by individuals and their family members, as well as 
governments’ activities in the management of banks. But, in view of the 
country’s policy to encourage private sector-led economy, holdings by 
individuals and corporate bodies in banks should be more than that of 
governments.  
More so, it recognised that individuals who form part of management of 
banks in which they also have equity ownership have a compelling business 
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interest to run them well. Such arrangements should be encouraged,
787
 but 
this will only be effective where the shareholders are active and corporate 
governance is observed because in a situation where shareholdings are used 
to encourage or cover up control fraud, the intentions of the Code are 
jeopardised. Therefore to achieve this, the Code limits government direct 
and indirect equity-holding in any bank to 10 per cent, while the equity-
holding of above 10 per cent by an investor is subject to the CBN’s prior 
approval.
788
 This is intended to curb government’s majority shareholding 
and to encourage more individual shareholdings. Perhaps it is perceived that 
where governments are majorly involved in banks, this may create a 
political control and an avenue for control frauds to occur.  
As seen in the chapter on CEOs, the majority involvement of government in 
the banks created intimate relationships between the CEOs and other 
members of the board and this medium was used to defraud the companies. 
Structural changes are also included in the Code to restore shareholders 
confidence and the application of corporate governance. One of the most 
important provisions of the Code is that the responsibilities of the chairman 
of the Board of Directors should be clearly separated from that of the head 
of management (MD/CEO) in such a way that no one individual/related 
party has unbridled powers of decision-making by occupying the two 
positions at the same time.
789
 The Code further stipulates that no one person 
should combine the post of Chairman/Chief Executive Officer of any bank. 
In furtherance of this provision, the Code also provides that no executive 
vice-chairman is recognised in the structure. In accordance with the 
provision of the Code, no two members of the same extended family should 
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occupy the position of chairman and that of CEO or Executive Director of a 
bank at the same time.
790
 
Owing to the passive nature of shareholders identified by the CBN above, 
the SEC introduced the Shareholders’ rights and responsibilities. 791  The 
SEC rules are intended to bring to the fore, the roles shareholders could play 
in preventing fraudulent activities in their companies and to serve as a 
guideline for shareholders. Although the effect of the rules can be said to be 
persuasive, credence is given to the provisions of CAMA and need not be 
repeated.
792
  
In effect, the rules were designed to create awareness to shareholders as a 
sort of ‘Know Your Rights’ mechanism to educate them, particularly 
minority and passive shareholders on the roles they could play in actually 
curtailing the excesses of the Board of Directors. This can be achieved 
during the general meetings; shareholders are therefore encouraged to take 
the attendance of annual general meetings very seriously as one of their 
major responsibilities and be aware this is an avenue to effectively exercise 
their rights. Another key responsibility of the shareholders is in taking 
interest in the implementation of the Codes of corporate governance. This 
means that shareholders should act as watchdogs over the managers of their 
companies, to guard against misfortunes and to safeguard their 
investments.
793
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8.5 Shareholder Primacy and Corporate Performance 
According to Abugu, shareholder interest is the principal means by which 
performance is assessed in corporate governance systems
794
. However, 
according to Blair, the notion that shareholder primacy should be based on 
the premise that directors and management must be accountable for 
shareholder value, failing which they cannot be held accountable at all is 
deeply flawed.
795
 Blair sees the notion of shareholder primacy as an issue 
only where corporate goals are being described in the light of 
maximization.
796
 However, most organizational theorists believe it may be 
difficult to determine what it means to ‘maximize’ business goals; therefore, 
economists have defined this to mean setting up challenging goals and 
trying to reach them.
797
 Economists’ theory of maximization thus believes in 
the use of economic model of human behaviour to improve corporate 
performance by providing managers and directors with high-powered 
incentives such as stock and stock options in order for them to maximize 
shareholder value.
798
  
As further explained by Blair, this conventional theory believes that unless 
directors and managers are closely monitored or given incentives to manage 
in the interest of the shareholders, they will always make decisions that will 
be for their own personal interest.
799
 This form of stock-options’ based 
compensation creates incentives for executives (stock option holders) to win 
big when the stock options go up and when stock options go down, rather 
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than being penalised, they are provided with even more stock options at a 
lower strike price which again serves as more motivation for executives to 
raise the stock price.
800
 This then leads executives to take very risky 
decisions knowing they stand to win where the decision succeeds and in the 
event of its failure, they lose nothing. Rather than focusing on overall 
corporate performance such as accountability and financial reporting, 
executives tend to focus on stock price and maximizing shareholder value. 
This has been identified as one of the major causes of the financial crisis.  
Accounting manipulation becomes a means to an end of raising the stock 
price and therefore enables executives to exercise their options favourably, 
also in the face of temptation to achieve favourable stock prices, however 
possible it can be. This is achieved in the form of earnings management. It 
is important to state that earnings management in itself is not a fraud, illegal 
earnings management, however is fraudulent. Earnings management is seen 
as a reasonable and legal management decision-making aimed at achieving 
stable and predictable financial results.
801
 Illegal earnings management on 
the other hand involves manipulating the financial results so that they do not 
reflect economic reality, a system commonly known as ‘cooking the 
books’802. This is where the fraud lies. Millon also examines the concept of 
earnings management.
803
 According to him, boosting stock prices should not 
involve earnings inflation; however, it is the thirst for consistent upward 
earnings that make companies understate or overstate their earnings.
804
 
Companies may therefore manipulate financial results to front performances 
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that really don’t exist. Many companies that go to lengths to present smooth 
earnings in this way get rewarded by the stock market with ‘predictability 
premium’.805 
Clearly, control fraud as a means of maximizing shareholder value using 
earnings management would be in the form of accounting fraud. Blair 
describes this as simply using the flexibility of accounting rules to smooth 
cash flow numbers.
806
 An example of stock price manipulation is seen in the 
case of Enron whereby in the last few years leading to its collapse, the 
company had indeed lost track of what goods or services it provided to the 
public and what its core values were. Rather, what was seen was a kind of 
trading activity which no one could really explain, but in reality turned out 
to be a high profile control fraud aimed at devising a system of growing 
revenues for the company in order to maintain a high stock price which in 
turn would mean fat pay cheques for the executives. It had also manipulated 
its balance sheets to conceal losses and engaged in accounting fraud. It is 
important to state that the effect of control fraud through accounting 
manipulation in a bid to maximize shareholder value also extends to 
competitive companies who feel pressured with the need to engage in high-
risk strategies in order to meet investor demands and expectations, and head 
off the threat of hostile takeover.
807
 
In the United Kingdom, it has been noted that the shareholder primacy 
model may have ironically contributed to unfair shares.
808
  The Bank of 
England’s executive director for financial stability, Andrew Haldane, in a 
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recent speech, challenged the efficacy of focus on shareholders. Haldane's 
argument goes as follows: 
‘Humans have problems deferring gratification. Given the 
choice between having something now or having a bit 
more later, we find it hard to wait. That goes for 
consumers, but it also goes for people who own and run 
companies. And if power resides with this particular 
group, what you get is widening inequality – because the 
fruits of a company's growth go disproportionately into 
raising executive pay and dividends, rather than into 
higher real earnings and investment. The shareholder 
model may, ironically, have contributed to unfair 
shares’809 
According to him, the problem of corporate governance in firms may be 
twofold. While some blame it on shareholders for demanding increasing 
short-term returns, others blame it on management for seeking short-term 
financial gain in order to maximise their compensation. It therefore becomes 
impossible to significantly distinguish the two. Haldane goes on to draw the 
inference that follows in that if impatient (money-scarce) individuals fail to 
sufficiently invest in skills, and impatient (short-termist) companies also fail 
to invest in capital, the result becomes weak capital accumulation, which 
will subsequently lead to weak long-term investment and skills deficits.  
Furthermore, in a country where shareholders are prioritised before interests 
of other stakeholders such as workers and suppliers are taken into 
consideration, the effect of power residing in one set of stakeholders who 
are short-termist would be high distribution of turnovers and profits rather 
than investing same or even distribution of same as wages. It is this 
inequality, that is, increase in executive and shareholder compensation at the 
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expense of real wage growth that according to Haldane might have 
contributed to unfair shares.
810
  Firms should therefore focus on all 
stakeholders rather than just shareholders in order to avoid the risk of future 
financial crisis. He goes further to call for reform of Britain’s corporate 
governance regime aimed at providing incentives for firms that focus on 
long-term value for a broader range of stakeholders.
811
 
8.6 Investigation of the role of Shareholders in the Banking Crisis 
The financial crisis of 2007 started in the United States in August 2007, 
spread to Europe by the first quarter of 2008 and became global by the 
fourth quarter of 2008. The global financial crisis adversely affected all 
sectors of the Nigerian economy, particularly the banking sector and 
Nigerian Capital Market.
812
 Subsequently, there was an immediate 
deterioration in value of assets owned by banks, which posed liquidity 
issues across the affected banks.  
The mandate of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) is derived from the 1958 
Act of Parliament, as amended in 2007.
813
 The CBN Act of 2007 of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria confers the overall control and administration 
of the monetary and financial sector policies of the Federal Government to 
the CBN. The CBN conducted special investigation on all the existing 24 
banks in Nigeria in 2009. It was not surprising that the investigations of the 
CBN confirmed peculiar challenges in the capital base requirements of these 
banks, owing to fraudulent practices and bad corporate governance.
814
 The 
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CBN also injected a total of N420billion ($2.8million) of government funds 
into five banks for stabilisation. 
815
 
The Nigerian banking sector underwent a consolidation through the 
acquisition of three banks by existing local players and a further three were 
nationalised by the National Deposit Insurance Company (NDIC) in 2011. 
The NDIC is an independent agency of the Nigerian Government that is 
responsible for protecting depositors and guaranteeing the settlement of 
insured funds when a deposit-taking financial institution can no longer 
repay their deposits. The NDIC established three bridge banks to take over 
the assets and liabilities of the three nationalised banks. The nationalisation 
of the three banks resulted in the creation of new banks, which were referred 
to as ‘bridge banks” and the delisting of the old banks from trading on the 
NSE.
816
 A breakdown of the shareholding structure of the banks shows that 
the former Spring Bank had 11.3 billion ordinary shares valued at 9.6billion 
naira, Afribank had 13.6 billion ordinary shares worth 9.49billion naira and 
Bank PHB had 20.2 billion ordinary shares put at 10.7billion naira.
817
 The 
CBN categorised the three banks as technically insolvent as at December 
2010.
818
 Subsequently, with the establishment of Asset Management 
Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) under the AMCON Act of 2010, the 
bridge banks were eventually sold to (AMCON) in 2011.
819
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Upon the acquisition of the three bridge banks by AMCON, many critics in 
Nigeria did not appreciate why CBN/NDIC took that decision. The ultimate 
losers in the banking crisis were investors who lost a significant amount of 
money at the NSE on a weekly basis. In one day, investors lost 
N141.96billion as the total value of all the shares listed at the Exchange 
dropped from N7.345trillion to N7.203trillion. Furthermore, the All Share 
Index dropped from 22,963.11 points to 22,519.32 points, a decline of 
nearly 1.93 per cent. The NSE Banking index also declined by 4.22 per 
cent; from 317.33 points to 303.93.
820
 This decrease was brought about by 
the massive decline in the share price of majority of the banks.
821
  
The question which then comes to mind is whether or not one or more of the 
shareholders could have been part of the activities that led to the banking 
crisis and problems in the NSE. Further questions to be asked would dwell 
on whether there might have been a collusion of majority shareholders and 
the CEOs in perpetrating the fraud. Evidence published by the CBN reveals 
that companies and individuals owe the five banks a total of 
N348.409billion.
822
 
In the investigation that follows, it will be seen that one major reason for 
shareholder apathy towards the activities that led to the crisis was the fact 
that the majority of the shareholders of the five banks were not only CEOs 
and Managing Directors of the banks, but also politicians, government 
officials and notable dignitaries. It is therefore not surprising that two 
presidents of the Nigerian Stock Exchange were listed by the CBN as major 
debtors in these banks and this includes Forbes-rated richest man in Africa, 
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Aliko Dangote,
823
 who, according to the CBN, has a non-performing loan of 
N2.5billion with Oceanic bank which was secured through Dangote 
Industries Limited.
824
 
8.6.1 The politics of control fraud 
In the periods leading to the crisis, politics and majority influence had 
impacted on corporate governance in banks. It becomes imperative to 
analyse the extent to which political influence and majority shareholding of 
government officials in collaboration with the CEOs led to non-performing 
loans and accounting manipulation, that is, control fraud that gave birth to 
the banking crisis of 2009. 
In October 2007, the EFCC published a list of five companies through 
which funds have been allegedly moved by the Delta State Governor, James 
Ibori.
825
 These are: Notore Chemical Industries (A fertilizer manufacturing 
company), OandO (Ocean and Oil Company), Celtel (A 
Telecommunications Company), Oceanic bank and Intercontinental bank as 
companies. This became a serious concern for the Commonwealth 
Development Corporation
826
 (CDC) because the allegations involved two of 
the CDC-backed private equity funds, that is, the Emerging Capital Fund 
(ECP) and the Ethos Fund. Both funds, which have invested in Nigerian 
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companies, were alleged to be ‘fronts’ for money-laundering by the then 
governor of the oil rich Delta state. As revealed in the EFCC affidavit 
published by The Street Journal
827
, the allegations brought against the 
former governor included illegally selling off Delta State’s assets to offset a 
private loan from Intercontinental bank and defrauding $290million 
(£196million) from Delta State. The Governor was also accused of his 
illegal dealings with both Intercontinental bank (where ECP had board 
representations) and Oceanic bank (where Ethos had board representations) 
were central to the charges.  
The London Metropolitan Police was notified by the EFCC as the former 
governor was at large and had previously had criminal records in the UK. 
The UK courts froze his assets in the UK to the tune of $35million and he 
was later arrested in May 2010, in Dubai, upon instructions by the London 
Metropolitan Police. 
Investigations by the EFCC also revealed a series of practices whereby the 
corruptly obtained funds from Intercontinental and Oceanic banks were 
laundered within Nigeria by the governor. These include: 
• selling national assets to their front-men, their associates or those close to 
them; 
• securing private loans from banks without collateral, in return for placing 
government funds with those banks; 
• diverting funds by moving them through a series of front companies from 
government accounts to personal or business accounts; and 
• using front-men to carry out inflated or privileged government contracts.828 
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Furthermore, it was revealed that the former governor allegedly used these 
Delta State shares in Oceanic bank as security for a loan from 
Intercontinental bank, after which he then sold the Oceanic bank shares 
illegally to repay the Intercontinental bank loan.
829
  
Two directors of the ECP banked companies, namely, Henry Imasekha and 
Michael Orugbo, were also alleged by the EFCC as ‘the characters moving 
funds in Celtel, Notore and OandO’. Also, the Ethos-backed current 
Director, Obden Ibru, together with Oceanic Bank’s director, Cecilia Ibru, 
(mother and son) were arrested in Nigeria as associates. Obden Ibru was 
also listed as non-executive director of the ECP-backed OandO.
830
 Both 
Intercontinental bank and Oceanic bank, where ECP and Ethos had board 
representation, were in distress in 2009 in which the CBN had to 
intervene.
831
 ECP invested in Notore through an offshore company, Notore 
Mauritius. ECP’s Executive chair, Thomas Gibian, allegedly acknowledged 
that most of Notore’s directors in Nigeria including Henry Imasekha owned 
shares in Notore through Notore Mauritius. According to the EFCC, this 
arrangement could have been devised by the directors to avoid payment of 
tax on their Notore investment. Furthermore, it may have also led them to 
present themselves as institutional shareholders also trading as foreign 
investors, owing to the fact that their investment comes from an offshore 
company despite the fact that they are themselves Nigerians. This 
arrangement may also have created several layers of hidden transactions that 
could cause confusion on the identity of Notore’s actual owners. 832For 
instance, the EFCC stated its concerns in 2007 of the fact that Michael 
Orugbo secured a loan from Oceanic bank, even though he had no previous 
relationship with the bank. Subsequently, following the CBN’s audit of the 
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five banks non-performing loans, Notore was listed by the CBN as Oceanic 
bank’s biggest debtor owing a total of N32,392,951.00 ($83,000,000).833 
Furthermore, Thomas Gibian was stated by the EFCC as a non-executive 
director and major shareholder of Intercontinental bank, reportedly 
appointed in 2007. The affidavit by the EFCC indicated illegal money 
transfer through ‘Intercontinental bank managers’ cheques’. In 2009 when 
the CBN conducted its investigations, the CEO of Intercontinental bank 
(among others) was sacked, while the executive directors and senior 
management were required to step down. The CBN Governor ascribed the 
breakdown of Intercontinental bank to poor corporate governance practices, 
lax credit administration and absence or non-adherence to the bank’s credit-
risk management process.
834
 Gibian was however not removed, as he was a 
‘non-executive’ director, and remained so. 
As regarding Oceanic bank, it was also discovered that Oceanic bank 
wholly owned OandO Networks, whose shares Henry Imasekha and Wale 
Tinubu (a family member of Bola Tinubu, the then Lagos State Governor) 
illegally sold to Delta State companies in 2007.
835
 It was later revealed that 
these shares were potentially held in a secret and illegal arrangement on 
behalf of Delta state governor. It is therefore not surprising that OandO was 
also listed by the CBN as one of the biggest debtors of Oceanic bank, 
bearing in mind that Obden Ibru (Cecilia Ibru’s son) is a non-executive 
director of both OandO and Oceanic bank.
836
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It was further revealed that Oceanic bank’s CEO held a total of N235billion 
shares, both in Oceanic bank as well as other banks and companies.
837
 These 
shares were held in the name of other companies, including Dangote Sugar 
Refinery, Glaxo SmithKline Consumer Plc, Nestle Plc, OandO Plc, African 
Petroleum Plc, Dangote Flour Plc and Unilever Nigeria Plc.  
Below is the list of the banks and amount of shares owned: 
First Bank - 272,795,139 
Access Bank - 44,800,000  
Fidelity Bank - 12,500  
First City Monument Bank - 7,142,800  
Guarantee Trust bank - 110,000 
Bank PHB - 93,800,100  
UBA- 109,121 
Union Bank - 13,300,000  
 Zenith Bank - 10.280million.
838
  
As earlier mentioned, these shares were held in the name of companies and 
not in her own name. For instance, the First Bank shares are held through 
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Cloudy Heights Limited, Circular Global International Limited and Bliss 
Bloss Integrated Services Limited.
839
  
Certainly, a family bank where the major shareholders are from the same 
family can easily falsify bank financial statements, grant non-performing 
loans, and divert funds for personal reasons among others. Cecilia Ibru, as 
the Managing Director/CEO of Oceanic bank, took advantage of the fact 
that the Ibru family has a majority share in the bank and her position to use 
depositors’ money to acquire properties840 all over the world and to buy 
shares in many companies.
841
 
It is therefore not surprising that the subsequent resolution that Oceanic 
bank be acquired by Ecobank was embraced by the shareholders, the 
majority of whom contributed to the collapse of the bank. In an 
Extraordinary General Meeting held with Ecobank on 23
rd
 December 2011, 
Oceanic bank approved the proposed resolution to merge both banks, 
transferring all assets, liabilities and undertakings of Oceanic bank, 
including real and intellectual property to Ecobank Nigeria.
842
 According to 
the Vanguard, the shareholders were to receive N16,111,111,111 billion 
new shares in Ecobank Nigeria, as well as transfer of assets, liabilities and 
undertakings of Oceanic bank to Ecobank. The shares were to be credited as 
fully paid-up and Oceanic bank shareholders were to be credited with N2, 
600,000,000 as deposits for shares in Ecobank, to be issued as equity at 
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N2.34 per Ecobank share which is to be agreed by the shareholders of both 
banks.
843
  
8.6.2  The case of Afribank 
While the case of Intercontinental bank and Oceanic bank can be said to be 
based on majority influence and political domination, which can be said to 
have been condoned perhaps by passive minority shareholders, Afribank 
reveals activism on the part of shareholders demanding for answers, 
although this activism was soon cut short. 
In the case of Afribank, now known as Mainstreet Bank Limited, upon the 
initial sacking of the CEOs of the five banks in 2009, some Afribank 
shareholders, in a bid to request the result of the special investigation 
conducted by the CBN,
844
 some Afribank shareholders had challenged the 
CBN’s action at the Federal High Court in Lagos where the Trial Judge, 
Justice James Tosho, held in a ruling that the CBN did not have the absolute 
power to hire or fire bank directors without disclosing findings of the so-
called ‘special examination’ conducted into the financial statements of these 
banks and their affected directors.
845
 The court further held that although the 
CBN had power to regulate and control the business activities of these 
banks under Section 35 of the BOFIA, disclosure should and must be made 
when such powers would substantially affect interested parties as in this 
case.
846
  
However, an appeal was launched by the CBN and its governor contending 
the decision, with a motion for stay of proceedings pending the 
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determination of the appeal. However, while the matter was still pending in 
the appeal court, the CBN, in collaboration with the Nigerian Deposits 
Insurance Commission (NDIC) and the Asset Management Corporation of 
Nigeria (AMCON) nationalised Afribank.
847
 The shareholders then filed a 
motion to nullify the nationalisation, claiming that it was done pending an 
appeal and also in disrespect to the court and that the CBN had filed the 
motion for stay of proceedings in order to frustrate the diligent prosecution 
of the case. 
The above scenario was further compounded when the CBN filed another 
suit at the Federal High Court in Lagos, winding up the bank. Justice 
Charles Archibong, in his decision, wound up Afribank on the ground that 
the bank had been delisted by the CBN and therefore had no licence to 
continue to operate.
848
 Further efforts of the shareholders to challenge the 
CBN proved abortive.
849
 
From the above, it can be said that the shareholders of Afribank were 
ignorant of the insider abuse and control fraud in the bank and the 
revelations of the CBN triggered their demand for questions. However, 
these attempts of shareholders to demand for answers have been frustrated 
and while it can be rightly said that the CBN acted ultra vires its powers in 
sacking the CEOs without publishing the results of its special investigations, 
and subsequently winding up the bank. The shareholders argued through 
their counsel, Mr Onyebuchi Aniakor, that the winding up order was made 
by Justice Archibong when the matter was stated for mention and not 
hearing.
850
 Furthermore, upon the winding up petition brought by the CBN, 
the shareholders had made a preliminary objection to the petition, claiming 
that there was a pending suit before Justice Tosho of the same court and also 
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arguing that the winding up petition is a calculated effort by the CBN to 
overreach the pending suit. What is surprising is that this preliminary 
objection was struck out by the court. A number of issues would arise, 
questioning the independence of the judiciary and the power and 
manipulation exhibited by the CBN. However it is to be noted that these 
issues would be analysed in detail in subsequent chapters as this chapter 
only focuses on shareholders.  
It suffices to say that the case of AfriBank contrasts with that of Oceanic 
Bank where the majority of the shareholders were involved in control fraud, 
hence the prompt decision to merge the bank. The case of AfriBank 
suggests that minority shareholders’ rights were not strong enough to create 
a dominant voice. Whether or not increasing the strength of minority 
shareholders will indeed prevent or reduce control fraud in Nigeria may not 
be known for certain, but it is important to say that since the banking crisis, 
positive attempts have been made to strengthen shareholders’ rights and 
responsibilities in Nigeria and this is elaborated below. 
8.6.3 Control fraud through rent seeking 
As revealed above, one major inhibition to effective corporate governance 
practice that led to the collapse of the 2009 bank in Nigeria include the fact 
that politicians were involved as shareholders and directors of some of the 
banks, such as the Delta State Governor, mentioned above It can therefore 
be said that political connections were used to obtain public-sector deposits. 
This is known as rent seeking. According to Krueger, rent seeking occurs in 
market-oriented economies with government restrictions in economic 
activities, whereby people compete for rents.
851
  
Krueger examines situation where rent seeking can be seen as competitive; 
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that is, in case of quantitative restrictions on international trade. According 
to him, although rent seeking may be seen as a legal and healthy 
competition, the problem arises when it is achieved through bribery, 
smuggling and corruption.
852
 As seen above, majority of the shareholders 
were from the public sector such as ministries and government bodies, most 
of the banks therefore rely on government for deposits, licenses and other 
favours and by so doing, they become indebted to the government.
853
  Due 
to political pressure, the banks may be forced to make illegal decisions that 
will generate future deposits from the majority shareholders. These include 
control fraud through collaborative embezzlement where government 
officials uses the bank to defraud the government transferring key accounts 
to specific banks with which they have worked out a profitable arrangement 
(as seen above).
854
  
A notable example is the case of Oceanic bank, where it was discovered that 
the bank (through its CEO) wholly owned a number of companies including 
OandO Networks and the CEO’s son, Obden Ibru was a non-executive 
director of both Oceanic bank and OandO, Subsequently, OandO illegally 
sold shares to a number of Delta State based companies in 2007.
855
 It was 
later revealed that these shares were potentially held in a secret and illegal 
arrangement on behalf of Delta state governor. It is therefore not surprising 
that OandO was also listed by the CBN as one of the biggest debtors of 
Oceanic bank, bearing in mind that Obden Ibru (Cecilia Ibru’s son) is a non-
executive director of both OandO and Oceanic bank.
856
 This is a good 
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illustration of control fraud due to rent seeking, particularly where majority 
shareholders are very influential public sector personalities. This 
collaborative form of control fraud is usually shielded from minority 
shareholders and the general public during general meetings. 
8.7 Shareholder Activism in Nigeria 
Corporate governance embodies the totality of systems by which companies 
are directed and controlled
857
 and this involves promoting fairness, 
accountability and transparency within the organisation, the frictions that 
arise due to this are sometimes expressed through shareholder activism.  
Adegbite et al. consider the extent to which a country’s local shareholder 
activism is a reflection of its brand of politics.
858
 They describe shareholder 
activism as a corporate governance accountability mechanism, whether at 
the managerial or board level.
859
  Shareholder activism consists of a variety 
of activities through which shareholders influence the management and 
board. This can be in the form of meetings, letter writing or associations as 
the case may be.
860
 Gillian and Starks consider a shareholder activist as an 
investor who, thorough his voice, endeavours to change situations of 
concern, while not necessarily resulting to change in the firm’s control.861 
There is no gainsaying that shareholder activism is jurisdiction-based and 
rationales for shareholder activism differ according to countries. However, 
contrary to the general view that shareholder activism is driven by the desire 
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to maximize shareholders’ wealth, there is evidence to suggest that the need 
for responsible ownership is a driving force to shareholder activism.
862
 
Following the banking crisis in Nigeria, coupled with the activities of the 
CBN, CEOs and the threat of collapse of the Nigerian Stock Exchange, 
shareholders have been awakened to their rights and responsibilities. A 
number of shareholder associations have been developed by shareholders as 
avenues for exercising their rights as a group. These include Proactive 
Shareholder Association, the Nigerian Shareholders’ Solidarity Association 
and the Independent Shareholders’ Association of Nigeria. This is seen as a 
positive step towards shareholder involvement in companies. 
One case of shareholder activism saw the President of the Progressive 
Shareholders Association, Mr. Boniface Okezie, suing the CBN
863
 to 
declare the cost to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the Government 
and people of Nigeria so far of the banking reforms instituted by the CBN, 
and particularly, the total cash and value of properties recovered from 
Oceanic bank’s former CEO, the whereabouts of the money and properties, 
and what part of this cash and properties has been returned to Oceanic bank 
and/or its shareholders. Honourable Justice M.B. Idris ruled that the CBN 
should provide information within 72 hours of the total cash and value of 
properties recovered from Oceanic bank’s CEO, the whereabouts of the 
money and properties, and what part of this cash and properties has been 
returned to Oceanic bank and/or its shareholders.
864
 The action taken by the 
President of the shareholder association shows that shareholder activism is 
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really thriving in Nigeria. Following the banking crisis, corporate 
governance regulations now make provisions for shareholders involvement 
in banks.
865
  
Having said that, mention must also be made that shareholder activism in 
Nigeria has been influenced by the political culture of the country. The 
problem of corruption has been a problem since inception and has remained 
endemic even in the corporate sector. Adegbite et al, in their survey of the 
politics of shareholder activism in Nigeria, also considered the link between 
politics and pursuit of corporate interests and found that companies bidding 
for government contracts are forced to play by the rule of politicians.
866
 The 
success of any business is therefore dependent upon its level of political will 
and support. Adegbite el al also suggested that even though shareholders 
can propose resolutions at meetings, due to the level of corruption in 
society, leaders of shareholder associations are prone to bribes in order to 
inappropriately support management. A lack of information, shareholder 
apathy and a weak judicial system for shareholders to seek redress are other 
reasons attributed by Adegbite et al.
867
  
Going back to the case of Afribank’s shareholders, the level of political and 
power influence utilised to frustrate shareholder activism is shocking. While 
shareholders are constantly demanding accountability and transparency of 
directors, management and regulatory bodies, their activities are constantly 
undermined even at the judiciary l level where justice is meant to be done. 
That notwithstanding, there is also a fundamental problem of misconception 
and misuse of shareholder activism by members to the extent that they are 
gradually being conceived as a threat to the organisations’ day-to-day 
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management.
868
 This is based on the manner by which shareholder 
associations tend to comport themselves in the exercise of their rights, such 
as bullying and boycotting of AGMs. Commenting on this, Adegbite et al 
noted that some members of shareholder associations have expressed their 
concern on the way some of their members conduct themselves through 
negative publicity arising from threats and disruptions of meetings.
869
  
Perhaps this action is triggered out of frustration and as a means of a cry for 
help, but to whom? 
8.8 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter examined Nigeria’s shareholding structure and investigates the 
activities of shareholders in the banking crisis. It can be said that although 
adequate legal provisions exists in the CAMA and SEC Code for 
Shareholders as to educate shareholders of their rights and responsibilities, it 
was not until the crisis that shareholders actually became aware of  these 
rights.  They can therefore be said to have been more concerned with the 
financial turnovers of the company as opposed to activities of the board, 
thus, providing a perfect environment for control fraud.  
While it can be said that large shareholders will be more likely to make use 
of their voting power to influence managerial behaviour in their favour, 
through their voting rights and subsequently create an avenue to perpetrate 
fraud,
870
, it can also be said on the other hand, that there is a proposition that 
large shareholders will exercise more effective corporate governance, by 
way of monitoring the activities of the management and it has found support 
from a host of studies on developed market economies. This is exemplified 
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by a study of German Private Enterprises, which discovered that 
concentrated share ownership is associated with high rates of turnover of 
directors.
871
  
Vishny et al. are of the view that high concentration could reduce agency 
costs since it could serve as a substitute for legal protection. Even in the 
absence of strong legal institutions, large investors have the means and the 
incentives to monitor managers, though they bear the cost of undiversified 
risk. However, the problem here is that large shareholders may use their 
control rights to circumvent minority interests;
872
 and this is the case in 
Nigeria where large shareholders would rather use their vantage position to 
enrich themselves by engaging in sharp practices such as insider trading, 
issuance of non-performing loans, money-laundering and other illicit 
banking activities.  
Although there is no consensus yet as to how ownership concentration 
impacts on performance,
873
 Holderness and Sheehan, on their part, 
discovered little evidence showing that high ownership concentration 
directly affects performance of a company.
874
 However, as shown in 
Oceanic bank, where family ownership led to laxity on the part of the 
shareholders, majority shareholders’ actions negatively affected the 
performance of these banks. 
Furthermore, in Nigeria, where directors, who are also shareholders, are 
charged with the responsibility of managing a bank, the potential of 
incessant squabbles and political patronage at the detriment of the banks 
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tend to rise, thus paving the way for frauds to be perpetrated.
875
  
In Nigeria, it can be said that concentrated shareholdings contributed to the 
banking crisis. It is therefore suggested that shareholdings should be 
dispersed rather than concentrated. This is due to underlying problems in the 
country such as political influence and corruption. Majority shareholdings 
will pave the way for fraud in a country where corruption is endemic. It is 
therefore hoped that the Code of Corporate Governance aimed at prohibiting 
majority shareholdings over 10%, as discussed above, may help solve the 
problem of government concentration, but what about individual 
concentration, especially where majority shares are held in the name of 
family members or even companies that cannot easily be linked to one 
person? It suffices to say that the problem of concentrated shareholdings in 
Nigeria may not easily be solved by merely changing the rules, but by 
making sure background checks are made for potential shareholders.  
Despite the legal rules in place emphasising shareholders’ voting rights and 
also prohibiting management agenda control, shareholder activism in 
Nigeria is still emerging and it can be said that under a more facilitating 
regulatory and judicial environment, associations might do much more. In 
2007, shortly before the crisis, SEC published a Code of Conduct for 
Shareholders Associations to ‘ensure the highest standard of conduct 
amongst association members and the companies with whom they interact 
as bona fide shareholders’. 876  The code was designed to ensure that 
association members uphold high ethical standards and make positive 
contributions in ensuring that the affairs of public companies are run in an 
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ethical and transparent manner and also in compliance with the Code of 
Corporate Governance for public companies.
 877
 The Code encouraged 
shareholders to attend meetings regularly either in person or through their 
proxy and should maintain decorum during meetings.
878
 
The Code particularly stresses that Shareholder associations should promote 
good governance of their companies. They should also help to influence 
corporate governance policies that encourage investment and promote the 
interest of shareholders and shareholder value.
879
 Clearly the Code was not 
enough to prevent the 2009 banking crisis. Shareholder education and 
involvement in banks remained minimal up until the banking crisis. Again, 
as stressed in earlier chapters, the problem cannot be said to be lack of 
adequate regulation, but enforcement and compliance to existing 
regulations. While shareholders are being provided with the rules, little or 
nothing was done to actually educate them on the existence of these rules 
and here lies the problem. 
Furthermore, a number of shareholder associations have developed a list of 
problems encountered by shareholders, which can be said to be contributory 
factors to the crisis experienced in the corporate economy. 
Their findings were published by the House of Representatives Report of 
the Ad hoc committee on the investigation into the near collapse of the 
Nigerian Capital Market, most of which are highlighted below:
880
 
- Manipulation of the market using delisted companies 
- Regulatory failure of the financial sector regulators 
- Sensitive banking reforms 
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- Investors’ ignorance 
- Lack of co-ordinated relationship between shareholders and the SEC 
- Corporate failure in the institutional and governance structure of the 
Securities and    Exchange Commission 
- The Nationalisation of Shareholders Investments in Afribank, Bank 
PHB and Spring Bank. 
- Overriding influence of the CBN Governor on the financial sector. 
(The Governor is the de facto head of SEC, NSE and the Chief Executive 
Officer of the banks) 
- Enforcement failure 
The Committee, while evaluating the issues listed above highlighted by the 
associations, noted that: 
‘The uninformed investors provided a vacuum pump that 
the operators and regulators used to effect a sustained 
share price manipulation. On the part of the financial 
system, it appears that there were only two attributes of 
emergent regulatory environment: corruption or 
incompetence either is bad for the financial system... The 
associations believe that as things go wrong in the 
financial system, the government remained a mere 
observer’881 
The above quote from the House of Representatives suggests that 
shareholder associations believe that their ignorance and incompetence 
opened the way for corruption and fraud, and the government merely 
watched. It is therefore important that shareholders are actively aware of 
their rights and responsibilities and take steps towards preventing an avenue 
for perpetration of fraud. This can be in the form of attending meetings and 
                                                          
881
 Ibid 13 
 298 
 
asking questions where necessary. Shareholders should not only be 
concerned with dividends and profits. The need for shareholder associations 
therefore becomes important to help promote healthy activism within the 
country. 
Although, it can be said that effective shareholder activism could promote 
corporate governance, while shareholder activism tends to be emerging and 
should be encouraged, concentrated shareholdings, coupled with the level of 
corruption and power influence exhibited during the banking crisis, suggests 
a more institutionalised problem in the country. 
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Chapter 9 
Can Corporate Governance Regulations Help Prevent 
Control Fraud in Nigerian Banks? The Way Forward 
9.1 Introduction 
This thesis aimed at investigating control fraud in Nigerian banks using the 
2009 banking crisis as a case study. The thesis linked corporate governance 
regulations pre and post- banking crisis to the role of various actors and 
sought to examine whether or not there existed adequate legal and policy 
regulations that could have prevented the fraud. The chapter on corporate 
governance regulations indicated a number of problems such as duplication 
and inconsistency; This would then suggest that prevention of control fraud 
is not in itself determined by the provision of adequate corporate regulation 
but also requires other structures and the contribution of a range of 
stakeholders and other actors which together should help to prevent future 
control frauds in Nigeria. 
Having established that, it is the focus of this chapter to propose 
recommendations that can help prevent future control frauds in Nigerian 
banks. In doing this, the chapter will recap the major issues explored in the 
course of this thesis for the purpose of suggesting recommendations. The 
chapter starts from the premise that fraud is endemic, especially in a country 
like Nigeria, and that it is therefore impossible to completely eradicate fraud 
in Nigerian banks. What can be seen, however, is that a substantial 
reduction in control fraud could be achieved if various bodies are reformed 
so that they are more likely to contribute to this goal; therefore, because 
corporate actors are important factors in control fraud, any attempt to 
prevent or reduce control fraud in Nigerian banks should include an attempt 
to examine the role of stakeholders and other corporate actors in the 
prevention of control frauds. Furthermore, the chapter also discusses 
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contributions to theory, policy and practice in the light of the 
recommendations proposed. 
 
The thesis concludes that eradicating control fraud requires teamwork, and 
that each actor in corporate governance should contribute to this, with no 
single body saddled with the sole responsibility of ensuring good corporate 
governance. It is very important that the system should be coherent. 
Furthermore, the peculiarity of jurisdictions will mean that some aspects of 
corporate governance regulation in any economy should be culture-specific. 
In the case of Nigeria, this implies a number of things, including the need to 
eradicate or reduce corruption, educate major corporate actors and most 
importantly, improve enforcement mechanisms.  
 
In order to propose recommendations, it is important to reiterate the two 
major challenges of corporate governance and control fraud that have been 
identified throughout the course of this research; these are institutional 
corruption and the problem of enforcement. The sections that follow recap 
these two challenges and set out recommendations for reform. 
9.2  Corporate Governance Regulation in Nigeria: A problem of 
Enforcement? 
It is important to reiterate that the issue of enforcement is one of great 
concern, especially in a developing country like Nigeria. The nature of the 
country’s corporate environment, which has been polluted with corruption 
and political influence, remains a hindrance to good corporate governance 
and economic development in the country, and has also opened the way for 
control fraud in Nigerian banks. The main objective of this thesis was to 
investigate Nigeria’s corporate governance regulation in the wake of the 
2009 banking crisis and to assess whether or not regulation can help prevent 
future control frauds in Nigerian banks. The preceding chapters began with 
an expository of the nature of control fraud in Nigeria, followed by the role 
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of active participants in control fraud. Enforcement as a problem was 
mentioned throughout the course of this research. It is an endemic 
regulatory problem in Nigeria which mere legal provisions cannot seem to 
solve. It is worth recapping the provisions relating to enforcement, 
compliance and sanctions for the purposes of this section. The issue of 
provision of sanctions and compliance will only arise in a mandatory code. 
A voluntary code will be merely persuasive in encouraging companies to 
adopt and practice its principles but will impose no sanctions for non-
compliance. Needless to say, the SEC code has no compliance procedures in 
place.  
 
The 2006 CBN code merely provides that compliance is mandatory but fails 
to provide how compliance shall be monitored. The code provides in 
Section 6.1.4 that false rendition of accounts to the CBN shall attract a stiff 
sanction of fine plus suspension of the CEO for six months in the first 
instance, and removal and blacklisting in the second, whilst the defaulting 
staff would be referred to a professional body for investigation.
882
These 
compliance provisions seem quite weak to the extent that the CBN has not 
put in place any system for monitoring rendition to the CBN. As discussed 
in the previous chapter on CBN, using fines to ensure compliance is 
inadequate in a country with institutional corruption because control 
fraudsters will be quick to bypass regulatory measures, knowing they can 
always get away with a fine. 
 
Furthermore, the problem of regulatory enforcement in the periods before 
the crisis saw a wave of control frauds that were swept under the carpet. 
Lack of adequate regulatory enforcement paved the way for the massive 
control frauds of 2009. A number of enforcement failures discussed in this 
research are recapped below: 
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First is the judiciary. It is important to also note the problem associated with 
the judiciary and how Nigeria’s political environment has been used to 
influence the CBN’s intervention during the crisis. Although legal action 
was jointly taken by the CBN and the EFCC, to date, only one of the five 
cases has been decided in Nigeria. The rest of the executives have fled the 
country or escaped trial on medical grounds. 
As seen in the chapter on the CBN, the only trial that has been concluded in 
Nigeria is that of Mrs Cecilia Ibru who entered into a plea bargain where 
she pleaded guilty in order to have her sentences run simultaneously. In this 
regard, she was sentenced to 6 months in prison for three counts and she 
only had to serve one term of six months. This does not seem adequate 
compared to the crimes she had committed. Perhaps the leniency of her 
punishment may be due to her political connections. 
That notwithstanding, other cases remain pending. Perhaps some have been 
swept under the carpet. The slow and time-consuming pace of the judiciary 
can be seen as a deliberate measure either by the CEOs themselves or even 
the judiciary, as an act of corruption. 
It is important to reiterate the statement of Sanusi when he talked about the 
problem of vested interests in Nigeria: 
‘For the second CEO, we finished our case, established in 
Nigeria – we had a civil case in the UK, we had a criminal 
case in Nigeria – established the case… two weeks before 
the closing statements were made the judge was 
miraculously promoted to the Federal Court of 
Appeal. After three years of trial at the very end of trial! 
Because someone, a very popular religious leader with 
hundreds of thousands of supporters, carried into political 
authorities, and the system that was supposed to protect 
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depositors and handle criminals was used and manipulated 
to promote a judge so that he would not convict a thief’.883 
This reveals a fundamental judicial problem in the country. It is important 
that the judiciary is independent and conducts itself in a free and fair 
manner. The judiciary has been politically manoeuvred for the benefits of 
the CEOs who use their affiliations to elude themselves from being 
convicted. 
Furthermore, the cases of Afribank and Union Bank discussed in the 
previous chapter also revealed the judicial manipulation that exists in the 
country. As examined in the case of Afribank, there was duality of 
proceedings brought to court at the same time; yet all efforts by 
shareholders notifying the court of this duality proved abortive. The 
judiciary was seen to have disregarded all the cries of the shareholders and 
ultimately carried out a miscarriage of justice when it struck out preliminary 
objections brought by the shareholders. Issues regarding judicial 
independence cannot be ruled out in Nigeria as power and manipulation 
become more evident on a daily basis. 
Another enforcement failure lies in the regulatory power of the CBN. 
Although this has been dealt with in chapter six, it is however important to 
stress that the lack of co-ordination among the CBN and other regulatory 
agencies such as the SEC is an issue that calls for urgent attention if future 
control fraud is to be prevented. As a regulator, the CBN could have done 
more to prevent the crisis. Certainly apart from its own internal 
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disorganisation within the CBN, it also granted most of these banks use of 
the Discount window over and over again. 
While it can be said that the CBN might have indeed been a victim of the 
fraud as bad loans were fronted to the CBN in order to obtain money, 
however, as a regulator the CBN ought to have suspected banks that were 
excessively using this discount window. Adequate procedures ought to have 
been in place that would have flagged up banks that kept coming back to the 
CBN for financial assistance because this raised a suspicion of insolvency 
rather than illiquidity. A well-regulated system would take time to look at 
the books even after the financial assistance has been provided so that it 
could satisfy itself of the legality and quality of the loans owed to the bank. 
Regular inability of borrowers to repay these loans should have meant that 
the bank had to be specially investigated. 
Furthermore, the enactment of a new code, that is the 2014 CBN Code, took 
five years after the crisis. But is this new Code the solution? As noted in 
chapter five on corporate governance regulation, regulatory multiplicity 
itself creates ambiguity and an opportunity for even more control fraud. It 
might be suggested that it would have been better to reinforce the previous 
code in terms of enforcement rather than introduce a new comprehensive 
code which on the face of it may look promising but it may only be a matter 
of time until the country witnesses another set of control fraud. It therefore 
suffices to say that what is needed is a set of enforcement mechanisms for 
the existing codes. The enforcement strategies should first take into account 
the peculiarity of Nigeria as a country with institutional challenges and then 
consider banks as a specific type of entity with unique corporate governance 
mechanisms in order to proffer solutions that can help prevent future control 
frauds in Nigerian banks. 
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9.3 Control Fraud: An Institutional Problem of Corruption 
As noted by Adegbite, corruption has traditionally been at the centre of 
corporate governance regulation in Nigeria (and Nigerian banks) and 
became a way of life since the country’s independence from Britain.884  
It is important to mention that although Nigeria’s corporate sector is 
regulated through a combination of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 
(CAMA) and Corporate Governance Codes, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) stresses that effective corporate governance rests 
ultimately with the CEO and board of directors and there is need to improve 
board competence and integrity, especially in their relationship with other 
actors such as the shareholders and audit committee.
885
 SEC further adds 
that the problem of fraud in Nigerian Plc’s can be linked to a series of 
underlying problems such as opaque regulations, weak enforcement 
mechanisms and lack of checks and balances indicating that Nigeria’s 
corporate governance is still at a rudimentary stage with only about 40% of 
public limited companies following Corporate Governance Regulations.
886
 
As we have seen, the banking sector is not immune from this high level of 
corruption. This research investigated the high profile cases of CEOs of five 
banks who were able to behave in a corrupt manner in their banks for a 
number of years. It should be stressed that control fraud is an opportunistic 
type of fraud which uses ongoing deficiencies to manipulate situations. As 
predators, they ‘spot and attack’ human regulatory weaknesses to their 
advantage. They cause the firm to invest in transactions that are adequate for 
perpetration of fraud. These are transactions with readily unascertainable 
market values and utilise professionals as superior vehicles, flaunting 
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themselves as legitimate leaders, while moving the company to the best 
level suitable for weak regulation and accounting fraud. According to Black: 
‘Audacious control frauds transform the environment to 
aid their frauds. The keys are to protect and even expand 
the range of accounting abuses to weaken regulation. Only 
a control fraud can use the full resources of the company 
to change the environment... control frauds use the 
company’s resources to buy, bully, bamboozle, or bury the 
regulators.’887  
Skilful concealment is also utilised to perpetrate the fraud and it commonly 
involves manipulation of ‘cut off’ procedures, which are laid down as a 
means of checks and balances to ensure correlation between purchase 
records and stocks following the end of an accounting period.
888
 In effect, 
the aim is to ‘bolster’ or ‘shore-up’ a company in an unsecure financial and 
managerial position as a tool for maintaining confidence of shareholders, 
creditors and investors.
889
 In a corrupt environment, financial manipulation 
becomes almost normal.  
Furthermore, according to Yakasai: 
‘The complexity and trouble with most banks in Nigeria is 
that the directors work to the answer, mark their own 
examination scripts, score themselves distinctions and 
initiate the applause. But to the stakeholders (especially 
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the equity owners), the excellent report sheets are openly 
fudged or at best engineered and indeed the activities of 
the board are so varied and deceptively intractable that the 
more critically you look, the less you see.’890 
The institutional nature of corruption is endemic in the country. From day-
to-day activities to big financial transactions, every sector of the economy 
has been badly polluted with corrupt practices and the banking sector is not 
left out. Right from independence, Nigeria suffered from bad political 
administration where government officials converted the country’s wealth to 
their own pockets. The country witnessed a series of military rule before 
1999 when democracy was introduced. The period between 1999 to date, 
which is meant to be a civilian/democratic government, has seen even more 
political and economic corruption and one wonders whether Nigeria is 
actually benefiting from democracy. 
9.4 Nigeria: A Country of Vested Interests? 
The years that followed the banking crisis saw a number of issues unfold in 
the country. It is important to note that the two major sectors affected by the 
crisis are the banking and oil and gas sector. While this thesis focuses on the 
banking sector, it is necessary to mention that the CBN governor also 
carried out investigations on the oil and gas sector and revealed a series of 
corrupt practices that were and are still prevalent in the country. Attempts to 
bring the fraudsters to book saw the removal of the CBN governor who was 
first suspended in February 2014 and subsequently sacked. 
Why then did the CBN Governor get sacked? A number of questions arose 
following the activities of the president. The Governor challenged his 
suspension at the time but obviously, this did not stop him from getting 
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sacked. Perhaps the revelations of the CBN Governor led to his being 
removed from office.  
Although a lot of concerns have been raised on the underlying problems of 
the CBN and the reasons why the CBN might have failed as a regulatory 
body, thereby paving the way for control fraud, it is important to say that it 
is impossible for one single person to reform a system. Perhaps that is the 
problem faced by Sanusi. Shortly before his suspension, he had delivered a 
speech where he talked about overcoming the fear of vested interests and 
examined how vested interests are killing Nigeria.
891
  
According to him: 
‘We must recognize that at the heart of the problem of 
Nigeria, at the heart of ninety per cent of our issues – from 
Boko Haram, to religious crisis, to ethnic crisis to 
unemployment, to the lack of education, to the lack of 
health care – is that there are people who profit from the 
poverty and underdevelopment of this country. And these 
people are called Vested Interests’.892 
Sanusi shared his experience in the banking and oil and gas industry. Some 
of his findings have been explained in this chapter and previous chapters. 
Particularly, he talked about how the banking industry was polluted by the 
time he assumed office. He mentioned the level of corruption in the banking 
industry. According to him, the CEOs in 2009 had become untouchable, 
having both political and economic powers. They therefore believed no one 
could touch them, and people (including the CBN) were scared of 
challenging them in fear of getting sacked.
893
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These are the people who he calls ‘Vested Interests’. They were simply 
defrauding money from their banks and using it to purchase properties 
across the world. Sanusi further stated that the banks that they saved during 
the crisis had a total of about eight million customers with about N4.4trillion 
($2.4billion) in deposits.
894
 According to him, the eight million people 
consist of dedicated old people who had saved their money for 40-50 years 
only to find out one day that their money was gone. He also referred to civil 
servants who had worked for 35-40 years to save money for their pension, 
medical bills, school fees of their children and then woke up to realise that 
the bank has failed.
895
 
Sanusi further stated that: 
‘When people say banks have failed, it’s like saying a man 
whose throat has been slit and you say the man died. He 
did not die, he was killed. And those that murder the 
banks, those that destroy these deposits have always 
walked away. They become senators. They become 
governors. They become captains of industry. They set up 
new banks and they continue, forgetting the millions of 
poor people who don’t have a voice. That’s it! Nobody 
knows the number of Nigerians who have died from failed 
banks because they were sick and could no longer pay 
their medical bills because the money was locked up in a 
bank that has failed. Nobody knows the number of 
children whose parents could very well afford to pay their 
school fees who had to drop out of school because banks 
were mismanaged’.896 
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According to him, Nigeria lacks development because vested interests 
continue to rob the country of their assets. He believes that the only way 
Nigeria can move forward is to stop complaining and start working towards 
overcoming the fear of vested interests. He further explained that the master 
minders of these frauds are not very intelligent people, they are not to be 
feared and they have two powers only. First is ‘How much do you want?’ 
and if you refuse their bribe, they say ‘I’m going to destroy you.’897 
It can be said that the speech of the CBN governor is very rich in divulging 
the activities of Nigerian elites, who have contributed to the 
underdevelopment and corruption of the country. This shows that control 
fraud in the banking sector is but one of the series of frauds in the country. 
The question then is whether Nigeria can be purged of vested interests. Can 
these people be brought to book? Perhaps a good starting point is an attempt 
by every individual to participate in contributing their own share of 
promoting a corruption-free society. For the banking sector, this would 
mean that each corporate participant should strive to work towards 
promoting effective corporate governance and ultimately help to reduce the 
likelihood of future control frauds in the country. 
9.5 Recommendations for Reform 
As seen throughout the course of this thesis, the level of corruption and 
fraud in Nigerian banks remain a reflection of the economic and socio-
political environment. Nigeria as a whole is troubled with endemic 
corruption in all spheres of life, together with lawlessness and nepotism 
which could expose the corporate world and banking sector to corruption. It 
is good practice that potential investors satisfy themselves of the existence 
of strong business environment before any financial commitment. They 
therefore assess political, business and financial risks involved. Countries 
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that fail to pass this obviously lose trade and attraction in trade and 
investment, having failed to establish standards of transparency, fairness and 
accountability which are the themes of good corporate governance.   
Observance of sound corporate governance principles by Nigerian banks 
will promote efficiency, transparency, responsible and accountable banks 
and will ultimately control fraud.  
 
In view of this, two major recommendations are suggested:  
 
1. Given that the problem of regulatory multiplicity of 
corporate governance regulation creates opportunity for the 
perpetration of control fraud, it is recommended that 
regulatory bodies such as the CBN and SEC work together in 
the co-ordination of corporate governance codes to the effect 
that it gives one voice of unity and promotes teamwork in 
order to prevent future control frauds in Nigeria. 
2.  
2.  Given that the codes in themselves are not enough to enforce effective 
corporate governance practices and reduce control fraud in the banking 
industry; it becomes imperative for each corporate actor to actively 
participate in enforcement of corporate governance codes and standards 
targeted towards fraud prevention and control in the Nigerian banking 
industry. 
 
In this regard, a further set of recommendations is highlighted below: 
 CEOs should be adequately educated and empowered as main agents 
in both corporate governance and control fraud. It is important that 
CEOs are provided with adequate resources and trainings, 
particularly on fraud prevention and effective corporate governance 
that would be useful in their role as CEO.  
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 Regulators, mainly the CBN should educate all corporate actors, 
namely CEOs, auditors, shareholders and even employees on the 
importance of promoting corporate governance regulation in Nigeria 
and emphasizing the need to work as a team in order to reduce 
control fraud in the country. 
 The regulatory powers of the CBN and SEC should be strengthened 
in their supervisory oversight of banks. The CBN in particular 
should provide for a more effective licensing and monitoring 
strategy for banks, which should be strictly implemented, with the 
aim of enforcing corporate governance regulation in Nigeria and 
ultimately preventing future control frauds. 
 Shareholders should be particularly educated to be actively involved 
and encouraged to participate in promoting effective corporate 
governance through attending of meetings and showing interest in 
the management of the company by asking questions where 
necessary and also educating them on ways to seek redress. 
 Regulators should work together to harness their codes. The 
irregularities in codes should be addressed in order to prevent an 
avenue for future control frauds in the country. 
 Corporate governance regulation should provide for personal 
liability of auditors as is the case with CEOs. This should create a 
sit-tight position for auditors in Nigeria. 
 Independence of auditors (internal and external) and sub-committees 
should be promoted and other actors such as shareholders and other 
stakeholders should ensure that auditor independence is enforced in 
banks. 
 Provision of non-audit services should be prohibited and this 
prohibition should be adequately enforced. At the very least there 
should be a requirement of detailed disclosure of the provision of 
non-audit services to audit clients, including the cost of those 
services in comparison to the cost of audit services. 
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 The number of independent non-executive directors should be 
increased. More independent directors should be involved on the 
board. There should be a clear and coherent definition of 
independence. Directors might be required to make statutory 
declarations of independence, with sanctions where those 
declarations are proven to be false. Consideration should be given to 
granting the CBN to vet the board’s nominees. Shareholder 
associations might also be given the right to appoint an independent 
director. 
 Strategic judicial reforms should be made by parliament to promote 
judicial independence and facilitate faster determination of control 
fraud cases. 
9.6  The role of each actor in ensuring good corporate governance 
The subsections that follow will make specific recommendations for the role 
of each actor in enforcing corporate governance in order to prevent future 
control frauds. 
9.6.1 The CBN 
As recalled throughout this thesis, a large percentage of control fraud is 
blamed on the CBN’s lack of regulatory oversight, especially in the access 
to the discount window. As a way forward, it is recommended that the CBN 
allows greater transparency and more disclosure. This is in a bid to erase the 
on-going doubts on its integrity.  
Throughout this thesis, emphasis is placed on the failure of the CBN to 
publish the results of its special investigation conducted in 2009, which 
resulted in the removal of the CEOs of the five banks. The CBN was 
ordered by the court under the Freedom of Information Act to produce this 
information but yet refused and is still refusing to date. Nigerians are left to 
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wonder if and why the investigation took place at the time it did.  It is 
important to mention that over emphasizing the CBN’s refusal to produce 
the said documents will not yield any answers. What should be stressed 
however is the future of the CBN. The CBN has itself acknowledged 
regulatory failure; therefore a way forward is what is needed in the fight to 
prevent future control frauds.  
Firstly, the CBN should draw more focus on its own internal control, 
particularly its licensing and scrutinizing regime. Banks should be 
thoroughly scrutinized as part of their registration process. Proper and 
stricter background checks and due processes should be followed before 
registration of banks. Furthermore, it is very important to reiterate that the 
CBN admitted during its presentations to the committee that part of the 
problems during the crisis was that the banks were in the habit of producing 
inaccurate (but audited) financial statements to the CBN of which it was 
ignorant.
898
 This creates some possibilities: corruption or incompetence due 
to lack of adequate resources. If the CBN was unaware of this, then it can be 
said that perhaps it lacks adequate mechanisms to detect the fraud. As a way 
forward, it is therefore proposed that the CBN should be adequately 
resourced, first with strict scrutinizing regime to license banks, and second, 
with appropriate mechanisms to scrutinize financial statements presented by 
banks and in the case of EDW, there should be more clarity regarding what 
is accepted as collateral for the discount window and the CBN should be 
required to verify the legality or otherwise of these collaterals. The whole 
essence is to prevent future control frauds in banks. It is therefore 
recommended that the CBN should develop adequate enforcement 
mechanisms for compliance to the rules in place regarding the EDW. 
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Investigation Into The Near Collapse Of The Nigerian Capital Market, Resolution NO 
(HR70/2012) at p. 66. 
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Furthermore, the CBN should be adequately resourced to participate in the 
appointment of independent directors of banks by vetting nominees selected 
by the board. Independent directors as the name suggests must be 
independent of any affiliations with the bank that could pave way for the 
perpetration of control fraud; this is important if the CBN is to curb 
fraudulent activities such as excessive use of the discount window and 
granting of unsecured loans by the bank which are signs that control fraud 
are taking place. By participating in the selection process for independent 
directors, the CBN is, among other things, playing its role in promoting 
effective corporate governance and ultimately reducing the likelihood of 
future control frauds in Nigerian banks. 
Lastly, it is also recommended that a Code of conduct should be in place 
that would require the CBN to make public matters that relate to the public, 
especially issues of control fraud. The CBN should also have guidelines for 
its governors and top officials that would allow them to be accountable for 
their actions with appropriate penalties for regulatory failures. This is to 
promote transparency and accountability. Good corporate governance is a 
collective effort and if reform is to be made, it should come from the top. 
The masters should prepare to serve. 
9.6.2 Auditors 
As explained earlier in the chapter on Auditors, the limitations of audit as a 
task itself no doubt suggests obscurity and marginal difference as to what is 
expected of an audit and what audit actually produces. It could also be the 
case that auditors might be victims of control fraud, having absolutely no 
knowledge of what goes on behind closed doors; however, this is not the 
case of the auditors of these banks, as the EFCC had actually suspected 
collaboration and conspiracy between these auditors and the CEOs but sadly 
none of these auditors have been indicted. The public was led to believe that 
drastic steps were being taken to bring the culprits to book. However, while 
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this can be said of the CEOs and members of management staff and internal 
audit committees that were involved, very little can be said of the external 
auditors involved in the crisis. What the Regulators and EFCC merely did 
was to invite the auditing firm from time to time for a hearing without any 
further prosecution. It is important to also mention here that there is no 
conclusive evidence that the auditors are guilty, what is being stressed is a 
problem of inadequate regulatory oversight.   
While we are aware that there is no law in Nigeria that allows for personal 
liability of auditors, the disciplinary tribunal of ICAN has the status of a 
federal high court.
899
 As mentioned in the chapter on Auditors, to date, the 
involvements of audit firms in the banking crisis have not been investigated 
by ICAN, neither has it indicted any of its members. Over time, there has 
been a questionable silence on the part of the auditors, despite constant 
demand for questions by the public and media on why the auditors have not 
been questioned. A good recommendation in this regard, would be for 
personal liability of auditors to be enforced. This will serve to provide for 
adequate checks and balances for auditors and in effect help reduce the 
likelihood of auditors and audit committees collaborating with CEOs in the 
perpetration of control fraud. 
It is also recommended that adequate enforcement of the ban on non-audit 
services in Nigeria should be promoted. At the very least, wherever non-
audit services are provided, this should be disclosed in detail, particularly in 
terms of costs in comparison with audit services. This is because the 
provision of non-audit services may give auditors short-term incentives 
which lead them to engage in unethical practices and pave way for control 
frauds. The present CBN Code clearly lists the services to be banned and 
these have been discussed in chapter seven in auditors. If the country is to 
improve corporate governance in banks, every actor should contribute and it 
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is recommended that prohibition of non-audit services should be catered for 
in terms of enforcement and disclosure in a bid to promote auditor 
independence and ultimately ensure effective corporate governance. 
Also the provision of internal control should be strengthened for auditors as 
well. The internal regulation of auditors would mean it is harder to 
perpetrate control frauds. It is important that auditors are constantly 
monitored by their regulating bodies, such as ICAN, and issues of concern 
should be addressed in-house in a bid to ensure adequate checks and 
balances. 
Tenure of auditors as stressed in the present code should also be adequately 
enforced. Regulators should see that auditors are not over re-elected as this 
may impact on their independence. It is not enough to list provisions in the 
code but the zeal to enforce them proves its efficiency. It is important to say 
that if the code fails for instance and another wave of frauds occur, the CBN 
will bring forward another code, supposedly a more rigid one with tougher 
sanctions. This will continue to go on and on and the country will be left in 
a circle where frauds have become endemic. Perhaps, an understanding of 
this is necessary to inform actors of the need to play their part in corporate 
governance regulation. 
9.6.3 CEOs and Board of Directors 
With respect to the CEOs, this chapter has recapped the present regulations 
in place to curb the excesses of CEOs in Nigerian banks. The CEOs are very 
important actors in corporate governance. The essence of this research is to 
uncover the activities of the CEOs during the banking crisis and it is 
therefore important that they are well regulated if control fraud is to be 
reduced in Nigerian banks. Being the persons charged with the day-to-day 
running of the bank, the CEOs are constantly presented with an opportunity 
to commit fraud, whether or not this opportunity or thought can be carried 
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out depends on the regulatory measures in place and their ability to work 
round these measures. 
Firstly, packages which create perverse incentives should be abolished. 
There is no provision in the current codes that gives room for this; however, 
the trend of using monetary rewards to boost share price in itself encourages 
fraud. In Nigeria, CEOs are generally known to be affluent, with many of 
their riches coming from the banks, they are seen as rewards for good 
performance, despite the contrary provisions in the codes. It is problematic 
to continue this ongoing trend of monetary rewards. A good 
recommendation would therefore be for further research on the incentive 
effects of pay leading to fraud in order to boost share price, and for some 
kind of regulation of these pay practices to be introduced (as they have been 
in the EU). 
It is also important to look into board size and composition. Clearly 
Chairman/CEO duality has been abolished after the crisis and it is no longer 
an issue. What should be stressed however is the composition of board of 
directors, particularly, the Non-Executive directors and Independent 
directors. The composition of these groups of people should be from 
adequate qualifications and experience. In this regard, family ties should not 
be the sole criterion. It is important that appropriate background checks 
should be made before their appointment. A clear and coherent definition of 
‘independence’ should be adopted and more numbers of independent non-
executive directors should be encouraged on the board. Furthermore, 
statutory declarations of independence should be required by directors with 
sanctions for non-compliance and false declaration. This is to ensure higher 
standards of checks and balances and also promote independence. Another 
issue that should also be considered, taking into account Nigeria’s specific 
culture, is adequate share of tribe. Without being prejudiced, it is very 
important that at every point in time, Nigeria is adequately represented if 
possible with members of different tribes to ensure transparency and 
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accountability. This is necessary because of the cultural differences in the 
country. It therefore follows that people of the same tribe have a higher 
tendency to cover up for one another at workplaces, whereas the tendency of 
this with people of different tribes is lower. The country should be prepared 
to create a more professional working environment made up of people that 
are determined to make change happen and not an environment filled where 
everybody has an eye on the national cake. Tribal balance is therefore 
recommended in this regard. 
Education of CEOs and board members is also important. Constant training 
and conferences aimed at improvement should be encouraged. In Nigeria, 
this was another lucrative means of fraud, where a large amount of money 
was invested in training and conferences that never happened. Again 
accountability would solve this problem. It is important that the results of 
training and educational programmes are demanded from CEOs and board 
members to the effect that the company is satisfied that they have taken 
place. Merely stating in the annual report a large amount of money spent on 
staff or CEO training is not enough. More evidence should be provided that 
the training actually took place, for example, through certificate of 
attendance. 
9.6.4 Shareholders 
Shareholders rights and responsibilities under Nigerian law cannot be 
overemphasized. The 2007 code for shareholders have explicitly stated the 
duties and functions of shareholders. It was meant to educate shareholders, 
particularly passive and minority shareholders of their rights. 
However, it was not until the financial crisis of 2009 that shareholders 
started exercising these rights, demanding answers from both regulators and 
board of directors. The provision of shareholder associations and 
encouragement of shareholder activism should be further strengthened in 
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Nigeria. Shareholder participation in corporate governance must be 
encouraged if Nigeria is to reduce control fraud in banks. A good 
recommendation is that shareholders be involved in appointment of 
independent directors. This will serve as a means of checks and balances, 
and also help to promote effective corporate governance.  
Furthermore, it is important that shareholders should be better educated and 
encouraged to attend meetings, ask questions and be aware of the financial 
situation of the banks. No doubt the day-to-day running of banks is the job 
of directors; however it is important that shareholders should know the 
banks’ financial situation. This then also poses a problem that they can only 
know what is being told to them, true, but constant checks and balances will 
serve to protect their interest and in the case that they suspect any 
irregularity, this can be flagged up to the appropriate body such as the CBN. 
There is no gainsaying that shareholders are still largely unaware of their 
rights and privileges; some of them who are aware, are even scared to speak 
up. The chapter on shareholders examined the activities of shareholders 
during the financial crisis and how the judiciary was manipulated by the 
CBN to suppress the demands of the shareholders. Shareholder education is 
therefore very important and should be encouraged is shareholders are to be 
involved in promoting effective corporate governance regulation in Nigerian 
banks. 
Adegbite, Amaeshi and Amao consider the extent to which a country’s local 
shareholder activism is a reflection of its political culture.
900
 They describe 
shareholder activism as a corporate governance accountability measure, 
whether at the managerial or board level.
901
  Shareholder activism consists 
of a variety of activities through which shareholders influence the 
management and board. This can be in the form of meetings, letter-writing 
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or associations as the case may be.
902
 Gillian and Starks consider a 
shareholder activist as an investor who, thorough his voice, endeavours to 
change situations of concern, while not necessarily resulting to change in 
the firm’s control.903  
Shareholder activism in Nigeria has been influenced by the political culture 
of the country. Corruption has mainly been a drawback for Nigeria since 
Independence and seems to have eaten deep into spheres of the economy, 
including the corporate sector. That notwithstanding, the misuse of 
shareholder activism by members tends to create a threat to the 
organisation.
904
 The manner by which shareholder associations tend to 
exercise their rights, with activities such as bullying and boycotting of 
AGMs becomes a concern.  
According to Adegbite, Amaeshi and Amao, some members of shareholder 
associations have expressed their concern on the way some of their 
members conduct themselves through negative publicity arising from threats 
and disruptions of meetings.
905
  A good recommendation would therefore be 
to educate shareholders on the relevance of shareholder associations, 
particularly in protecting shareholders by giving them a voice of unity and 
also to work together in the effective management of the company. The role 
of shareholders as investors is paramount and should not be limited to 
simply received dividends and capital gains. 
Another important recommendation is the enlightenment of shareholders on 
the danger of pushing for short-term gains in the company, the result of 
which could lead to CEOs engaging in accounting malpractices and 
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ultimately control fraud. Shareholders should be educated on the need to 
work together for the efficient running of the company and they should not 
be so preoccupied in their financial gains, which may be to the detriment of 
the company. 
9.7 Summary and Conclusion: Contribution to theory, practice and 
policy 
This thesis addressed corporate governance and control fraud in Nigerian 
banks, using the first five distressed banks as a case study.  The thesis 
identified control fraud as an endemic problem peculiar to Nigeria’s 
institutional corruption which contributed to a number of factors that led to 
the banking crisis of 2009. The research examines the CEO as a financial 
super predator who uses regulatory weakness of corporate governance as a 
vehicle for fraud. As the main agent in control fraud, the CEO perpetrates 
fraud in collaboration with other individuals in the corporate web, such as 
board of directors, shareholders and auditors. The use of the theory of 
control fraud to understand the 2009 banking crisis in Nigeria can be said to 
be a peculiar contribution to theory, the first of its kind in Nigeria. The 
research therefore makes theoretical contribution by using the banking crisis 
to analyse and examine corporate governance as a driver of control fraud 
Furthermore, the thesis is relevant to policy on corporate governance 
regulation in Nigerian banks. The thesis stressed the need to improve 
regulatory enforcement if control fraud is to be reduced in Nigerian banks. 
The problem of enforcement was stressed throughout the research to point 
that regulatory reform is required in corporate governance that will take into 
account the problem of institutional corruption in the country and the need 
for each corporate participant to play their role in enforcing corporate 
governance if control fraud is to be reduced in Nigerian banks. It is 
recommended that regulators such as the CBN and SEC, as well as 
corporate actors including shareholders, auditors and board of directors 
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work collectively to promote effective corporate governance in Nigerian 
banks. The recommendation of a ‘team work’ approach is a positive 
contribution to policy and practice for effective corporate governance and 
ultimate reduction of control frauds in Nigerian banks. 
The recommendations suggested in this research can be said to be a bold 
step in the race towards a fraud-free environment for Nigerian banks. The 
research concludes that Nigeria is a country with its own specific culture in 
terms of development and socio- economic advancement. It is therefore 
important that the country strives to attain international best standards of 
corporate governance if it is to promote investments and retain confidence 
to its financial sector. Eradicating or at least reducing control fraud through 
enforcement of corporate governance regulation will certainly go a long 
way in this and it is important that investors are convinced that the country 
is financially stable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 324 
 
Bibliography 
BOOKS 
Abugu, E.O. (2011) Directors’ Duties and frontiers of Corporate 
Governance United Kingdom: Thomson Reuters  
Ajogwu, Fabian, (2007) Corporate Governance in Nigeria: Law and 
Practice Lagos: Centre for Commercial Law and Development 
Alford, D. (2010) “ Nigerian Banking Reform, Recent Actions and Future 
Prospects” University of South Carolina School of Law Coleman Karesh 
Law Library  
Anand, S. (2007). Essentials of Corporate Governance. Hoboken, N.J.: J. 
Wiley & Sons. 
Ayres, I. And Braithwaite, J. (1992), Responsive Regulation: Transcending 
the Deregulation Debate New York: Oxford University Press 
Bagehot, W. (1873). Lombard Street: A Description of Money Market, 1962 
ed. Irwin, Homewood, IL. 
Black, W. K.. (2005) The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One Texas: 
University of Texas Press  
Blair, M. M. (2003). ‘Shareholder value, corporate governance and 
corporate performance: a post-Enron reassessment of the conventional 
Wisdom. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL FLOWS IN A 
GLOBAL ECONOMY, Peter K. Cornelius and Bruce Kogut, eds., Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Bostley R.W.B. and Dover C.B. (1972) Sheldon’s practice and law of 
banking10th Edition, London: Macdonald and Evans 
 325 
 
Brown, C. V. (1996) The Nigerian Banking System Illinois: North-western 
University Press.   
Cahill.M, Chen F, Lambert D ,Pinheiro. J,and Sun. D. (2002) Detecting 
Fraud in the Real World Handbook of Massive Datasets, Kluewer. 
Calavita, K., Pontell, H.N., Tillman, R., (1997). Big Money Crime: Fraud 
and Politics in the Savings and Loans Crisis Berkeley:University of 
California Press 
Cleary, E. J. (1965). The building society movement, 1st edition London: 
Elek books 
Collins, M. (2012). Money and Banking in the UK: A History (Vol. 6). 
Oxford: Routledge. 
Comer, M., J. (1986) Corporate Fraud 2
nd
 edition  Berkshire: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company  
Cousins J. Mitchell,A., Sikka, P., Willmott, H. (1998) ‘Auditors: Holding 
the public to Ransom’ A monograph by the Association for Accountancy 
and Business Affairs, Basildon: Basildon, UK.  
Cyert, R. M., & March, J. G. (1963). A behavioral theory of the firm. New 
Jersey: Englewood Cliffs, NJ 
Flint, D. (1988). Philosophy and Principles of Auditing: An introduction. 
London: Macmillan Education. 
Saleem Sheikh (ed) 1995 Corporate Governance & Corporate Control 
London: Cavendish Publishing. 
Sutherland, E., H. (1949), White Collar Crime. Newyork: Dryden. 
 326 
 
Goodhart, C. (1988). The Evolution of Central Banks. London: MIT Press 
Books 
Goodhart, C.  And d. Schoenmaker (1995a) Institutional Separation 
between Supervisory And Monetary Agencies in the Central Bank and 
Financial Systems ed. C.A.E. Goodhart London: Macmillan 
Goldsmith, R.W. (1955) Financial Structure and Economic Growth in 
Advanced Countries. Capital Formation and Economic Growth, Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press 
Hayes, R., Dassen R., Schilder, A. and Wallage, P. (2005), Principles of 
Auditors: An Introduction to  International Standards on Auditing 
Edinburgh: Pearson Education Limited.  
Messier Jr. N. F. (2003). ‘Auditing and Assurance Services: A systematic 
Approach’ (3rd Ed), New York: McGraw-Hill Company Inc. 
Kiger, J.E. and Scheiner, J.H.  (1994). Auditing 1
st
 Ed., Houston: Houston 
Mifflin Company, USA. 
Krauss, I. I. and A. Maccahan  (1976). Computer Fraud and 
Countermeasures Baltimore: America Fidelity and Guarantee Company. 
Ovuakporie, V (1994)  Bank Frauds; Causes and Prevention: An Empirical 
Analysis, Lagos: ATI Books. 
Richards, D. and Smith, M.J. (2002) Governance and Public Policy in the 
United Kingdom, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Reiman J, (2000) The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison, 6
th
 ed, 
Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
 327 
 
Makanjuola, Y. (2015) Banking Reform in Nigeria: The Aftermath of the 
2009 Banking Crisis Palgrave Macmillian Press. 
Mayer, M. 1990 The Greatest Ever Bank Robbery: The Collapse of the 
Savings and Loans Industry Newyork: Charles Scribner’s Sons. 
Monks, R.A.G, & Minow, N (2001) Corporate governance - 2nd ed. 
Oxford: Blackwell Business. 
Monks, R.A.G. & Minow, N. (1995). Corporate Governance Blackwell: 
Cambridge, MA. 
Pizzo,S., Fricker, M., Muolo, P., 1989 Inside Job: The Collapse of 
America’s Savings and Loans. New York: McGraw Hill. 
Rosoff, S.M., Pontell, H.N., Tillman, R. (2002) Profit Without Honour: 
White-Collar Crime and the Looting of America, 2
nd
 ed. New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River. 
Shaw, E. (1973). Financial Deepening in Economic Development, New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Tandon, B.N.; Suddharsanam, S; and Sundharabahu, S. (2006). A handbook 
of Practical Auditing, (13
th
 Ed) New Delhi: New Delhi; S. Chand 
&Company Ltd. 
Young M. R. (2002) Accounting Irregularities and financial fraud, New 
York: Aspen law and Business, Aspen Publishers Inc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 328 
 
JOURNALS 
 
ABEL, R. L. (1980) ‘Redirecting social studies of law’ Law and Society 
Review, 805. 
ABURIME, T. U., GANNON, G. L. & CORRADO, C.J. (2011) ‘How long 
should Bank CEOs continue? Evidence from Nigeria.’ 1-137  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1970184 accessed 22 
December 2014. 
ACHESON, G. G., Hickson, C. R., & Turner, J. D. (2010). ‘Does limited 
liability matter? Evidence from nineteenth-century British banking.’ 6(2) 
Review of Law & Economics, 247-273 
ADEGBAJU, A. A. and OLOKOYO, F. O. (2008) Recapitalization and 
Banks’ Performance: A Case Study of Nigerian Banks. 6(1) African 
Economic and Business Review, 1-17 
ADEGBITE, E. (2012) ‘Corporate Governance Regulation in Nigeria’ 
112(2) Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in the 
Society 257-76. 
ADEGBITE, E. (2012) ‘Corporate Governance in Nigeria: Towards 
Governmental Engagement’ 7(3) Int. Journal of Business Governance and 
Ethics.209-231  
http://www.nigeriainvestment.com/doing_business/nigeriastockexchange.ht
ml assessed 27 August, 2011. 
ADEGBITE, E., AMAESHI, K. & AMAO, O. (2012) ‘The Politics of 
Shareholder Activism in Nigeria’ 105Journal of Business and Ethics 389-
402. 
 329 
 
ADEYEMI, B. (2011) ‘Bank Failure in Nigeria: A Consequence of Capital 
Inadequacy, Lack of Transparency and Non-Performing Loans?’ 6(1) Banks 
and Bank Systems, 107   
http://businessperspectives.org/journals_free/bbs/2011/BBS_en_2011_01_A
deyemi.pdf accessed 21 November 2013. 
ADEYEMI, S.B. (2004) ‘Ministration of Financial Crime: The Role of 
Accountant’, 1 Student Accountant Journal, 7-13. 
ADEYEMI, S.B. & OLOWOOKERE, J.K. (2012) ’Non-audit services and 
Auditor Independence – Investors perspective in Nigeria’ 2(5) Business and 
Management Review Vol. 89-97  
http://www.businessjournalz.org/articlepdf/BMR_2509july2512h.pdf 
accessed 2nd August, 2013. 
ADEYEMO, K. (2012) ‘Frauds in Nigerian Banks: Nature, Deep Seated 
Causes, Aftermaths and Probable Remedies’ 3(2) Mediterranean Journal of 
Social Sciences 279-289. 
Adeyinka O. F. (2009) ‘Corporate Governance in Nigeria: the Turning 
Points’   https://www.ubagroup.com/upload/docs/corporate-governance-the-
turni_T4XNA_20120901020906uy4pxw8ac7.pdf accessed 3rd July 2014 
ALFORD, D. (2010) ‘Nigerian banking reform: Recent actions and future 
prospects.’ http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1592599 accessed 25 November 
2013.  
AJAYI, M.A. (2011) ‘Determinants of Fraud in the Nigerian Banking 
Industry’ 3(2) Lapai Sociological Law Review 101-109. 
 330 
 
AJOBOLAVE, S.O. (2008) ‘A Survey of the Perception of Ethical 
Behaviour of Future Nigerian Accounting Professionals’, 43(3) The 
Nigerian Accountant, 54-59. 
AKINDELE, R.I. (2011) ‘Fraud as a negative catalyst in the Nigerian 
Banking Industry’ 2(5) Journal of Emerging Trends in Economics and 
Management Sciences 357-383. 
AMAO, O. & AMAESHI, K. (2008) ‘Galvanizing Shareholder Activism; A 
Prerequisite for effective corporate governance and accountability in 
Nigeria.’ 82(1) Journal of Business Ethics 119-130. 
ANICHEBE, A.S. (2010) ‘Auditor Independence in the Global 
Environment’ Journal of Certified National Accountants of Nigeria, A 
Quarterly Journal of National Accountants of Nigeria, July-September, 41-
44.  
http://anan.org.ng/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/journaljanmar2011.pdf 
accessed 25.09.13 
 
BABATUNDE, M.A., & OLANIRAN, O. (2009) ‘The effects of internal 
and external mechanism on governance and performance of corporate firms 
in Nigeria.’ 7(2) Corporate ownership & control, 330-343.  
<http://www.virtusinterpress.org/IMG/pdf/Paper19.pdf> accessed 22 
November 2013. 
 
BAKRE, O.M. (2007) ‘The Unethical Practices of Accountants and 
Auditors and the Compromising Stance of Professional Bodies in the 
Corporate World: Evidence from Corporate Nigeria’ 31(3) Accounting 
Forum, 277-303. 
BAMANGA, M.A. (2010) The current crisis and macroeconomic statistics: 
statistical initiatives and challenges at the Central Bank of Nigeria. 25IFC 
 331 
 
Bulletin, 454 <http://www.bis.org/ifc/publ/ifcb34af.pdf> accessed 6 
December 2013. 
BARROS, C.P. & CAPORALE, G.M. (2012) Banking Consolidation in 
Nigeria, 2000–2010 13(3) Journal of African Business, 244-252. 
BAYSINGER, B.D. & BUTLER, H.N. (1985) ‘Corporate Governance and 
the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board 
Composition’ 1(1) Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 101-124. 
BEATLINE, A. (1992) ‘What is an Audit?’ XXV(1)The Nigerian 
Accountant, .41. 
BEATTIE, V.A., FEARNLEY, S. & BRANDT, R.T. (2001) Behind closed 
doors: what company audit is really about. Palgrave: Basingstoke. 
BECTH, M., FRANKS, J., MAYER, C. & ROSSI, S. (2009) ‘Returns to 
Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a clinical study of the Hermes UK 
Focus Fund.’ 22(8) The Review of Financial Studies 3093-3129. 
BERENBEIM, R. (2004) ‘Corporate Governance: Giving Ethics 
Operational Meaning’ 71(3) Vital Speeches of the Day, 87-89. 
BERMIG, A. & FRICK, B. (2010) ‘Board Size, Board Composition, and 
Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from Germany’  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1623103 accessed 20 October 2014. 
BLACK, W.K. (2005) “Control frauds” as financial super-predators: How 
“pathogens” make financial markets inefficient.’34(6) The Journal of Socio-
Economics, 34(6), 734-755. 
BLACK, W. K. (2010) ‘Epidemics of Control Fraud Lead to Recurrent, 
Intensifying Bubbles and Crises’ Intensifying Bubbles and Crises.   
 332 
 
http://www.franzhoermann.com/downloads/black-control-fraud.pdf 
accessed 27 December 2014 
 
BLACK, W.K., CALAVITA,K., PONTELL, H.N., (1985), The Savings and 
Loans Debacle of the 1980’s: White-collar Crime or risky business? Law 
and Policy 17(1) 23-55 
BLAIR, M. (2003) ‘Shareholder value, corporate governance, and corporate 
performance’. Corporate governance and capital flows in a global 
economy, 53-82. 
BLAIR, M.M. (1994) ‘CEO Pay: Why Such a Contentious 
Issue?’12Brookings Review 23–37. 
BOLTON, R.J. & HAND, D.J. (2002) ‘Statistical Fraud Detection: A 
Review’ 17 Journal of Statistical Science 235-249. 
BONIFACE, C. (1991) ‘Fraud in the Banking Industry’ The Nigerian 
Banker Oct-Dec 22-23, CIBN Press. 
BRATTON, W.W. (2002) 'Enron and the dark side of shareholder value' 76 
Tulane. Law Review 1275. 
CALAVITA, K., PONTELL, H.N.,(1991) ‘Other People’s Money 
Revisited: Collective Embezzlement in the Savings and Loans and 
Insurance Industries’ 38(1) Social Problems 94-112 
CARAPETO, M.., LASFER, M. & MACHERA, K. (2005) ‘Does Duality 
Destroy Value?’ Cass Business School Research Paper.   
http://ssrn.com/abstract=686707  accessed 24
th
 July 2014. 
CHIZEA, B. (1991) ‘Frauds in the Banking Industry’, Journal of Chartered 
Institute of Bankers of Nigeria, Oct-Dec ISSN0189-6679. 
 333 
 
MILLON, D.K. (2002) ‘Why is Corporate Management Obsessed with 
Earnings Management and What Should be Done about It?’70 GEO. Wash. 
L. Rev 890. 897. 
DE ANGELO, L.E. (1981) Auditor independence, low balling, and 
disclosure regulation. 3 Journal of Accounting and Economics 113 – 127. 
EBIMOBOWEI, A. (2011) ‘Non Audit Services and the Impairment of 
Auditors’ Independence: A further Examination’ 8(2) Pakistani Journal of 
Social Sciences 100-107. 
EIJFFINGER, S.C.W. & DE HAAN, J. (1996) ‘The Political Economy of 
Central Bank Independence Special Papers in International Economics (19 
May 1996) 22. 
EISENHARDT, K.M. (1989) ‘Agency Theory, An Assessment and 
Review’Academy of Management Review 1457-74. 
EJIOFOR, C. (1999) ‘Liquidation Banks in Nigeria’, Body and Soul 
Weekend Paper Vol. 1 No. 9. 
ELSAYED, K. (2007) ‘Does CEO Duality Really Affect Corporate 
Performance?’ 15(6) Corporate Governance: An International Review 
1203-1214. 
FAMA, E.F. & JENSEN, M.C. (1983) ‘Separation of ownership and 
control’ 26 Journal of Law and Economics, 301-25. 
FINANCIAL STABILITY DIRECTORATE (2008) ‘Liquidity in the time 
of Financial Turbulences’ 11 Banque de France Financial Stability Review 
1 
 334 
 
FIRTH, M. (2002) ‘Auditor provided consultancy services and their 
association with audit fees and audit opinions’ 29(5)(6) Journal of Business 
Finance and Accounting  661 – 693. 
FLORENCE, D. (2012) “The Politics of Central Banking and Implications 
for Regulatory Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Cases of Kenya, Nigeria 
and Uganda,” http://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/DP_2.2012.pdf 
accessed 19 December 2013. 
FORD, C. & HESS, D. (2011) ‘Corporate Monitorships and new 
Governance Regulation: In theory, In practice and In context’ 33(4) Law 
and Policy, 509-541. 
FRANKS, J. & MAYER, C. (1996) ‘Hostile Takeovers and the Correction 
of Managerial Failure’ 40(1) Journal of Financial Economics, 163–181. 
GATTO, A. (2006) The Law and Governance Debate in the European 
Union: Decent Work Research Programme DP/163/2006,  
http://staging2.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
inst/documents/publication/wcms_193614.pdf  accessed 28
th
 July 2014. 
 
GILLAN, S. L. (2001) ‘Option-Based Compensation: Panacea or Pandora’s 
Box?’ 14 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 115–128.  
GILLIAN, S.L. & STARKS, L.T. (1998) ‘A survey of Shareholder 
Activism: Motivation and empirical evidence.’ 12(3) Journal of Corporate 
Finance 275-305. 
GOODHART, C. (2008) ‘Liquidity risk management.’ 11 Banque de 
France Financial Stability Review 39-44. 
GOODHART, C. A. (2002) ‘The organizational structure of banking 
supervision.’ 31(1) Economic Notes, 1-32. 
 335 
 
GOODHART, C. A. E. (1987) ‘Why Do Banks Need a Central Bank?’ 39 
Oxford Economic Papers 75-89.  
GOODHART, C. & SCHOENMAKER, D. (1995) ‘Should the functions of 
Monetary policy and Banking supervision be separated?’ 40 Oxford 
Economic Papers, 539-60. 
GORTON, G. (1985) ‘Clearing houses and the Origins of Central Banking 
in the U.S.’ 45 Journal of Economic History, 277-84. 
GORTON, G. & MULLINEAUX, D.J. (1987) ‘Joint Production of 
Confidence: Endogenous Regulation and 19th Century Commercial Bank 
Clearinghouses.’ 19(4) Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 457-68.  
GRABOSKY, P.N. (1995b) ‘Using Non-Governmental Resources to Foster 
Regulatory Compliance, Governance’ 8(4) An International Journal of 
Policy and Administration 527-550. 
GREENFIELD, W.M. (2004) ‘Attention to People and Principles is key to 
Corporate Governance and Ethics’ 30(4) Employment Relations Today 6-10. 
HALDANE, A. G. (2012). Control rights (and wrongs). 32(2) Economic 
Affairs, 47-58.  
HEYNES, S. (2010) ‘Fighting Fraud in Nigeria- What Progress has been 
made’ 29 KPMG Forensic Fighting Fraud, 16-17. 
HENDRY, J., SANDERSON, P., BARKER, R. & ROBERTS, J. (2007) 
‘Responsible Ownership, Shareholder value and the new Shareholder 
activism.’ 11(3) Competition and Change, 223-240. 
HOLDERNESS, C. G. & SHEEHAN, D. P. (1988) ‘The role of majority 
shareholders in publicly held corporations: An exploratory analysis.’ 20 
Journal of financial economics, 317-346. 
 336 
 
HUSSEY, R. (1999) ‘The Familiarity Threat and Auditor Independence.’ 
7(2) Corporate Governance, 190-197. 
IDOLOR, E. J. (2010) ‘Bank Fraud in Nigeria: Underlying Causes, Effects 
and Possible Remedies’ 6(6) African Journal of Accounting, Economics, 
Finance and Banking Research, 62 -80. 
IDOWU, A. (2009) ‘An assessment of Fraud and its management in Nigeria 
Commercial Banks’ 10(4) European Journal of International Sciences 628-
640. 
IYANIWURA, W., IYANIWURA, S. (2014) ‘The Nature of Shareholding 
in Nigeria: Evidence from the Banking Crisis.’ 14(5) Global Journal of 
Management And Business Research, North America  
http://journalofbusiness.org/index.php/GJMBR/article/view/1345 
accessed: 10th January 2015. 
IWU-EGWUONWU, R., C. (2011) ‘Behavioural Governance and Corporate 
Governance quality’ 3(1) Journal of Economics and International finance, 
1-12. 
JÁCOME, L. I. (2008) Central bank involvement in banking crises in Latin 
America. IMF Working Papers, 1-49. 
JENKINS, J.G. & KRAWCZYK, K. (2002) ‘The Relationship between 
Non-Audit Services, and Perceived Auditor Independence.’ Fall/Winter 
Journal of Business and Economic Perspectives, 25-36.  
http://www.acis.pamplin.vt.edu/faculty/jenkins/Vita.pdf accessed 02.08.13 
 
JENSEN, M. & MECKLING, W. (1976) ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’ Journal of Financial 
Economics, 3, 305-360. 
 337 
 
JOHN, K. & SENBET, L. W. (1998) ‘Corporate governance and board 
effectiveness.’  22(4) Journal of Banking & Finance, 371-403. 
KEASEY, K. & WRIGHT, M. (1993) ‘Issues in Corporate Accountability 
and Governance, an Editorial’ 23 Accounting and Business Research 291-
303. 
KINNEY, W.R., PALMROSE, Z. & SCHOLZ, S. (2004) ‘Auditor 
independence, non-audit service and restatements: Was the US government 
right?’ 42 Journal of Accounting Research, 561 – 588. 
KNAPP, M. (1985) ‘Audit Conflict: An Empirical Study of the Perceived 
Ability of Auditors to Resist Management Pressure.’ 60(2) The Accounting 
Review, 202-211. 
LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, F., SHLEIFER, A. & VISHNY, R. 
(1998) ‘Law and Finance’ 106(6) Journal of Political Economy, No.6 1113-
55. 
LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, F., SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. 
(1999) ‘The Quality of Government’ 15(1) Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization, 222-279. 
LENNOX, C.S. (1999) ‘Non-Audit Fees, Disclosure and Audit Quality.’ 
8(2) European Accounting Review 239-252. 
LETZA, S. KIRKBRIDGE, J., SUN, X. & SMALLMAN. C. (2008) 
‘Corporate Governance Theorizing; Limits, Critics and Alternatives.’ 50(1) 
International Journal of Law and Management, 17-32. 
MACK, N., WOODSONG, C., MACQUEEN, M., K., GUEST, G., & 
NAMEY, E. (2005) ‘Qualitative Research Methods: A data collector’s field 
guide’ 
http://www.fhi360.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/Qualitative%20R
 338 
 
esearch%20Methods%20-
%20A%20Data%20Collector%27s%20Field%20Guide.pdf  accessed 22
nd
 
January 2011. 
MAMMAN, H. & OLUYEMI, S.A. (1994) ‘Banks Management Issue and 
Restoring the Health of Nigerian Banks through Improving the Quality of 
Management/Employees’ 4(4) N.D.I.C. Quarterly 57. 
MASCIANDARO, D. (2006) ‘E Pluribus Unum? Authorities Design in 
Financial Supervision: Trends and Determinants’ 17(1) Open Economies 
Review,73-102. 
MEHRAN, H., MORRISON, A., & SHAPIRO, J. (2011) ‘Corporate 
Governance and Banks: What have we learned from the Financial Crisis? 
502 Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports 3  
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr502.pdf accessed 12 
December 2013. 
MUSTAPHA, M, (2010) ‘Corruption in Nigeria: Conceptual and empirical 
notes.’ 3(2)  Information, society and justice journal 165-175. 
NWABUGO, N.E. (2011) The Story of Structural Adjustment Programme 
in Nigeria; From The Perspective of The Organised Labour 11(7) Australian 
Journal of Business and Management Research. 30 
O’DONOVAN, G. (2003) Change Management-A Board Culture of 
Corporate Governance. Corporate Governance International, 6(3), 28-37. 
Oghojafor, B, George O, Owoyemi, O. (2012), Corporate Governance and 
National Culture are Siamese Twins: The Case of Cadbury (Nigeria) Plc. 
3(15) International Journal of Business and Social Science, 270 
 339 
 
OKIKE, E. N. (2007). ‘Corporate governance in Nigeria: The status quo.’ 
15(2) Corporate Governance: An International Review 173-193. 
ONOJA, I.R. (1998) ‘The Contributions of Research Development in the 
Banking Industry in Nigeria’ Nigerian Journal of Management Research, 
210.   
OSEMEKE, L. & ADEGBITE, E. (2014) ‘Regulatory Multiplicity and 
Conflict: Towards a Combined Code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria.’ 
Journal of Business and Ethics 1-21. 
OTUSANYA, J. & LAUWO, S. (2010) ‘The Role of Auditors in Nigerian 
Banking Crisis.’ 9 Accountancy Business and the Public Interest, 9, 159-
204. 
OTUSANYA, O. J., LAUWO, S. & AJIBOLADE, S. O. (2013) ‘An 
investigation of corporate executive fraud by CEOs in the Nigerian banking 
sector’ 2(1) African Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 65-89. 
OWOLABI, S.A. (2010) ‘Fraud and Fraudulent Practices in the Nigerian 
Banking Industry’ 4(3)(b) African Research Review 240-256. 
OSLON, S. K. & WOOTTON, C. W. (1991) ‘Substance and Semantics in 
the Auditor’s Standard Report ‘, 18(2) The Accounting Historian’s Journal 
85-111. 
O’SULLIVAN, M. (2003) ‘The Political Economy of Comparative 
Corporate Governance’ 10(1) Review of International Political Economy, 
23-72. 
PASSAS N. (2005). ‘Lawful but awful: ‘Legal corporate crimes’. 34(6) The 
Journal of Socio-economics, 771-786. 
 340 
 
PASSAS N, (1993) ‘Structural Sources of International Crime: Policy 
Lessons from the BCCI Affair ‘20 Crim.e Law and Social Change, 293-309 
PASTOR, L. & STAMBAUGH, R. F. (2001) ‘Liquidity Risk and Expected 
Stock Returns’ National Bureau of Economic Research 1  
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.407.8237&rep=re
p1&type=pdf accessed 21 January 2015. 
PELLEGRINA, L.D., MASCIANDARO, D. & PANSINI, R.V. (2013) ‘The 
central banker as prudential supervisor: Does independence matter?’ 9(3) 
Journal of Financial Stability,415. 
PETER, Z., JERRY, M., & DANJUMA, I. (2012) ‘Assessment of the 
Adequacy of External Auditing in Disclosing Fraud in Nigerian Commercial 
Banks’ 3(6) Research Journal of Finance and Accounting, 149-156. 
http://www.iiste.org/Journals/index.php/RJFA/article/view/2410 
PONTELL H.N., (2005) ‘Control Fraud, Gambling for Resurrection and 
Moral Hazard: Accounting for White Collar Crime in the Savings and Loan 
Crisis’. 34 The Journal of Socio-Economics 756-770 
POST, J.E., PRESTON, L.E. & SACHS, S. (2002) ‘Managing the Extended 
Enterprise: The New Stakeholder View’ 45(1) California Management 
Review 6-28. 
PRENTICE, R.A. (2000) ‘The Case of The irrational Accountant: A 
behavioural Insight into Securities Fraud Litigation’ 95(1) North-western 
University Law Review 133. 
PRINGLE, L.M. & BUSHMAN, T.A. (1996) ‘An Examination of 
Independence in Fact when Auditors Perform NonAudit Services for Audit 
Clients.’ 6(1) Accounting Enquiries, 91-120. 
 341 
 
PROIMOS, A. (2005) ‘Strengthening corporate governance regulations, 
6(4) Journal of Investment Compliance 75 – 84. 
QUINTYN, M. & TAYLOR, M.W. (2003) ‘Regulatory and supervisory 
independence and financial stability’ 49(2) CESifo Economic Studies, 259-
294.  
ROTCHSCHILD, M. & STIGLITZ, J.E. (1976) ‘Equilibrium in 
Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect 
Information.’ 90(4) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 629-649. 
SALEHI, M. & ZHILA, A. (2008) ‘Fraud Detection and Audit Expectation 
Gap: Empirical evidence from Iranian Banks’ 3 (10) International Journal 
of Business and Management, 65-67. 
SARKAR, J. & SARKAR, S. (2000) ‘Large shareholder activism in 
corporate governance in developing countries, Evidence from India.’ 1(3) 
International Review of Finance, 161-194. 
SHOCKLEY, R. (1981) ‘Perceptions of Auditors’ Independence: An 
Empirical Analysis.’ 56(4) The Accounting Review, 785-800. 
SURENDA, A, (2006) ‘Striking a Balance between Rules-based and 
Principles based Approaches for Effective Governance: A Risk based 
Approach’ 68 Journal of Business Ethics 53-82 at p. 54. 
SUTHERLAND, E. H, 1940 ‘White Collar Crime’ 5(1) American 
Sociological Review 1-12  (being a paper presented at the thirty-fourth 
Annual Presidential address in Philadelphia on Dec. 27, 1939 (Fifty second 
annual address by President Viner) 
SUTHERLAND, E., H., (1944) ‘Is White Collar Crime, Crime?’ 10 (2) 
American Sociological Review 39-132. 
 342 
 
TREVINO, L AND M. BROWN (2004) ‘Managing to be Ethical: 
Debunking five business Ethics Myths’ 18(2) Academy of Management 
Executives 69-81. 
UCHE, C. U. (1999) ‘Foreign Banks, Africans and Credit in Colonial 
Nigeria 1890-1912’52(4) The Economic History Review New Series, 669-
691.   
WHEELER, S., ROTHMAN, M.L., 1982 ‘The Organisation as weapon in 
White Collar Crime’. 80(7) Michigan Law Review 1403-1426 
YAKASAI, A. (2001) ‘Corporate Governance in Third World Countries 
With Particular Reference to Nigeria’ 9(3) Corporate Governance, An 
International Review 239-250. 
YE, P., CARSON, E. & SIMNETT, R. (2006) ‘Threats to auditor 
independence: The impact of non-audit services, tenure and alumni 
affiliation.’ American Accounting Association, 10-12  
http://aaahq.org/audit/midyear/07midyear/papers/Ye_ThsreatsToAuditorInd
ependence.pdf accessed 2nd August, 2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 343 
 
Papers 
Andrew Haldane ‘Unfair Shares’ Remarks Given by Andrew G. Haldane, 
Financial Stability and Member of the Financial Policy Committee (21 May 
2014) 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2014/sp
eech732.pdf  accessed 28
th
 July 2014 
ACCA ‘Corporate Governance: External and Internal Actors.’  
http://www.accaglobal.com/uk/en/student/acca-qual-student-journey/qual-
resource/acca-qualification/p1/technical-articles/corporate-governance.html 
accessed 29 December 2013 
Bernanke, B.S. (2007) ‘Central Banking and Banking Supervision in the 
US’ Speech delivered at Allied Social Sciences Association Meeting, 
Chicago. 
Berger, A. N. (2000). The Integration of the Financial Services Industry: 
Where Are the Efficiencies? FEDS Paper, No. 2000: 36. 
Black, W. K. (2005) ‘When fragile becomes friable: Endemic control fraud 
as a cause of economic stagnation and collapse.’ In IDEAS Workshop: 
Delhi, India, Financial Crime and Fragility under Financial Globalization, 
December 19-20. 
CBN Public Statement on the Recapitalisation of eight Nigerian Banks p.15 
and 16 available at   
http://www.cenbank.org/out/2011/pressrelease/gvd/press%20statement%20-
%20gov.pdf accessed 13 November 2013. 
CBN National Inclusion Financial Strategy, Abuja (20 January 2012) 8 
http://www.cenbank.org/Out/2012/publications/reports/dfd/CBN-
 344 
 
Summary%20Report%20of-Financial%20Inclusion%20in%20Nigeria-
final.pdf accessed 21 January 2015 
Charles Chukwuma Soludo, ‘Consolidating the Nigerian banking industry to 
meet the development challenges of the 21st century’ (Special Meeting of 
the Bankers’ Committee, Abuja, 6 July 2004)  
http://www.bis.org/review/r040727g.pdf accessed 20 December 2012 
Davis, E.P., Obasi U. (2007) ‘The Effectiveness of Banking Supervision’ 
Brunel University Economic and Finance Working Paper Series, Working 
Paper 09-27  
De Nicolo, Gianni, et al. (2003). Bank Consolidation, Internationalization 
and Conglomeration: Trends and Implications for Financial Risk. IMF 
Working Paper, 3(158) 
Diana B. Henriques & Kurt EichenwaId, A Fog Over Enron, and the Legal 
Landscape, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2002. Available at   
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/27/business/a-fog-over-enron-and-the-
legal-landscape.html Last accessed 14th September 2015 
Ejiofor, C ‘Liquidation Banks in Nigeria.’ Body and Soul Weekend Paper 
Vol. 1 No. 9 (31st October 1999)  
European Central Bank, ‘The role of Central Bank in Prudential 
Supervision’ (2001)  
www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/prudentialsupcbrole_en.pdf accessed 10 January 
2015. 
Lemo, T. Regulatory Oversight and Stakeholder Protection. A Paper 
Presented at the BGL Mergers and Acquisitions Interactive Seminar, held at 
Eko Hotels & Suites. V. I., on June 24 2005. 
 345 
 
Leslie Wayne, ‘Enron, Preaching Deregulation’ Worked the Statehouse 
Circuit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2002,  
Local Authority Pension Fund Forum (LAPFF) on: ‘Consultation on audit 
firms providing non- audit services to listed companies that they audit.’ APB 
Discussion Paper, Response by the Local Pension Fund Forum, January 
2010. https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/APB/Consultation-on-
audit-firms-providing-non-audit-se/Responses-to-Consultation-on-audit-
firms-providing/Local-Authority-Pension-Fund-Forum.aspx  accessed 7
th
 
July 2014. 
Llewellyn, D.T (2006) ‘Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation and 
Supervision: The Basic Issues’ Paper presented at World Bank Seminar – 
Aligning Supervisory Structures with Country Needs   
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTOPCONF6/Resources/2057292-
1162909660809/F2FlemmingLlewellyn.pdf accessed 20 January 2015 
Okeahalam C., C., Akinboade O., A. (2003) ‘A review of Corporate 
Governance in Africa: Literature, Issues and Challenges’ A paper presented 
for the Global Corporate Governance (15 June, 2003)  
Passas, N. Transnational Crime, The interface between legal and illegal 
actors: Presented in the National Research Council Workshop on 
Transnational Organised Crime, Washington DC, Passas, N. (ed) 1999a 
Transnational Crime, Dartmouth, Aldershot,  
 
Pratap Chatterjee, Enron: Pulling the Plug on the Global Power Broker, 
CORPWATCH. Available at  
http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=1016  
Last accessed 12
th
 September 2015 
 
 346 
 
 SEC Examines Ties Between Banks and Enron, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 
2002 
 
Sanusi Lamido Sanusi ‘Address by the Governor of the Central Bank of 
Nigeria, Mallam Sanusi Lamido Sanusi on Developments on the Banking 
Sector in Nigeria  (Abuja 14 August 2009)  
http://www.cenbank.org/Out/speeches/2009/Govadd-14-8-09.pdf  accessed 
12.10.11 
 
Sanusi Lamido Sanusi ‘The Nigerian Banking Industry: What went wrong 
and the way forward (Convocation Lecture, Bayero University, Kano, 26 
February 2010) 5-11.  
http://www.cenbank.org/OUT/SPEECHES/2010/THE%20NIGERIAN%20
BANKING%20INDUSTRY%20WHAT%20WENT%20WRONG%20AND
%20THE%20WAY%20FORWARD_FINAL_260210.PDF accessed 22 
October 2012 
Sanusi Lamido explodes: How vested interests are killing Nigeria.  
http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/153212-sanusi-lamido-explodes-
how-vested-interests-are-killing-nigeria.html accessed 22 December 2014 
Sanusi L. Sanusi, ‘Global Financial Crisis Impact in Nigeria, Nigerian 
Financial Reforms and the Roles of Multilateral Development Banks and 
IMF’  Submission to the House Financial Services Committee of the US 
Congress Hearing on the Global Financial Crisis, 2010,   
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/file/hearings/111/sanusi111610.pdf  
accessed 12 January 2014. 
 
What is Earnings Management?’   
http://www.swlearning.com/pdfs/chapter/0324223250_1.PDF  
accessed 20 November 2014 
 347 
 
 
Yauri, N.M. (2012) ‘Bank Recapitalisation in Nigeria: Resuscitating 
Liquidity or Forestalling Distress?’ 3(10) International journal of Business 
and Social Science, 230   
http://www.ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol_3_No_10_Special_Issue_May_2012/
31.pdf accessed 22 November 2014.   
 
Newspaper Articles and Publications 
BBC News ‘Former Nigerian Bank CEO, Cecilia Ibru, jailed for Fraud’ BBC 
News (9 October 2010) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11506421  
accessed 28.10.12 
 
BBC News: ‘Africa Former Governor, James Ibori jailed for 13 years’ (17 
April 2012) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17739388 accessed 
27th January 2015 
 
Central Bank Advertorial:   
http://www.cenbank.org/Out/publications/pressRelease/GOV/2009/ADVER
TORIAL2.pdf accessed 15 October 2013 
 
CBN List of Debtors  http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/10/cbn-releases-
fresh-list-of-bank-debtors/#sthash.NMrZTvFW.dpuf accessed 20 October 
2013 
 
CBN is frustrating our case- Afribank Shareholders:   
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/12/cbn-frustrating-our-case-afribank-
shareholders accessed 17th October 2013 
 
 348 
 
‘Former MD of Oceanic Bank, Cecilia Ibru, Convicted of Bank Fraud’ 
Sahara Reporters, 8 October 2010 http://saharareporters.com/news-
page/former-md-oceanic-bank-cecilia-ibru-convicted-bank-fraud accessed 1 
December 2013. 
 
Getting Banks to Lend Again’ BGL Banking Report, 2010, 15-16   
http://www.bglgroupng.com/docs/banking_report.pdf accessed 12 January 
2014. 
 
Ibori’s Oando Deal: The Untold Story!’ The Street Journal, 23 September 
2013 http://thestreetjournal.org/2013/09/iboris-oando-deal-the-untold-story/ 
accessed 23 November 2013.  
 
Nationalised Banks; Shareholders to sue CBN, NDIC, AMCON’ Business 
and Finance (10 August, 2011  
http://www.thenigerianvoice.com/nvnews/57904/1/nationalised-banks-
shareholders-to-sue-cbn-ndic-am.html. accessed 18 October 2013 
 
Nationalised banks: 32b naira worth of shares lost by Nigerian shareholders. 
http://www.africanmanager.com/site_eng/detail_article.php?art_id=17147  
accessed 11 November 2012 
Nationalised Banks: Shareholders to Sue CBN, NDIC, AMCON   
http://www.thenigerianvoice.com/nvnews/57904/1/nationalised-banks-
shareholders-to-sue-cbn-ndic-am.html  
‘Rescued Banks: EFCC Seizes Ibru’s 103 Properties’   
http://www.proshareng.com/news/8814 accessed 23 November 2013 
 
Schiesel, S. (2002) ‘Trying to Catch WorldCom Mirage’ New York Times 
(June 30, 2002). 
 
 349 
 
Securities and Exchange Commission: ‘Know your Rights as a Shareholder’ 
Investor Education Series   
http://www.fsrcc.gov.ng/files/INVESTOR%20PROTECTIONKNOW%20Y
OUR%20RIGHT.pdf accessed 30
th
 November 2013. 
 
SEC Releases Final Decision:  
http://www.proshareng.com/article/1495.html accessed 22nd September, 
2013. 
Shareholders appeal Afribank’s liduidation    
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/07/shareholders-appeal-afribanks-
liquidation/ accessed 15 October 2013 
The Economist, ‘Marc Rich, King of Commodities, died on June 26th, aged 
78 (London 6 July 2013)  
http://www.economist.com/news/obituary/21580438-marc-rich-king-
commodities-died-june-26th-aged-78-marc-rich accessed 26 January 2015 
 
ThisDay ‘Justice Ministry, EFCC Flouts Courts Order on Cecilia Ibru’s 
Assets ThisDay (26 March 2013  
http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/justice-ministry-efcc-flout-court-order-
on-cecilia-ibrus-assets/143200/ accessed 29 June 2013 
 
‘UK High Court Orders Rogue Banker, Erastus Akingbola, to Surrender £68 
Million Loot to Intercontinental Bank’ Sahara Reporters, 4 April 2011 
http://saharareporters.com/news-page/uk-high-court-orders-rogue-banker-
erastus-akingbola-surrender-%C2%A368-million-loot-intercontin accessed 
6 December 2013. 
 
‘UK DFID Implicated in Widespread Corruption in Nigeria-Part 4’ Special 
Reports, 10 April, 2013 
 http://elombah.com/index.php/special-reports/15408-uk-dfid-implicated-in-
widespread-corruption-in-nigeria-part-4  
 350 
 
accessed December 2013 
 
Vanguard news, 16
 
July 2012  
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/07/shareholders-appeal-afribanks-
liquidation/ last accessed 19.10.13 
 
Other Websites 
Afribank:  
http://grandioseparlor.com/2006/10/nigerian-super-banker-whistles-fraud-
cover-up-at-afribank/  
Assets Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON)   
http://www.amcon.com.ng/about_us.aspx 
AWD:  
http://www.nairaland.com/126888/cadbury-plc-akintola-william-union  
accessed 22 January 2015 
Business Directory: http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/tier-2-
capital.html accessed 30June 2013 
CBN: http://www.cenbank.org/museum/Governors.htm 
Forbes:http://www.forbes.com/global2000/#p_144_s_acompanyRankOveral
l_All_All_All accessed 6
th
 August, 2011 
Forbes: http://www.forbes.com/profile/aliko-dangote/ accessed 6 August 
2013 
IFAC:http://www.ifac.org/auditing-assurance/auditor-reporting-iaasbs-1-
priority accessed 3rd August 2013 
OECD: 
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.
pdf accessed 22nd September 2014 accessed 30th June 2013 
NDIC: http://ndic.org.ng/about-ndic.html accessed 30th June 2013 
NDIC: http://www.ndic.org.ng/frequently-asked-questions.html accessed 
30th June 2013 
Serious Fraud Office: http://www.sfo.gov.uk/ accessed 26 December 2014 
 351 
 
The Nigerian Stock Exchange   
http://www.nigerianstockexchange.com/quoted_companies.jsp  
accessed 6th August, 2011 
The National White Collar Crime Centre, 1996 p.330. Available at 
http://www.nw3c.org/ Last accessed 6
th
 October 2014 
Transparency International: http://www.transparency.org/ accessed 21
 
June 
2012 
http://www.niauditoffice.gov.uk/index/aboutniao/value_for_money_audit.ht
mValue_for_Money_Central_Government accessed 02.09.13 
http://www.Mbendi.com.energysector.html accessed 6
th
 August, 2013 
http://www.advfn.com/StockExchanges/about/JSE/JohannesburgStockExch
ange.html assessed 27th August, 2011 
http://www.brunel.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/82118/0927.pdf 
accessed 22 January 2015  
 
